The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has signed contracts with the giants of the American military-industrial complex (MIC) Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to test a new American “superweapon” - a project called CODE (Collaborative Operations in Denied Environment). in restricted areas). The concept of CODE is this - a “swarm” of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which actively exchange information with each other, as well as with a single command post, “breaks through” into the so-called anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) zones, and suppresses priority targets such as electronic warfare (EW) systems and anti-aircraft missile systems. This is demonstrated on video with computer models.

Anti-access/area-denial zones of Russia and China are one of the main “headaches” of the USA

As for the concept A2/AD, it is often used in the West, and denotes the territory in which the penetration of enemy forces is countered and, at the same time, the effectiveness of the use of weapons by the troops that have broken through (if any) is limited. A good example of such a zone is the Russian Khmeimim base in Syria, which is simultaneously covered by S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and gun systems and the latest Krasukha-4 electronic warfare systems. . This combination makes it possible to create a zone with a radius of 200 km (the S-400 missile, which allows you to shoot down targets at distances of up to 400 km, has not yet been adopted for service), in which enemy aircraft are practically powerless. In recent years, the US military, as well as their NATO colleagues, have constantly said that China, and especially Russia, have learned to create very powerful A2/AD zones, considering this fact one of the main military challenges available.

Thus, the creation of weapons and concepts that make it possible to break through the defenses of these “forbidden” zones without losing, for example, a large part of an aircraft carrier’s air wing, is one of the Americans’ priorities.

“Swarm” of drones - a new implementation of the ideas of the 1970−1980s

Within CODE, a whole group of drones, each of which can have a different purpose (reconnaissance, strike, kamikaze, etc.), must be controlled by just one person from a command post. The developers want to achieve this by increasing the autonomy of the drones in the “swarm” - they must themselves detect and recognize enemy targets, as well as differentiate them by priority, immediately sending this information to the rest of the UAVs in the group and to the command post. Next, targets must be attacked in the optimal way - after processing the information received.

The very ideas of recognizing enemies based on available information about them in the carrier’s memory and automatically determining the priority of targets were implemented in the Soviet P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles, the development of which began in 1969. The missile was put into service in 1983. The maximum target engagement range for this anti-ship missile is 600 km. At the same time, if “Granites” are fired in salvos, for example, at an aircraft carrier strike group, missiles flying at supersonic speed use their radars to detect enemy ships, compare the information received with that available in their database, determining the types of ships, and exchange the received information. information, determine the highest priority goals and optimally distribute them among themselves. Another Russian heavy anti-ship missile, the P-1000 Vulcan, operates in exactly the same way.

Thus, the application of elements of artificial intelligence in the field of weapons is not a new concept. However, enormous progress in the field of microelectronics, combined with the advent of high-definition digital video cameras, makes it possible to reach new heights in this field. If previously tasks such as those presented in the CODE project were technically impossible, now they are already feasible.

CODE is not fully protected from electronic warfare

There are a number of serious questions about the CODE project, in the form in which it was presented by DARPA. If we are talking about breaking through the A2/AD zones, then their most important element, as we have already said, is electronic warfare systems. Modern electronic warfare systems are capable of fighting UAVs by disrupting, through interference, radio communication channels through which control is carried out from the command post; at the same time, signals from navigation satellites can be suppressed (or, more interestingly, replaced with false GPS data).

In the case of a “swarm” of drones, communication channels are available both between the UAVs themselves and with the command post. Even taking into account the increased autonomy of these drones, the big question is how they will be able to conduct effective combat operations in conditions of active use of electronic warfare. Moreover, at the same time, air defense systems and short-range air defense systems will operate on the UAV.

Another, even more serious problem for the use of CODE will be weapons that generate a powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Strong disturbances in the electromagnetic field completely “jam” communications and also destroy unshielded electronic components. The same effect is one of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. According to available information, several types of EMP weapons are being developed in Russia.

As a result, as we see, it will again not be possible to create a “panacea” for all ills - CODE is perfect for a war with most countries in the world, but not with the leading players in the world of weapons, such as Russia, which already have, or in In the future, they will create modern electronic warfare systems, and even more so EMP weapons.

