MiG plane and Su plane - which is better. Olympiad on the history of aviation and aeronautics Weight mig 29 and su 27
In the Soviet Union there has always been competition between companies developing weapons systems. And it manifested itself in aviation competitions. The work on creating fourth-generation aircraft was no exception. Despite the fact that the development of the famous Su-27 and MiG-29 was ultimately divided into two programs - a heavy and a light fighter, the likelihood that only one type of aircraft would be adopted remained until the very start of mass production. We should not forget that even after production launch, the order volume, depending on the current views of the military, could change significantly. Well, with the advent of Gorbachev and the destruction of the USSR, economic and political factors began to influence. As a result, the Su-27 became the clear favorite, and the MiG-29 has practically faded into oblivion over the past two decades. But was the Su-27 really so superior to the MiG-29 and is it really possible to get by with only heavy fighters? This question is still relevant now, since, unlike the United States, Russia today is developing only a heavy vehicle, continuing to move along a path adopted solely on a subjective basis.
Complex and expensive machines often have redundant data for the main range of combat missions, as a result of which their implementation resembles hammering nails with a microscope. That is why at one time in the United States the concept of two fighters was adopted: a heavy one and a light one. And the distribution of the fighter fleet was structured in such a way that 80% should be light aircraft, and 20% should be heavy. This ratio, of course, may fluctuate slightly: 90 to 10 or 30 to 70 percent, but in any case, the fleet of light fighters should be at least 70 percent. And this ratio was arrived at in the USA and the USSR after lengthy research and analysis of the combat use of fighters in various conflicts and during exercises. An aircraft fleet of two types of aircraft is the basis of the power of the air force of any large country. It should be noted that only those states that claim a leading role at least in their region have a fleet of heavy vehicles. These are the USA, Russia, China, India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Japan. The world fleet of heavy vehicles is about 1000 vehicles. At the same time, the fleet of light fighters is about 14,000 vehicles. Those. The share of heavy vehicles in the world is only 7%.
Of course, the construction of heavy fighters is justified, but making the main bet on them is fundamentally wrong. An optimal balance is required. And it would be wrong to bias towards heavy fighters - this is a deep mistake both in economic terms and in terms of efficiency. But this is exactly what was done in our country in the 90s of the last century. With this proposal, the MiG-29 became the official stepson in our country.
The creator of the Su-27 was Mikhail Petrovich Simonov, it was he who created the legendary aircraft from the first T-10, losing to the F-15. A designer from God, he was also an energetic and talented organizer. And unfortunately, his organizational activities were focused precisely on turning the concept of the ratio of heavy and light fighters upside down. The concept was then brought under the Su-27, and not a fighter under the concept. Simonov was not at a loss in the 90s and continued to lobby for his car when R.A., who had never had such energy. Belyakov (general designer of the A.I. Mikoyan Design Bureau), apparently, was completely lost in the new economic and political realities. Thus, during the period of active lobbying for the Su-27, Rostislav Apollosovich did not oppose anything to this lobby. And this was the general’s first mistake. Naturally, the MiGs were pushed into the shadow of the “dry” ones.
Honored Test Pilot of the USSR, Chief Pilot of the Design Bureau named after. Mikoyan Valery Evgenievich Menitsky recalled: “Once I came to Oleg Nikolaevich Soskovets, who was then first vice-premier. The beginning of our conversation was interesting. He says: “What exactly is this - a MiG? I don’t even know such an aircraft, there are Sy, but there are no MiGs.” And smiles. It is clear that he said this as a joke, but there was some truth in this joke, because both in the government and in the Ministry of Defense everyone was talking only about the Sy aircraft. Needless to say, approximately two-thirds of the budget was allocated to Sukhoi's company.
Did a light fighter even have the right to exist in an era of widespread savings on defense? Could it solve problems and was it not inferior to the Su-27 at times? Representatives of the Mikoyan Design Bureau had no doubt that the MiG-29 was the best in its class; moreover, they were confident that in many respects it was even superior to the heavy Su-27. The question of which aircraft has the advantage - the MiG-29 or the Sy-27 - could be resolved very simply: in a training air battle. In addition, such a battle would allow us to simulate the actions of our mixed aircraft fleet against a mock enemy. Develop tactics of action both against a single heavy fighter and against a “combination” of F-15 - F-16. It was the Mikoyanites who initiated such a training battle. And many military and civilian institutes TsNII-30, GNIKI, LII, TsAGI, NIAS supported this idea. The only opponent was Mikhail Petrovich Simonov. In his opinion, such air battles did not make sense, because supposedly even without them it was clear that the Su-27 was much better than the MiG-29. In particular, the Sukhovites claimed that their aircraft had higher flight qualities. Indeed, at lower speeds (500-550 km/h) the Sy-27 had a slight advantage, but at speeds above 550 km/h - and this is the main real combat range - our aircraft looked much stronger. Another advantage of the Sy-27 was its powerful radar. But only an amateur can evaluate a locator based on its power. Power itself does not mean very much in battle, since the detection range and target acquisition range and its tracking depend not so much on the power of the locator, but on the size of the target, that is, its reflective surface. And the Sy-27, by the way, is 1.5 times larger than the MiG-29.
No one wanted to go against Simonov’s opinion, so it seemed that the idea of these air battles was never destined to come true. However, there was a person who was able to come to an agreement with Simonov, this was the head of the Combat Use Center in Lipetsk, Sulambek Askanov. And the battles were fought. More than a hundred battles showed that in 80 percent the advantage was on the side of the MiG-29. Moreover, the MiG won close, medium, and even long-range maneuvering battles, which were obviously considered the Sy-27’s strong point. As the Mikoyanites expected, it was not the power of his locator that came to the fore, but the size of our “twenty-ninth”. This result was deafening for many, and they preferred not to advertise it. From a scientific and methodological point of view, these experiments were carried out quite correctly, and there was no reason to doubt the reliability of their results.