In one of his speeches dedicated to the formation of US strategic doctrine in January 2012, President Obama stated that American interests in the field of economics and national security are closely related to various processes that occur in the space between the Western Pacific Ocean, South Asia and the Indian Ocean . He noted that the United States will pay close attention to this part of the planet and, as a result, will change the intended tactics of using American troops and their allies in the event of an armed conflict in the region.

The need for such changes in East Asia has been described in academic literature, which has questioned the ability of the United States to protect and defend its interests in this part of the world. For several years, some experts have argued that China, by deploying anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons of vital interest to the Americans and their allies, has changed the strategic balance in the western region Pacific Ocean to your advantage. According to other analysts, due to progress in the field of weapons, regional powers can significantly threaten American dominance (including at the global level).

Collage by Andrey Sedykh

As a result, the US Army is currently introducing various new concepts that will ensure a stable military-strategic balance in the field of conventional armed forces. One of them is Air Sea Battle, which unites the efforts of the US Navy and Air Force to protect American bases in the region from the threat of missile attacks, change the balance in the field of offensive weapons, improve the stability of underwater operations, and eliminate vulnerabilities of various types of satellite systems command and control, reconnaissance and surveillance, improving the interaction of various branches and types of troops, improving the capabilities of electronic reconnaissance and cyber operations. The main method of its implementation will be the integration of ground forces, navy, air force, space technology, cyber warfare units to deter and, if necessary, destroy the forces of the alleged enemy using advanced weapons to deny access and block a certain area (A2/AD).

Although such ground-based weapons play a significant role in the A2/AD strategy, their role in the Air Sea Battle concept is currently not fully explored. At the same time, they could significantly and at relatively low cost increase the capabilities of the American armed forces in this region. One approach would be to develop similar low-cost weapons to significantly increase China's military spending and, if deterrence fails and the conflict escalates into the open, to reduce the damage China could inflict on Asian states.

The effectiveness of the use of anti-ship missiles in the Asia-Pacific region

In connection with the above-mentioned changes in the strategies of the United States and China, the use of ground-based anti-ship missiles (ASMs) is an urgent issue. If American troops located in the region are given the opportunity to potentially use them, they can be used in a wide range of combat missions: from protecting the interests of US allies and partners in the region to creating a naval blockade of a potential aggressor in the event of hostilities.

Currently, there are about 45 types of missiles in the region, which are in service with the armies of the People's Republic of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Brunei. The performance characteristics of the most common of them and those planned for adoption are shown in the table.

RAND analysts assessed the effectiveness of the use of anti-ship missiles based on their technical capabilities and the impact of the American strategy of blocking access to the PLA Navy in the event that they choose to conduct active combat operations against US allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) . The main approach of analysts was the position that the maximum containment of the PLA Navy in the territorial waters of the People's Republic of China (that is, ground-based anti-ship missiles should be located on the first ridge of islands blocking China's further access to the Pacific Ocean) will have a decisive influence on their conduct of military operations in the region. They recognized that a ground-based anti-ship missile approach to deterrence of the PLA Navy alone was ineffective, and therefore analyzed the role that this type of weapon could play in a comprehensive deterrence strategy.

According to the RAND Corporation, the use of ground-based anti-ship missiles will significantly complicate the actions of the PLA Army and Navy in the event of an open conflict with US allies and partners. These weapons are highly mobile (except when used stationary) and are relatively easy to use. As a result, the PLA Navy will have to use a much larger amount of military resources to detect and intercept ground-based anti-ship missiles. In addition, anti-ship missiles will provide significant assistance if the United States and its allies decide to establish a long-range naval blockade of the PRC.

RAND specialists conducted a comprehensive analysis of the role of the above-mentioned type of weapons in China’s military containment strategy. It is believed that in the course of equipping the US contingent, which can be deployed in allied and partner countries in East Asia, with ground-based anti-ship missiles, relatively little material resources will be spent. For their normal functioning, in addition to American military personnel, the participation of the armies of those countries on whose territory these anti-ship missiles will be located will be required. It will also become necessary to have access to those systems of these states that will ensure target identification, missile control based on the information received, and the functioning of anti-ship missile batteries.

It is assumed that the above-mentioned complexes based on American and local elements will protect all straits to which China may have access. In addition to land-based anti-ship missiles, in the event of a naval blockade of the PRC, it will have to use means of intercepting and inspecting merchant ships, such as helicopter aircraft or coastal guard vessels of regional states. In the event that during the discussion of strategy the choice falls on the use of local, rather than American, ground-based anti-aircraft missile systems, they will have to be integrated within the framework of a single control system.

In the course of analyzing the likelihood of introducing a blockade of the PRC, experts carefully studied the possibility of covering ground-based anti-ship missiles for each of the straits through which the PLA Navy could break into the Pacific Ocean in the event of hostilities.

Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits

The relatively narrow Strait of Malacca is of strategic importance. Nearby Indonesia and Malaysia have significant arsenals of ground-based anti-ship missiles that can effectively intercept targets along the entire 730-kilometer length of the strait. Although anti-ship missile batteries can be destroyed, the guaranteed destruction of these weapons without the participation of PLA ground forces will be very difficult due to the small size of anti-ship missile launchers (PU). Land-based anti-ship missiles that have a longer range, such as Indonesia's C-802 ASM (an adapted version of the Chinese YF-2 anti-ship missile), can provide more effective resistance. The C-802 ASM can hit targets at a distance of 120 kilometers, making it the longest-range land-based anti-ship missile deployed in the region. The PJ-10 BrahMos anti-ship missile system, which is a joint Russian-Indian development, can increase the range of destruction of potential enemy ships to 1,500 kilometers.

At the same time, the closure of the Strait of Malacca does not guarantee the maintenance of a stable naval blockade of the PRC in this region. To ensure this, it is necessary to take similar measures in the Sunda and Lombok Straits. Since their width is relatively small, experts do not see any problems in their protection of ground-based anti-ship missiles.

Japan, Taiwan and Philippines

If Taiwan and the Philippines become involved in a proposed conflict, ground-based anti-ship missiles deployed on their territory will also serve as a means of limiting the freedom of action of the PLA Navy. For example, a missile located on the island of Taiwan with a range of 100 kilometers, together with missiles that can hit targets at a distance of 200 kilometers, will provide control of shipping traffic south of the island of Okinawa. Another option for protecting this area is to base an anti-ship missile system with a 200-kilometer range on Ryukyu Island. The space between Okinawa and Japan could be blocked by anti-ship missiles with a 100-kilometer range located on Japanese territory. The Luzon Strait, the area of ​​​​the island of Borneo and the Philippines can be protected by anti-ship missiles installed on the island of Taiwan and the territory of Malaysia and/or the Philippines.

However, according to experts, the area of ​​water located between Australia and Indonesia remains uncovered in this case. This problem can be solved by using the PJ-10 BrahMos anti-ship missile in a ground version located in Indonesia and/or Australia.

Korea and Japan

The PLA Navy can also use the Korea Strait for the transit of ships between South Korea and Japan. It can be easily blocked using ground-based anti-ship missiles with a range of 100–200 kilometers located on the territory of these two states. According to experts, to achieve an optimal level of security in this strait, it is necessary to simultaneously use ground-based anti-ship missiles in service with these two states.

The optimal option for placing anti-ship missiles

Experts believe that it will be relatively easy to deploy ground-based anti-ship missiles in all of the above territories on a temporary basis. On the contrary, the permanent deployment of these types of weapons would provoke a negative reaction from China and would presumably have a negative impact on US-China negotiations of various kinds. For the normal functioning of ground-based anti-ship missiles as deterrents, close cooperation with those states on whose territory they are located is necessary, which is also a factor for which the United States, according to experts, should not aggravate relations with the PRC. Thus, the most optimal option for the use of anti-ship missiles is to prepare the places from which they are planned to be launched, and to place warehouses of this type of weapons on the territory of Asian states, or to prepare for the emergency transfer of ground-based anti-ship missiles from the United States.