However, Simonov could not be satisfied with such a result. Mikhail Petrovich urgently flew to Lipetsk. Thanks to his activities, certain restrictions were created for the MiG-29. These restrictions did not allow him to reach the acceptable angles, which were deliberately reduced, justifying this by insufficient lateral controllability. Naturally, these restrictions were incorrect and far-fetched. All aircraft of that time did not have the required level of lateral control for such angles of attack. But, be that as it may, these restrictions for the MiG-29 were accepted. New battles have already been fought with them. What kind of purity of the experiment could we talk about when the MiG pilots were placed in obviously unequal conditions? Firstly, restrictions were imposed only on one aircraft, and secondly, the pilot had to monitor the prohibited angle of attack, any excess of which was punishable as a precondition for stalling, visually, “by eye,” which is generally unacceptable in combat. In this situation, the Su-27 already had an advantage. Center pilot A. Kharchevsky commented on the results of the battle: “Now the picture is a little better. Finally, the advantage of the Sy-27 began to appear.”
Next, a pair of MiG-29 and Su-27 conducted an air battle. The twin was controlled by the chief pilot of the OKB named after. Mikoyan Valery Evgenievich Menitsky. This is how he describes the battle: “For the first minute and a half of the battle, we moved along the trajectory, reaching the place necessary for the attack in all possible ways. We quite quickly managed to create an advantage for ourselves to attack the target; we sat on the “tail” of the Sy-27 and spent the rest of the battle without getting off it. We must pay tribute to the Sy-27 pilot, he piloted well, but we still won the battle. True, Kharchevsky tried to convince me that the pilot was chosen poorly and that if he carried out the battle himself, the result would be different. But the fact of the matter is that the result of the experiment should not depend on the pilot’s qualifications.”
The second mistake of Rostislav Apollosovich Belyakov in those years was that he did not want to implement the next modification in metal - the MiG-29MZ. It was a machine of the size of a MiG-29, but at the same time capable of performing missions with a range greater than that of the Cy-27 with a range of about 4000 km, equipped with in-flight refueling. In addition, it was a full-fledged multifunctional fighter, capable of “operating on the ground” in difficult weather conditions day and night. Belyakov feared that this device would “cut off the oxygen” to his main development - the MFI fighter. The MiG-29MZ was a modernization of the MiG-29M - the welded structure made of aluminum-lithium alloy was 10 percent larger in area than the MiG-29, plus a front controlled horizontal tail was added. This multi-role fighter was designed to gain superiority in the air and to work against ground targets.
Belyakov’s third mistake is human; he did not know how to build relationships with the leadership of the Air Force and the ministries of defense and aviation industry. With his knowledge, he stood out noticeably among general designers, but he lacked flexibility in relationships with people. He could, for example, openly, in front of a large crowd of people, make very unflattering critical remarks to the military, which, of course, they could not like, since these remarks did not add to the authority of the critic.
All this affected the MiG-29 program. That is why and only why it did not gain fame equal to that of the Su-27. And that is why the MiG-29 development program stalled for many years. But the results of the outgoing year give hope that the MiG-29 in its latest incarnation (MiG-35) will take its rightful place in the Russian Air Force and the air forces of our friendly countries. In addition, I would like to hope that the development of a single fifth-generation fighter has a reasonable basis, or there is the prospect of developing, like the Americans, a light fighter.
Sources:
Menitsky V.E. My heavenly life.
Gordon E., Fomin A., Mikheev A. MiG-29.
Levin M. The same MiG.
Belosvet A., Polushkin Yu. MiG-29? No, MiG-33.
Mig-29 Eritrean Air Force
Background
Eritrea is a state in northeast Africa, on the Red Sea coast. It borders Sudan to the west, Ethiopia to the south and Djibouti to the east. Gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.
Ethiopian-Eritrian conflict 1998-2000 - an armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea for control of disputed border territories.
On February 21, 1999, the Eritrians ambushed two MiG-29s, bringing the first to attack at an altitude of about 6 km on the Ethiopian Su-27 "52" on duty above. Approaching acceleration, the Su-27 pilot used the R-27RE from a range of about 45 km, but the missile exploded near the target without hitting it, since the MiG-29 pilot’s nerves could not stand it and he turned away, knowing about the surprise for the fighter attacking him. The Su-27 pilot, continuing to approach the enemy in a turn, fired another R-27T at the retreating enemy at a distance of 10 km and even saw the explosion of his missile near the MiG-29, which then began an energetic descent. But here a missile was also fired at the Su-27 from the MiG-29, which had previously been in ambush behind the plateau and suddenly began to pursue the attacker. The altitude difference of more than 4 km and the supersonic speed of the Su-27 allowed him to escape from the enemy, although the sight of two self-destructing missiles fired at him from the MiG-29 remained in the pilot’s memory for a long time.
The damaged Eretrian MiG-29 was not counted, although, according to intelligence data, it did not return to its airfield. The pilots, having carefully analyzed this air battle, were convinced of the correctness of their tactics, the superiority of aviation technology, and perked up.
Already on February 25, 1999, a Su-27 with tail number “54”, performing scheduled duty in the air, was sent out to intercept a pair of MiG-29s, clearly planning to attack Ethiopian ground forces. Taking into account the experience of his comrades, and clearly following the commands of the guidance officer, the pilot accurately entered the zone of permitted launches, correctly maintained the regime and launched two P-27s on time at the leader of the open pair, piloted by the Eritrean pilot Samuel. As a result, the first MiG-29 was shot down, immediately disintegrating in the air, the pilot was killed, and the second, turning vigorously, returned to its territory without completing the mission. The victory was confirmed by ground forces.
The next day, the enemy decided to catch the Su-27 on duty in the air, and at the end of its duty, sent a MiG-29 type aircraft towards the capital of Ethiopia. The ground control point noticed the target at a high altitude and immediately began to aim the Su-27 with tail number "58". Everything happened almost as if it were a training exercise until the last minute, when the ground guidance point detected another MiG-29 flying at low altitude and suddenly began targeting the Su-27. To the credit of the Su-27 pilot, despite the warning from the ground, and later the trill of the Bereza, signaling that his plane was captured by the enemy and a possible launch on it, he managed to aim and launch two R-27T missiles in an extremely limited time, which hit the target. Eritrean pilot Jonas was killed. The second enemy plane, seeing the falling debris of its partner, urgently turned away and returned to its airfield. Due to the low fuel remaining, the Su-27 also had to return to its base. After landing, he had about 200 kg of kerosene left in his tanks, which is less than half of the permitted emergency balance.
A thorough analysis of the battle showed that the Su-27 pilot was not shot down only because he fully realized the advantage of the Su-27, which has a slightly longer permitted launch range (here they are 2 seconds!!!) and, in this case, a higher flight speed. Subsequently, the guidance navigators always paid special attention to the air situation at low altitudes, even somewhat delaying the start of guidance.