A number of anti-ship missiles can be installed not only in ground-based, but also in a number of other versions, which will increase the degree of flexibility of their use. At the same time, the question arises of mobilizing and creating an effective management structure for anti-ship missile batteries located in different conditions. According to experts, the optimal scheme for the mobilization and transfer of Patriot air defense systems units, developed by the US Army. The minimum composition of one unit of this complex includes two launchers with four launch containers on each, eight supply vehicles, a radar, a control center, additional equipment necessary for the normal functioning of the complex, and a corresponding crew. All these components can be transported on five C-5 aircraft or seven C-17 aircraft. When moving the complex, it is also possible to use high-speed vessels.

Considering the high level of development of the anti-ship missile market for various deployments (including ground-based), experts believe that a structure of an anti-ship missile unit similar to the one described above can be created for any type of these missiles without much effort.

Assessing the impact of the international situation on the strategy of using ground-based anti-ship missiles to contain the PLA Navy, analysts note that not all Asia-Pacific states are fully allied and/or partner states of the United States. The most striking example is Indonesia, which, despite providing American military assistance, is strengthening relations with China. Perhaps the need to convince such countries to deploy ground-based anti-ship missiles on their territory will become a major problem for American foreign policy in the region.

Cooperation within the framework of creating a common defense system of ground-based anti-ship missiles can significantly improve interaction between the United States and Asia-Pacific countries in the field of national security. At the same time, the pressing question is whether these countries will be able to effectively use ground-based anti-ship missiles to ensure a blockade of the PLA Navy. Experts believe that since the American army does not have sufficient experience and the material and technical base to use them as effectively as possible, cooperation with Asian countries in this direction may be significantly difficult.

Today, the US Air Force and Navy have the capabilities to contain the aspirations of the PLA Navy without the use of ground forces. However, they are mostly expensive and their deployment may be hampered by China's efforts. Ground-based anti-ship missiles, which are launched from relatively small-sized installations located in difficult-to-reach areas, can significantly improve the American deterrence system without the use of expensive equipment. The use of these missiles could facilitate patrol missions for the US Air Force and Navy. The massive deployment of launchers on the territory of US allies and/or partners will complicate the work of Chinese command and control systems and intelligence agencies. The use of ground-based anti-ship missiles as part of the Air Sea Battle strategy would significantly increase American capabilities to counter the Chinese area denial (A2/AD) strategy. This will also facilitate cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries in the deployment and potential use of these weapons, according to the RAND Corporation.

Frightening report

The idea of ​​the potential use of ground-based anti-ship missiles by the United States and its allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region as a significant deterrent factor is especially relevant in light of the increasing potential capabilities of the PLA Navy.

For the first time in the country's history, China's naval nuclear deterrent has reached the level of initial combat readiness. A report with this information was published in the US Congress by the subcommittee dealing with China.

China's JL-2 solid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) could reach initial operational capability in late 2013, according to a draft report prepared by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The flight range of this SLBM is expected to be 4,000 nautical miles (7,408 kilometers). In combination with the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) of Project 094 (code “Jin” - Jin), the JL-2 missile will pose a threat directly to US territory. Currently, the PLA Navy has three SSBNs of this type, with plans to deploy two more boats by 2020.

The report contains information according to which China is developing two new nuclear submarine (NPS) projects - the Project 095 nuclear-powered missile-torpedo submarine (SSBN) and the Project 096 SSBN. The Project 096 SSBNs are expected to significantly increase their range, mobility, the secrecy and effectiveness of China's nuclear deterrent.

Facilities belonging to the US military on the island of Guam will soon be under threat from Chinese ground-based missiles, experts emphasize.

Despite the fact that China currently cannot use land-based cruise missiles, the PLA Navy, experts say, is developing the ability to strike ground targets using sea-based cruise missiles. A special role in this context will be played by the Project 095 PLAT and the Project 052D guided missile destroyer (code “Luyang-3” - Luyang III). This will make it easier for the Chinese side to attack targets located in the western Pacific Ocean, including on the island of Guam.

As stated in the report mentioned above, the PLA Air Force acquired 15 new H-6K bombers (an improved version of the H-6). H-6K aircraft can carry ground-attack cruise missiles and have an increased range compared to the previous version. Air-launched cruise missiles will allow the PLA Air Force to strike virtually all targets in the Western Pacific.

The report contains information according to which the PRC is currently developing an improved version of the DF-21 ballistic anti-ship missile system - DF-21D. Its expected range will be 810 nautical miles (1,500 kilometers). As a result, it will not be able to hit targets on the island of Guam, which is 1,600 nautical miles (3,000 kilometers) away from Chinese territory.

Among other innovations of the PLA Navy, analysts pay special attention to the construction of the first Chinese aircraft carrier, Liaoning, from the deck of which the J-15 Flying Shark fighter took off and landed. In June 2013, during the exercise, the first group of carrier-based aircraft pilots and takeoff and landing control officers for aircraft carriers was certified, and in September 2013, the takeoff and landing of carrier-based aircraft on a ship was tested. It is expected that crew training will continue until the first air regiment equipped with J-15 fighters enters service with the PLA Navy in 2015–2016.

The report also contains information on other new ships of the PLA Navy. In 2012, China introduced two new classes of surface ships: the Luyang-3 guided missile destroyer and the Jiangdao frigate (Project 056). The construction of guided missile destroyers "Luyan-2" has been resumed. Serial production of the Jiangkai-2 guided missile frigates (project 054A) continues. Analysts believe that most of these ships will enter service by 2015. In their opinion, by this time China will become the second largest power in the world in terms of the number of large ships launched, and by 2020, despite the increase in production of the American fleet, it will be the largest builder of military ships in the world and will annually produce the largest number of submarines and surface ships.

The position of experts expressed in the report under review is as follows: over the next 5–10 years, China’s military preparations will significantly change the strategic balance in Asia. Along with strengthening US-China relations, China is increasing its ability to strike bases and ships of the United States and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States has the necessary tools to neutralize Russian Anti-Access Denial (A2/AD) zones in the European theater, but lacks the capabilities to destroy new Russian strongholds. Moreover, the US military is overly reliant on its airpower to cope with these new threats.

“We have the tools, but they are clearly not enough. And the pace at which we will have to destroy these centers of the system of denial and denial of access and maneuver in order to deploy our troops will depend on the depth at which we can attack the forces and means of this system, said the former commander of US forces in Europe, Air Force General retired Philip Breedlove, speaking June 29 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We are now almost entirely dependent on the Air Force and aviation assets with which we intend to solve the A2/AD problem.”

But aviation may not be enough. Breedlove believes U.S. ground forces also have a role to play in countering Russia's anti-access and anti-maneuver threat. “We need more high-precision, long-range, high-survivability ground assets,” the general said. “We need a high density of these capabilities to match the density of the anti-access and anti-maneuver system we will face.”

However, Breedlove did not say anything about whether the ground-based capabilities he was talking about complied with the provisions of the INF Treaty, which prohibits the use of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. Perhaps Breedlove was referring to a weapon that meets the requirements of the treaty - something similar to the Russian Iskander-M complexes.

The general also called on NATO to explore the possibility of creating its own offensive A2/AD capabilities. According to him, Russian anti-access and maneuver zones are inherently offensive in nature, and therefore the United States must respond accordingly. “Are we creating our own anti-access/denial system?” Breedlove asked. “This is a big question.”

Evelyn Farkas, who most recently served as the US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian affairs, said that while Moscow is modernizing its forces (compared to the US), the Kremlin's planned military investment of $700 billion 10 years is a fairly insignificant amount. But when allocating funds, Russia thinks strategically. “They are not engaged in complete modernization in all areas,” Farkas noted. “But they are acting very smartly, building up capabilities in some key non-nuclear areas - cruise missiles, air defense systems and so on. And this creates quite serious problems for us.”