This air battle was recorded on videotape by a front-line Ethiopian correspondent. A few days later, this video was broadcast on local television, which helped raise the morale of the troops and the prestige of the Su aircraft. He was recognized as the eldest in the Ethiopian warplane family. Thanks to the effective use of the Su-27, absolute air supremacy was achieved. Throughout the war, Eritrean aircraft never bombed the country's territory.
The enemy did not try to engage in open air clashes again, although he made a number of attempts to use someone else’s hands to test Ethiopia’s air defense system. In one case, an allegedly lost Kenyan Douglas aircraft flew in from the northwest, which was intercepted over a desert area at a very long range and forcibly landed at the Bahar Dar airfield by a Su-27 on duty near the capital. After stopping the intruder, the Su-27 walked twice over the Douglas pilots escorted by ground guards and calmly landed at the main airfield.
MiG-35 – why Russia needs a second 4++ generation fighter
On January 26, 2017, a presentation of the newest Russian multifunctional fighter-bomber of the 4++ generation took place on the territory of the MiG Corporation production complex in Lukhovitsy. MiG-35. A little later it was announced that this aircraft would be purchased by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, the Russian Aerospace Forces already have Su-35S, which also belongs to the 4++ generation. Why does our country need a second fighter of this class?
Historical duet
The MiG-35 is called a light fighter. He is really very easy to climb. In terms of rate of climb, it has no equal. For the MiG-35 this parameter is equal to 330 m/s. The main competitors do not reach this figure: F-16 – 250 m/s, Dassault Rafale – 305 m/s, Su-35S– 280 m/s. And the light American fighter of the 5th generation F-35A has only 240 m/s. But as for weight, even comparison with “drying” does not “make it easier” to perceive the newest MiG. After all, its maximum take-off weight is 29,7 t - not much less than the Su-35S with its 34,5 t. For comparison: maximum weight Dassault Rafale – 24,5 T, F-16E Block 60 – 22,6 t. True, the “light” American “invisibility” F-35A the maximum weight reaches even 31,8 etc. And this once again emphasizes the fundamentally different meaning that is attached to the concept of “light fighter” today.
MiG-35 And Su-35C– the latest modifications of the Soviet classics MiG-29 and Su-27. However, the difference between the new MiG and Su, in comparison with their “ancestors,” is fundamental. In the system of the USSR Armed Forces there was a clear distribution of functions between the two air “fighters”. The MiG-29 was in service with elite regiments based in the GDR. The Su-27 was not allowed onto the line of contact with NATO. It would seem that a clear preference was given to the MiG, which was lighter and more dexterous in maneuverable air battles (remember the rate of climb, which still remains its signature feature).
But in fact, the advanced units in Germany were considered as a kind of expendable material for the initial period of the great European war. The MiG-29s were supposed to take (or deliver) the first blow and die heroically in a heated battle. In part, this is precisely the meaning that was put into the concept of “light front-line fighter”, which was assigned to the MiG-29.
Su-27 It was supplied to the air defense forces, and to the air force it was based mainly at airfields in Poland and Ukraine. This plane was supposed to cover the sky over the second, main wave of attacking (or defending) Soviet troops, which was supposed to decide the outcome of the war. The Su-27 began to be called a heavy air superiority fighter. In comparison, the MiG-29 took less weapons (combat load 2180 kg versus 6000 kg for the Su-27), and flew not so far (combat radius 700 km versus 1680 km). At the same time, the cost of the light MiG-29 was only 25% less than that of the heavy Su-27, although it was initially thought that their price would generally be 1:1.9.
Another thing - MiG-35 And Su-35S. There is no qualitative difference in functionality between them: unlike the “basic models” (and this is the main difference), both of them are multi-role fighter-bombers, capable of both gaining superiority in the sky and delivering missile and bomb strikes against ground or sea targets. Even their combat load has almost leveled off (7 and 8 tons). These are versatile air warfare tools that can do similar combat work in the skies.
And the question arises: why does the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) need a second aircraft with the same functionality and almost the same capabilities?
For example, the “range” of the MiG-35 and Su-35S radars is two times different - 200 and 400 km, and the combat radius of the aircraft is different - 1000 and 1800 km. The cost of the new version of the MiG-35 has not been announced, but one can easily assume that although it is less, it is not two times less (such a difference in price could not be achieved even for the MiG-29 and Su-27). The acquisition of the MiG-35 will give additional tactical flexibility to the Russian Aerospace Forces, but to perform the same tasks, more MiGs will be needed and it is unlikely that it will be possible to save on this. Not to mention that maintaining a fleet of two types of aircraft is more difficult and expensive. And yet, the MiG-35 was presented to the public with pomp and has already been included in the Russian Federation’s arms procurement program. For what?
MiG-35 again
It’s worth starting with the fact that the aircraft for which the name MiG-35 was applied have already taken to the skies several times and served as decoration for the flight program of the MAKS air show.
This is what should have been the name of the 5th generation multirole fighter, the development of which began in the USSR in 1981. The prototype of the future MiG-35, which was created in response to the development of the first American 5th generation fighter F-22, had the designation MiG 1.44. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the development of this program slowed down. And although the MiG 1.44 managed to take off on February 29, 2000, soon after this takeoff the final fall occurred: the project was closed in favor of the development of the Design Bureau named after. BY. Sukhoi, now known as T-50. The MiG-35 index has been released for further use.
Since the MiG 1.44 project was stalled, since the second half of the 1990s the designation MiG-35 began to be applied to all modifications of the MiG-29, the main front-line fighter of the Russian Air Force. MiG-29M (flyed for the first time back in 1984), MiG-29M2, MiG-29M3, MiG-29M4 - sooner or later the designation MiG-35 began to loom next to all of them (though most often in parentheses).
Finally, the marketing designation MiG-35, without any brackets, was assigned to the aircraft that participated in the Indian Air Force tender for the purchase of 126 medium multi-role fighters costing more than 9 billion. dollars. This MiG-35 debuted at an air show Aero India in Bangalore in 2007 and was, in fact, a land version of the MiG-29K carrier-based fighter, developed on the basis of the MiG-29M for the Indian aircraft carrier Vikramaditya, which was transformed into the Soviet heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Gorshkov. The MiG-35 differed from the MiG-29K, essentially speaking, only by replacing the brake hook with a brake parachute and the folding wing with a regular one.
The MiG-29K returned to its home airfield after completing a mission in the Mediterranean Sea on the Admiral Kuznetsov TAVKR off the coast of Syria
Unfortunately, the MiG-35 lost the tender in India (the Indians preferred the French Dassault Rafale), but this happened rather for political reasons. After massive purchases of the Su-30MKI and MiG-29K, the leadership of the Indian Armed Forces did not want their fighter fleet to consist entirely of Russian aircraft.
The MiG-35 of the 2007 model was not useful to the Indians, but the groundwork for this project was such that it was unwise to lose it. Moreover, a significant part of this groundwork appeared thanks to Indian funding for the development of the MiG-29K. And so on January 26, 2017 in Lukhovitsy the world was revealed "real" MiG-35, although most of its advantages in comparison with the MiG-29, which all media wrote about as incredible news after the presentation, generally repeat the lists from ten years ago.
Fly-by-wire control system instead of a hydraulic one, Zhuk-A radar with an active phased array antenna, increased combat load and fuel reserves, anti-corrosion protection and reinforced landing gear, smokeless RD-33MK engines with increased thrust, 2.5-fold reduction in flight hour cost (replacing an engine in the field takes only 58 minutes), a “glass” cockpit with large displays, and so on.
There are, of course, some additions. Still, our designers did not sit idly by for 10 years. The new MiG-35 provides for the installation of new Russian weapons that are not exported. The maximum detection range of air targets by the new modification of the Zhuk-AME radar has been increased to 260 km, and its weight decreased from 240 to 100 kg! A very powerful multispectral defense complex, allowing you to detect the launch of an enemy missile and track its trajectory from any direction. At the same time, the creators of the real MiG-35 claim that they have brought its quality “to the point of excellence.”
Most of these systems will also be useful for the future 5th generation light fighter, if the decision to create it is made. After testing on board the MiG-35, all that remains is to manufacture a new “shell” with radio invisibility technology (although new engines will also be needed). This project, if it comes to fruition, will be led, as expected, by the MiG Corporation, which will preserve the legendary company, which has enormous potential. And this is also one of the important aspects of the MiG-35 project.
And yet, the creators of the MiG-35 concept should be given an A+ primarily for marketing: it is not without reason that the presentation format was more reminiscent of a show of a new luxury car model and representatives of more than 30 foreign countries were invited to the event.
Export potential
The moment for the next “debut” of the MiG-35 was not chosen by chance. This is an offer for countries that need a 4++ generation fighter, but not as expensive as Western ones Rafale, F-16 or even our heavy Su-35S. The cost of the MiG-35, we repeat, has not been announced, but it is obvious that it will become the most affordable 4++ level fighter on the market. Actually, this is where its “lightness” lies.
The argument that the share of light and heavy fighters in the Air Force fleet of a self-respecting country should be 30 and 70%, respectively, is cunning or rather the “sauce” under which the new “dish” in the form of the MiG-35 is served. This thesis is true for countries such as the USA and the USSR. But most traditional Russian arms buyers need just a fighter. And the cheaper, the better.
The Su-27 family of aircraft had been selling very successfully on the international market for decades, but there came a point when almost everyone who could buy one did so. The MiG-35 is an excellent attempt to “stir up” buyers and create a new sales segment for domestic aircraft. The MiG-35 offers the same multi-role capabilities as the Su-35S, but at a more affordable price. There is a chance that in the context of a recession in the global economy, when already poor countries are becoming very stingy with the purchase of military “toys,” this calculation will work.
China, of course, will not buy the MiG-35, nor will Poland and Bulgaria, which still operate the MiG-29. But among the customers there may be not only Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Malaysia, Algeria, Cuba and Peru, but also India, which is not very happy with the choice Rafale, whose purchases had to be reduced from 126 to 36 due to high costs. But India needs something to replace order 450 obsolete MiG-21s, which are still in service with this country.
Su-35S, Syria, flight to Khmeimim airbase, February 2016
Export value Rafale was estimated at 100 million dollars. This is more than the price of an American 5th generation light fighter F-35A, whose cost the manufacturer promises to reduce to 83,4 million dollars. The MiG-35, presented as part of an Indian tender (that is, more than 5 years ago) cost about 45 million dollars. The price of the 2017 MiG-35 will probably be higher (although this will depend on the configuration), but it is unlikely to exceed 83 million dollars, for which China bought the Su-35S in 2015.
And yet the question remains: why does the Russian Aerospace Forces need the MiG-35?
There are also significant economic reasons for this. Serial production of the deck-based MiG-29K has already been established in the country, and at the expense of a foreign customer. And the MiG-35 is in many ways the same MiG-29K. Why not join the ranks of domestic aerospace forces with a modern machine, the production of which has already been mastered? And then, lo and behold, orders will appear from abroad. After all, the adoption of an aircraft into service in one’s own country is an important argument in negotiations with foreign clients. Moment– one of the most famous domestic brands in the world. It would be a sin not to use its potential.
MiG-35 – official presentation ceremony
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From: Yury Bogdanchikov
Topic: MiG vs Sy II
Date: June 7, 2000 16:43
start M21.TXT
AIR BATTLES IN LIPETSKSolve the question of which aircraft has more advantages - MiG-29 or Sy-27 -
It could have been very simple: in a training air combat. Of course, the Mikoyanites were
It's interesting to know which plane is better, but the main reason why we
insisted on holding such battles, this was not the case. The main thing is that in such a battle you can
It was necessary to simulate your actions against a fictitious enemy. Let's say against
"bundles" of American fighters F-15 - F-16, approximately suitable for
"weight category" Sy-27 and MiG-29. Of course, the analogy of these “connections” is sufficient
conditional But even with all the conventionality of such a battle, it was possible to develop
tactics of action both against a single heavy fighter and against
"bundles" of heavy and light fighters (F-15 - F-16).
This idea itself was suggested by common sense. By the way, many military and
civil institutions - TsNII-30, GNIKI, LII, TsAGI, NIAS - supported her. But how
Mikhail Petrovich Simonov has always been the main opponent of common sense.