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Lisa Sawyer Samp, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' International Security Program, said the capabilities gap between the U.S. and Russia is real, but it exists at the regional level in Central and Eastern Europe. Moscow is simply not able to keep up with Washington everywhere, as the Soviet Union used to do. “I want to be very clear that the Russian military is not Goliath,” Samp said. “They cannot surpass the United States on a global scale. However, Russia has modern capabilities that, in their current configuration, are capable of posing a serious challenge to the United States and its allies at the regional level.”

Samp noted that there are three key areas in which Russia has already gained or is beginning to gain advantages. One of them is a system of restricting and denying access and maneuver, the second is joint actions of various types of armed forces and branches of the military, and the third is the forces and means of cyber and electronic warfare. “This capability will have to be taken into account in Army planning and acquisition priorities,” she said.

While U.S. and European leaders have expressed concern about Russia's war hysteria, Farkas stressed that Russia's "escalation/deescalation" doctrine does not emphasize the use of tactical nuclear weapons. “In fact, it’s not like that; “It’s about denying the enemy the ability to intervene in ongoing or imminent military actions that Russia is undertaking,” Farkas said. “So they can use cyber means, they can use outer space, they can do anything to escalate the situation to the point where the United States or one of the European allies says: “Okay, we won’t get involved in this.”

However, Farkas acknowledged that "de-escalation" could include the demonstration or even use of nuclear weapons. “But I don’t think at all that it will necessarily be a nuclear conflict,” she said.

Dave Majumdaris a National Interest editor covering military issues.

According to military.com, as the commander of the US Air Forces in Europe and Africa, General Frank Gorenz, said at the annual aerospace conference held near Washington, D.C., NATO is gradually losing its air superiority vis-à-vis Russia.

“The advantage we had in the air, I can honestly say, is being eroded not so much by the aircraft they [Russia] produce, but, more worryingly, by their ability to conduct (A2/AD) anti-access operations / preventing them from entering areas that they are able to reliably cover,” Gorenc said.

With this statement, the general joined the chorus of military analysts and politicians who are loudly prophesying, like Cassandra, about the loss of technological superiority of the United States armed forces and the growing threats that constitute effective countermeasures to American military power, primarily the ability to carry out high-precision strikes.

According to the general, Russia accelerated the development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems during the 2008 war with Georgia and has invested heavily in the deployment of modern long-range anti-aircraft missile systems (like the S-400) and other ground systems A2 / AD, taking into account the experience gained during the war. “They learned a lot then and took all measures to deprive us of the asymmetric advantage obtained thanks to the qualitative characteristics of our aviation; and they succeeded,” he emphasized.

"It's one thing to counter airborne threats that have grown significantly, but it's clear that surface-to-air missile systems are much cheaper and quite affordable, and that's a concern," he added.

Gorenc is convinced that the widespread adoption of A2/AD systems poses a challenge to the strength of US air forces around the world. “Until now we were talking about A2/AD systems in the Pacific, but now this is no longer a problem only in the Pacific region. This largely applies to Europe, as well as other places on the planet.”

Indeed, the development of the A2/AD strategy fundamentally undermines American principles of warfare. “The American way of warfare requires reliable aerial reconnaissance ... because we believe that by gaining air superiority, we can solve any problem, and without superiority this is hardly possible,” Gorenc said.

The American general called for the development of new tactics and a new way to organize training, or, more precisely, a return to the old training programs: “It is clear that we must organize training according to the same methods that we used during the Cold War.” However, the growing technological capabilities of potential US adversaries may require the development of new operational concepts such as long-range strike operations without entering A2/AD zones.

Recently, leading Western publications have been delighting Russian readers with loud headlines with equally scandalous content. Then: “Russian military forces in their current state are capable of capturing Tallinn and Riga in less than 60 hours,” then: “NATO forces are unable to defend the eastern borders of the EU in the face of Russia,” and recently Bild decided to go even further and that Russia would only need one night to capture Poland in the event of an attack.