Any initiative ran into his direct opposition. True, at the same level
chief designers" and technical managers of the Sukhoi company, our initiative
At first I met with support. We even jointly prepared an air program
fights, having worked through a lot of material in three weeks. But it turned out that this
the issue lies within the exclusive competence of their general designer. AND
if at our company the general designer Belyakov gave me complete carte blanche
to resolve this issue, then the Sukhovites have neither the chief designer Nikitin nor
chief designer Marbashev had no right to do this. And the general
designer Simonov, as I already said, categorically rejected this idea.
In his opinion, such air battles did not make sense, because supposedly without them
it was clear that the Sy-27 was significantly better than the MiG-29. In particular, the Sukhovites asserted,
that their aircraft has superior flight performance. Indeed, on
at lower speeds - 500-550 km/h - the Sy-27 had a slight advantage, but
at speeds over 550 km/h - and this is the main combat range - our aircraft
looked much stronger. Another advantage of the Sy-27 was its powerful
locator But only an amateur can evaluate a locator based on its power.
Power itself does not mean very much in battle, since range
detection and target acquisition range and its tracking depend not so much on
the power of the locator, how much depends on the size of the target, that is, its reflective surface.
And the Sy-27, by the way, is 1.5 times larger than the MiG-29. And this led us to
certain thoughts.
In any case, we were interested in checking the quality of the Sy-27 aircraft in combat and
see for yourself how much the statements of the Sukhovites correspond to reality.
But we didn’t get this opportunity.
Then I decided to come from the other side, and proposed to Mikhail Petrovich together
to resolve the issue of his company's pilots flying the MiG-29, and ours flying the Sy-27. But also
He rejected this option. Perhaps in this refusal he, as the general
designer, there was a reason: our aircraft had already been accepted for service, but
its progress did not go entirely smoothly, and the Sy-27 was only undergoing testing, and in
During the flight, all sorts of surprises were possible. This, however, did not frighten us.
The desire of our test pilots to see the bottlenecks of the Sukhov technology
was stronger. But Simonov’s fear of the possible loss of the plane prevailed.
However, I think he was even more afraid of the fact that even during the flyby he could
it turns out that the advantage of the Sy-27 over the MiG-29, which he told everyone about,
- nothing more than a myth. Be that as it may, we can’t agree on anything
The rapprochement between the companies, which I had hoped for, did not work out.
True, at the end of our conversation, Mikhail Petrovich told me:
- So that you don’t think that I’m generally against our cooperation, I can personally
you will be given the opportunity to fly on a Cy-27, but only for pure aerobatics,
without testing the aircraft at extreme points.
But I refused this offer:
- Unlike you, we are ready to take all your pilots to the MiG-29 and show them
to them any point they want to see, in any range of heights and speeds,
in any mode and in any combination. And this issue has already been agreed with
management of the company. If you are not ready for such mutual contact, then you can
provide the opportunity to fly on the Sy-27 only to me, and then only for a flyby as
combat pilot, I don’t need such a flight. I can perform such a flight in
another department.
It seemed that the idea of these air battles was never destined to come true, because
no one wanted to go against Simonov's opinion. And yet such a person
found. It turned out to be the head of the Combat Weapons Center in Lipetsk, Sulambek.
Askanov (we called him Sergei Sergeevich).
When I became a chief pilot, we began to work very closely with this Center,
representing the elite part of the Air Force. The strongest pilots from
combat units, a very large amount of scientific, methodological and research work was carried out
work. We understood the importance of close contact with the Center’s employees,
which not only revealed shortcomings in equipment, but also gave us a lot
useful tips.
At first, the pilots treated us with caution and distrust, deciding that the main
Our task is not to reveal the shortcomings of our aircraft, but to disguise them. But
when they realized that the management of our company was really interested in
close contact with the institute, that we are driven by a sincere desire to make our
the machine is better, which means, together with them, look for the most efficient ways
solving problems, real creative work was in full swing.
Already after three months, we have established the style of work that gives the best
results in the interaction of two such departments. Almost once every two weeks
I flew to Lipetsk, took part in flights there, together with leading pilots and
heads of departments analyzed research materials, looked for ways
solutions to emerging problems. The institute’s staff, in turn, more than once
visited our company.
In many ways, this productive cooperation was facilitated by the appointment of new
Head of the Center Sergei Askanov, Ingish by nationality. He had
enormous experience in everyday combat work, he rose to the rank of deputy commander
divisions. Among the flight personnel, he stood out for his intelligence. Nobody
I’ve never heard him raise his voice at his subordinates, much less swear
swearing, which is the traditional sin of pilots who love strong words. Askanov was
a great pilot. He was distinguished by very good piloting technique - very
soft, without strong jerks. He performed all the figures energetically, but at the same time
they looked together, like a single complex.
The same expressive style of piloting distinguished one of the best
pilots from Kubinka, military pilot Volodya Shilov. Everything is literal
We admired his aerobatics. His turn radii were minimal, but he
he drew them so beautifully in the air that it was clear: the pilot was doing
them with ease and some amazing freedom.
Working as the head of the Combat Weapons Center allowed Sergei
Askanovy show all your intellect, all creative abilities, use
a wealth of flight experience. Sergey did a lot for the work on the MiG-29 and
Cy-27. He saw not only their advantages and disadvantages, but also that their attitude towards
the planes at the top are very subjective. The installation from above was unambiguous: Sy-27
be shown completely ready for use, practically free from defects, and
MiG-29; on the contrary, those requiring major improvements. Askanov understood all this and
I was very worried about this situation. He and I discussed it more than once, and one day he
he suddenly said to me:
- You know, Valery Evgenievich, I decided to conduct air battles between the MiG and
"Sy".
On the one hand, his decision, of course, made me happy, on the other hand, I understood
that it could cost him his career, and considered it necessary to warn him. But Sergei was
a man of principle, he wanted to get an objective picture and therefore
I didn’t change my decision. Such battles were carried out. More than a hundred fights
showed that 80 percent of the advantage was on the side of the MiG-29. And ours
the aircraft won close, medium, and even long-range maneuvering battles, which
were obviously considered the Sy-27's strong point. As we expected, to the forefront
It was not the power of his locator that stood out, but the size of our “twenty-ninth”.
This result was deafening for many, and it was preferred not
advertise. From a scientific and methodological point of view, these experiments were carried out
quite correctly, and there was no doubt about the reliability of their results
no reason. However, we would be happy even if our MiG-29
won fifty percent of fights.
But such a result, of course, could not suit Simonov, since
damaged the image of Cy-27, and with it the authority of the company. Therefore, Mikhail
Petrovich urgently flew to Lipetsk, where he developed a vigorous activity. From his suggestion
came up with certain restrictions for the MiG-29 that did not allow it to reach
regime of permissible angles, which were obviously reduced under the pretext of insufficient
lateral control. These restrictions were, to put it mildly, incorrect and
far-fetched, since all the aircraft of that generation did not have the required level
lateral controllability for these angles of attack. But nevertheless, these restrictions on
The MiG-29 was accepted and they decided to conduct new battles with them.
There was no purity or correctness in the conduct of this experiment. Pilots on
The "twenty-ninth" MiG was deliberately placed in unequal conditions: firstly,
restrictions were imposed on only one plane, secondly, to track
prohibited angle of attack, any excess of which was punishable as if by a precondition
to stall, the pilot had to visually, “by eye”, what in battle in general
unacceptable.
But nevertheless, we agreed to repeat air battles even with
restrictions on our aircraft. Unfortunately, by that time Sergei Askanov
died in a MiG-29 crash, other people were involved in the experiment. When I
flew to Lipetsk and they showed me the results of this new fighting program, and
pilots and specialists clearly felt uneasy at the obvious stretching of their
results in favor of Sy-27.
And Alik Kharchevsky, a pilot at the Center, simply told me:
- Here, Valery Evgenievich, now the picture is a little better. It's finally happened
the advantage of Cy-27 appears.
- And if you lower the restrictions on the MiG-29 even further, then air battles will not
will be needed,” I answered.
They offered to conduct an air battle with the Sy-27 on a twin MiG-29, and I
did not refuse. For the first minute and a half of the battle, we moved along the trajectory
going to the place necessary for the attack with all possible
ways. We quite quickly managed to create an advantage for ourselves to enter
attacking the target, we sat on the “tail” of the Sy-27 and spent the rest of the battle without getting off
him. We must pay tribute to the Sy-27 pilot, he piloted well, but the battle was all
we won just the same.
True, Alik tried to convince me that the pilot was chosen poorly and that
if he conducts the battle himself, the result will be different. But the fact of the matter is that
the result of the experiment should not depend on qualifications
pilot
Despite everything, we were satisfied with the results of repeated air battles,
and most importantly, we managed to find out how to behave against a “bunch” of F-15s -
F-16. And for us this became the main result of the training air battles.
In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the Lipetsk Combat Weapons Center and
his pilots. As I already said, this Center brings together the entire elite of our aviation
Air Force. A lot depends on his work. Sometimes the pilots of the institute see
airplane those shortcomings (from the point of view of combat use) that we,
test pilots, we cannot identify. And all their methodological developments,
based on experiments and research, provide rich food for thought
aircraft designers.
I remember with gratitude Sergei Askanov, Hero of Russia, a pilot with great
letters, my friend. He gave a new impetus to the work of his team, was his
soul. I remember such bright pilots as Alik Kharchevsky (with him we
brought together not only by common work, but also by personal friendship), Alexander Troshchev, major
Viktor Sheloganov (unfortunately, he died during testing of the aircraft), Nikolai Chaga.
They not only criticized certain shortcomings of the equipment, but also suggested
ways to eliminate them. With such a creative approach to work, they noticeably
stood out among the Center's flight personnel. I think that at another turn of fate they
could have become brilliant test pilots and great military leaders.
It was a pleasure working with them. We had many difficult moments in
relationships, but they were always resolved at the business level.
I would like to wish the Center and all its pilots health, success and good luck.
BELYAKOV'S MISTAKES
Belyakov did not want to make the MiG-29MZ, and this was his strategic mistake. This
there was a machine of almost “Mig” size, but it made it possible to perform tasks with
the range of action is greater than that of the Sy-27M, and it also solved problems
multifunctional fighter. Rostislav Apollosovich had peculiar
concerns. He thought that this device would “cut off the oxygen” to our main machine -
MFI fighter. The MiG-29MZ was a modernization of the MiG-29M - welded
the aluminum-lithium alloy structure was 10 percent larger in area
more than the MiG-29, plus a forward-controlled horizontal one was added
plumage. This multi-role fighter with a range of about 4000 km,
equipped with in-flight refueling, it was intended for conquest
superiority in the air and for working against ground point targets in complex
weather conditions day and night. Fighter MFI - multifunctional fighter
fifth generation - was in the size of Sy-27, but the level of its combat complex,
made using the "stele" technology, reached the level
fighters of the 21st century. I told Belyakov that his fears were in vain, but
It was impossible to convince him, after all, he had the thinking of former times.
This was his mistake, which the leadership of the Ministry immediately took advantage of
defense, although, in theory"; 1 it was precisely this that should have convinced Belyakov to accept
order required by the Air Force. But here personal motives came to the fore, and this
the strategic mistake cost us dearly...
At our company, as at others, the general designer was actually
autocratic boss, there was no need to talk about collegial decisions.
Of course, various councils were held at which certain
questions, but everyone looked at the general’s mouth, his word was the last. I think
There should be such unity of command in management, and all decisions and demands
the instructions must be followed strictly, but at a preliminary stage
there should be a wider discussion. Unfortunately, in practice this is almost not the case.
it happens: everyone adapts to their superiors and there is a sense of collegiality
more ostentatious character. There are, of course, heated debates, but when it comes
As for cool decisions at the general level, there’s not much to talk about here.
And this is the main and main mistake in management. She, alas, is characteristic not only
for our design bureau, in which, in principle, there was more collegiality than at the company
Sukhoi.
I must say that this is typical for most enterprises that decide
large-scale government tasks, this was the leadership style of that time,
style developed by a certain system of government - as a state as a whole,
and its institutions of power, production, and, to a lesser extent, culture.
I personally cannot complain in this sense about the lack of attention to me and
to other pilots from Belyakov. On the contrary, I cannot remember a case
whenever he would not accept me and listen carefully to the story about those
problems with which I came to him. It was with his help that I solved everything
pressing issues related to equipment and flight personnel. The only thing is
What was required from me was a clear argumentation of the question, preferably confirmed
digital material, or specific visual motivation.
By the way, I learned this way of asking the question from our chief designers during
led by Belyakov, and this is truly an incomparable school of personal growth.