Despite the seemingly unfounded nature of such materials, they are backed by serious research from fairly authoritative “cantors” like the Atlantic Council or the RAND Corporation. As a rule, in simulated scenarios of hypothetical military operations, the “A2/AD” symbol set very often appears, which, according to Western analysts, has a decisive impact on the balance of power in the region.

But what is the reason for its appearance and constant use in the Russian context? Let's try to figure out what it means and what meaning the creators put into it.

The abbreviation A2/AD refers to the term anti-access/area-denial (literally: access denial/area blocking). It usually refers to certain areas where the current strategy of the US armed forces will not be able to operate fully, and the troops themselves will be in a vulnerable position.

It was originally invented by the Pentagon to describe the totality of weapons of the People's Republic of China that are capable of blocking access to the Western Pacific Ocean or neutralizing the ability to carry out operations in this region, which is vital for US interests.

In order to better understand the nature of US concerns about such zones, we should delve a little into history.

From the very beginning of the Cold War, the positions of Europe and the United States in the European theater of operations were extremely vulnerable. A huge armored Soviet fist threatened to smear NATO forces along the entire length of the border with the Warsaw Pact countries.

The United States was unable to give a symmetrical response, at least based on the impossibility of logistically ensuring the transfer and operation of such a number of troops and equipment. Therefore, the main US doctrine to counter the enormous power of the USSR was based on an asymmetric response and was embodied in the so-called first “compensation strategy.”

She intended to rely on nuclear weapons and the constant conviction of the whole world that the current US President was not entirely at peace with his head and was ready to press the “red” button at any moment.

Subsequently, it was replaced by the “Second Compensation Strategy” that existed in the 1970-1980s. It was based on the “AirLand Battle” doctrine, which provided for the establishment of air superiority and the use of precision weapons to enable a counter-blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union. Including with the help of small groups of special operations using the stinging tactics of a “swarm of bees” (swarming).

The Soviet Union also did not sit idle. The main response was the development of mobile air defense systems, fighter aircraft, and means of destroying ships - with the goal of nullifying attempts to counteract the maneuverable units of the ground forces.

As a result, two completely different types of armies were formed. A huge iron “roller”, supported by rocket artillery and attack aircraft, ready at any moment to make its way to the English Channel and an expeditionary force capable of being transported by sea, but extremely vulnerable without the support of aviation in the fleet.

The AirLand Battle doctrine proved its viability during Operation Desert Storm, when the significant potential of Saddam's armored formations was neutralized by air forces using precision weapons.

F/A-18F Super Hornet aircraft refueling from a RAAF KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft above a city in Iraq. HOTO/AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE/SERGEANT HAMISH PATERSON"

After the collapse of the union and the transition of the world to a unipolar model, this paradigm became the basis for the implementation of power scenarios to redraw the world geopolitical map.

Subsequently, the US's ability to dominate the battlefield expanded due to a developed network of satellites, a manifold increase in the ability to collect and transmit information, a developed communications system and unhindered dominance in cyberspace.

With the air force doing all the grunt work, supported by the navy, the ground forces increasingly focused on mobility, flexibility, and rapid movement of troops in response to geopolitical threats. In the light of the “Global war on terror”, the structure of most units was transformed into reinforced rifle formations, adapted to counter-insurgent campaigns and began to resemble more “advanced” police forces than an army, in the classical sense.

Judge for yourself: in 2009, a plan was adopted to create a modular army. The brigade remained the highest tactical formation. All combat brigades were divided into heavy, “striker” and light infantry (this also includes airborne ones)

Of the 31 army brigades (they are planned to be further reduced to 30 by 2017), only 9 remained heavy (they have 90 M1 Abrams tanks and about 130 M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles) the rest are 14 light infantry brigades (on Hummvees and with towed light howitzers, where there is no armored vehicles at all) and another 7 “striker” brigades (the same for armament + about 300 Stryker armored personnel carriers, the bulk of which are armed with a 12.7 mm M2 Browning machine gun and a 40 mm Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher).