Another mistake of Belyakov, tactical, is the inability to build relationships with the average
a member of the leadership of the Air Force and the ministries of defense and aviation industry.
With his knowledge, he stood out noticeably among general designers in history
aviation there were few such highly educated, knowledgeable, high
the intellect of specialists like Rostislav Apollosovich. But he lacked flexibility
in relationships with people. He could, for example, openly, in front of a large crowd of people,
make very unflattering critical remarks to the military, which, of course, is not
they might have liked it, since the authority being criticized by these remarks is not
added. This negative attitude boomeranged back to the company.
I remember at one of the meetings, it seems, in Irkutsk, which was conducted by the highest
composition of the leadership of the ministries of defense and aviation industry, Belyakov
spoke quite sharply about some of the actions of the Air Force leadership, in particular
weapons service, which was then commanded by Mishyk. Hearing an impartial
criticism addressed to him, he turned all purple, and everyone saw it. When we
were returning to Moscow, he said to Mikhail Romanovich Waldenberg:
- What do you think, I will forgive Belyakov such a rinse in front of all the honest people?
Hey, Belyakov, hold on, I’ll say my word again!
And Belyakov had many such blunders, and he made them without any malice
intent, guided solely by the interests of the case. He just wanted
point out the negligence of some workers, their incompetence, but did
This is in a very offensive and clumsy form. Still, at the same time, he had to comply
tact and remember that the military is a particularly vulnerable people, criticism
They are not allowed to have any leadership at all. Therefore, if someone starts
criticize the military leadership in public, in front of subordinates, they don’t do that
forgets and does not forgive. We often got it because of this.
In this respect, Mikhail Petrovich Simonov differed favorably from Belyakov, he
did not make such mistakes, preferring to remain silent once again or even
it is undeserved to praise the leadership of the military department. Therefore, the allies
there was always a lot of it. In addition, Belyakov was “charged” with one or two
certain leaders - as a rule, it was the Minister of Defense or
head of the Central Committee department (for example, Ustinov) - and worked with them directly, a lot
achieving precisely by decisions taken at a high level. He was an armchair
The general designer rarely left his office. Although, of course, he too
I had to go to Vladimirovka and other training grounds to participate in
various meetings at the Ministry of Aviation Industry. But from the living
working with middle management of the Air Force and the Ministry of Defense, he practically
He completely refused and did not allow the chief designers to develop these relations. AND
they, bound by such an attitude of the general, could not fully demonstrate
your organizational skills. But also the activity of such chief designers,
like Vasilchenko, Waldenberg, Belosvet, could not replace the activity
general Such a sedentary lifestyle-leadership had exclusively
negative consequences for the company.
Outwardly, Belyakov looked arrogant, although, in essence, he was a modest person. His
intellectual superiority in disputes with superiors was obvious, he did not
embarrassed, he put leaders of any level in their place if they were wrong.
Of course, this caused irritation in the circles of the highest military department and
Air Force. While Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov was healthy, many were forced
swallow bitter pills from Belyakov, but when he was left without
high-ranking defense, offended bosses took out their hostility on him
in full. And this could not but affect both his career and fate
companies.
I talked with many leaders, and they unanimously told me:
- You ask your Belyakov when was the last time he was in Pirogovka? When
was he in our offices? No one can even remember this. And Mikhail
Petrovich can even go to the head of the department and spend five to ten minutes with him
talk, and for that it will be a holiday!
In Belyakov’s terms, he should not have stooped to such communication, but I believe
that Mikhail Petrovich was absolutely right in this regard. First of all, so
This made it much easier for him to achieve his goals; secondly, everything was simple to him.
were treated well at different levels. And the result was obvious. And this is correct:
the general designer must communicate with various managers of the middle
link In this way, they will know the general better, and he will know better
true requests and requirements of precisely those people who are working on the topic and
she is directly led. Mikhail Petrovich’s position here was very
positive, and against his background Belyakov looked unprofitable. Which means they increased
points for one company and decreased for another.
Rostislav Apollosovich Belyakov has always been an intelligent, honest person, in people he
did not tolerate narrow-mindedness, rudeness and adventurism. Among the general
designers treated him like a patriarch - not because of his age, but because
the level of his talent and knowledge. He was a recognized leader who enjoyed great
respect in your environment. True, many employees of the Ministry of Defense
and the High Command, which Belyakov could sometimes besiege, belonged to him
hostile. Belyakov’s laurels especially haunted Simonov, and when he became
Deputy Minister of Aviation Industry, his negative attitude towards
He transferred Rostislav Apollosovich to Mikoyanov’s company.
When one of the most powerful organizers in the aviation industry, I.S.
Silaev was up for a promotion, he said a lot of kind words to our company,
and R. A. Belyakov personally. And among his close friends he bitterly admitted that
some comrades (meaning primarily Simonov) tried to cool him down
feelings both for this person and for our company.
Belyakov was simply not ready for the new era and the rules that it
dictated. He is accustomed to strict compliance with governing documents, to
effectiveness and efficiency of the decisions of the Central Committee of the party and the government, and here
suddenly it turned out that even the president’s decrees do not apply.
I think history will remember the name of Rostislav Apollosovich with gratitude more than once
Belyakov, who gave a whole galaxy of brilliant students - designers and
heads of aviation enterprises and institutes. But his main achievement
talent - these are beautiful aircraft created under his leadership in our
team. All over the world they know that Mikoyan machines are the simplest in
control and the most durable and reliable in operation. MiG is a fighter aircraft,
machine for combat.
Recently, a dispute has escalated on the Internet around the current state of affairs in the field of equipping the domestic Air Force with combat aircraft. Particular emphasis is placed on the obvious advantage that the Sukhoi Design Bureau has, and the almost complete loss of the once strong position of the MiG Design Bureau. There are debates regarding the advisability of equipping our Air Force exclusively with Su aircraft. The legitimate questions that are raised are why all the orders go to one company, while the second one is degrading and undeservedly forgotten.
The nature of the discussion reaches open accusations of unscrupulousness of the Sukhoi company, and on the other hand, the machines based on it began to be called obviously weak, unnecessary and unpromising. There is also an opposite opinion - the MiG-29 is a real masterpiece, which the Sukhovites deliberately crushed. It becomes a shame, and it’s a shame for both sides at the same time, since Sukhoi’s excellent aircraft are deservedly in demand, and the MiG-29 is an aircraft no worse and also deserves the most enthusiastic reviews. But why, despite all this, do we not see new MiGs in service, and the old Soviet-built 29s are almost out of service? We will try to answer these questions, dotting all the “Is” as far as possible.