Brigade artillery is represented by 3 batteries of 8 guns (155 mm M109 self-propelled guns for “heavy” brigades, 120 mm M777 howitzer for “striker” brigades, 1 battery of 120 mm M777 howitzers and 2 batteries of 105 mm M119 howitzers for light infantry brigades). MLRS (M142 HIMMARS and M270 MLRS) are in service with 4 more separate artillery brigades.

Things are even more dire in the Marine Corps. Because of this, the Corps is conceived precisely as an expeditionary force capable of rapid deployment to various theaters of operations; it is “lightweight” to the maximum. For 3 divisions (one truncated) there are only 2 tank battalions (M1A1 Abrams) and 6 mechanized (3 each on wheeled LAV-25 and tracked AAV-P7), and the MLRS is in service with only two artillery battalions.

However, in the classic scenario of gaining air superiority and suppressing air defenses, a barrage of airstrikes would destroy command centers and communication systems, paralyzing command and control, the next victims would be artillery and tactical missile units, and the A-10 and AH-64 squadrons would be left to finish the job , grinding the armored fist of a potential enemy into “edible mince.”

The remaining separated and disintegrated forces will become easy prey for the ground component of the US armed forces, which comfortably maneuver under conditions of dominance in the information and intelligence space.

The meaning and main danger of the A2/AD zones is precisely that developed, layered air defense systems of all levels (long-range, medium-range and short-range), advanced electronic warfare systems and cyber attacks create a kind of “bubble” that guarantees protection of this area from “domination” US Air Force (and possibly the satellite constellation) for a certain time.

In turn, under the cover of this “bubble”, anti-ship defense systems, tactical missile systems and MLRS “fetter” the ground and sea components of the opposing armed forces, preventing them from developing the initiative.

In sum, these factors create almost ideal conditions for the use of tactical formations, where the emphasis is on dagger strikes by tank and mechanized units in conditions of large-scale support from artillery and MLRS, which is what the Russian army is so famous for.

This situation creates such serious risks for the operation of the US Armed Forces that the Pentagon is already launching a number of expensive programs that can “compensate” for these critical vulnerabilities in the military doctrine of the United States.

A fundamental role in these plans is played by the "" (third compensation) strategy developed by the CSBA (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments).

She proposes to primarily focus on unmanned operations, which include the development of a stealthy, long-range advanced UAV, including sea-based capabilities, and a family of unmanned combat aircraft systems.

The latter involves the creation of “” drones integrated into a single network (within the framework of a System of Systems (SoS) Integration Technology and Experimentation), built on the principle of “open architectures capable of helping American aviation overcome enemy air defenses.

The second component is a massive transition to “stealth” aircraft, which are not as “sensitive” to A2/AD zones as previous generations of aircraft.

The F-35 and F-22 aircraft are superior to fourth-generation aircraft in terms of stealth, but they have a short range. Many experts believe that the F-35 is imperfect even in terms of stealth technology, so the United States has focused on creating a class of stealth, extended-range bombers that will allow a quick and global response to enemy actions at significant distances).

Although the A2/AD strategy takes into account nuclear attack submarines, they are difficult to counter. Therefore, the Pentagon attaches particular importance to unmanned underwater systems.

In addition, faced with the possibility of a start, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense began to develop equipment and technologies for protecting orbiting satellites, and the Joint Center for Integrated Space Operations was recently opened.

The Pentagon will spend $22 billion on space programs this year, plus an additional $5 billion. Two billion of this amount will go to “,” which includes top secret.

The main goal of implementing the Third Offset strategy is the formation of a global surveillance and strike system. Which, in turn, will allow you not to depend on bases located near the enemy and to operate without constant support from space; deliver strikes with high efficiency within several hours; elastically influence various situations around the world.

In this case, it becomes possible to give an asymmetric response to the A2/AD strategy without significant losses on our part.

Well, for now these are just plans, the defense department can only hope that Trump will win the elections and it will be possible to watch the night capture of Poland not from behind the trenches somewhere near Krakow, but while comfortably eating popcorn at the Ramstein airbase)