In order to understand why the MiG-29 became exactly the way we are used to seeing them, we need to go back into distant history. The origins of both aircraft lie in the late 60s, when the Air Force began the PFI program, a promising front-line fighter to replace the existing aircraft fleet.
It is worth clarifying here that in the USSR the Air Force was not the only one that operated combat aircraft. The air defense forces were almost an equal player. The number of fighters in their composition even exceeded the number of those in the Air Force. But for obvious reasons, the air defense forces did not have bombers and attack aircraft - their task was to intercept attacking enemy aircraft, and not to carry out retaliatory strikes. Therefore, there was a clear division in the country between front-line fighters and fighter-interceptors. The first went to the Air Force, the second to the Air Defense. The former were, as a rule, light, maneuverable and inexpensive aircraft, while the latter were more complex, more expensive, had more powerful avionics, high altitude and flight speed.
Thus, it was the Air Force that initially launched the PFI program. However, for the first time, a front-line fighter was given quite difficult tasks. The reason for this was the appearance in the United States of the powerful F-15 fighter, capable of long-range air combat. Intelligence reported that the plane was almost ready and would fly in the early 70s. An adequate response was needed, which is what the PFI program became. For the first time, a front-line aviation fighter under this program was supposed to acquire substantial dimensions and powerful avionics, previously characteristic only of air defense fighters.
However, almost immediately the PFI program began to be divided into two subtypes - LPFI (light front-line fighter), and TPFI (heavy front-line fighter). The rationale for this approach was numerous. The fleet of two types of aircraft promised to be more flexible in use. In addition, information appeared about a similar approach in the United States - a lightweight F-16 was already being prepared for flight there. There were also opponents of this concept, who believed that two types of aircraft complicate operation, supply, personnel training, etc. And most importantly, building a large series of a “light” fighter does not make sense - it is obviously weaker than the American F-15, as a result of which such a fighter will simply become a mass prey for the American.
Initially, the leader in the PFI competition immediately stood out - the Sukhoi Design Bureau, which presented a project for an aircraft with an integral layout that looked promising. OKB "MiG" presented an aircraft close to the classic one, similar to the MiG-25. From the very beginning, Yakovlev OKB was not considered as a leader. When dividing the PFI into heavy and light, it is important to understand that initially, before the division, the single aircraft was seen as heavy, with a take-off weight of about 25-30 tons, so the light fighter competition became a kind of offshoot and addition to the main competition. Since Sukhoi was already in the lead in the “heavy” project, the “light” version was quickly intercepted by the MiG design bureau, also showing a new project for an integrated aircraft.
The initial design of the MiG-29 is not an integral layout according to the PFI project
Already during the competition, customers of the air defense forces joined in. They were only interested in the “heavy” version, as it met the requirements of a long flight and powerful avionics. Thus, the heavy version has become a universal project - both front-line and interceptor fighter. It managed to more or less reconcile the conflicting requirements of two departments - the Air Force and Air Defense.
The essence of the differences between light and heavy fighters
After dividing the program into light and heavy, their differences were not clearly defined for a long time. Everyone seemed to understand what the essence was, but they could not formally define it. Modern analysts are also haunted by this problem - they have difficulty understanding why there were two planes in the first place. Far-fetched explanations are used about how lightweight is more maneuverable, half the price, etc. Heavy - long range. All these definitions reflect only the consequences of adopting the concept of two fighters of different weight classes, or are completely false. For example, a light fighter has never been half the price of a heavy one.
However, an acceptable formulation of the differences was found during the design of aircraft. And it is key to understanding the differences between these aircraft. A light fighter (MiG-29) had to operate in its own information field, at a tactical depth, and a heavy (Su-27) fighter, in addition, had to be able to operate outside the information field of its troops.
This meant that the MiG should not fly more than 100 km deep into enemy territory, and its guidance and combat control was carried out from ground control posts. Thanks to this, it was possible to save on the composition of avionics, simplifying the aircraft as much as possible, and thereby improve flight characteristics and make the aircraft widespread and inexpensive. In those years, “expensive” did not mean cost (money was given “as much as needed”), but mass production (complexity of the product, labor-intensive assembly), the ability to assemble such aircraft quickly and in large quantities. In terms of armament, the main caliber was the R-60 (and later R-73) heat-seeking missiles, which in some cases complemented the R-27. The onboard radar had a stable detection range no greater than the launch range of the R-27 missiles, essentially serving as a radar sight for these missiles. Complex and expensive electronic warfare or communications equipment was not provided.
The Su-27, on the contrary, had to be able to rely only on its own strength. He had to independently conduct reconnaissance, analyze the situation and attack. He was supposed to go behind enemy lines and cover his bombers in deep raids and intercept enemy targets over his territory, ensuring isolation of the theater of operations. We did not expect our own ground control posts and radar stations on enemy territory. Therefore, a powerful onboard radar was immediately required, capable of seeing further and more than its “light” counterpart. The flight range is twice that of the MiG, and the main armament is the R-27, supplemented by the long arm R-27E (high energy) and R-73 close-in missiles.
The radar was not just a sight, but also a means of illuminating the air situation and reconnaissance. They had to have their own electronic warfare equipment and powerful communications. The ammunition load is twice that of a light one, because it may be necessary to fight for a long time and with high tension, separated from your own forces. At the same time, the aircraft had to remain capable of conducting maneuverable combat, like a light fighter, because over enemy territory, he could meet not only his “heavy” opponents in the form of the F-15 and F-14, but also the F-16, optimized for “dog dumps”.
A powerful radar with a large-diameter antenna gives the Su-27 very broad capabilities, which is unattainable for the MiG-29 with a smaller-diameter antenna. Some advantage of the MiG in air combat with a heavy fighter is only a slightly smaller EPR.
Briefly, we can say that the Su-27 was an aircraft for gaining air superiority in the theater of operations as a whole, and the MiG-29 solved the more specific task of covering its troops from enemy air strikes over the line of contact.
Despite the fact that both aircraft were initially bred into different weight categories, competition between them began to appear almost immediately. Various research institutes and specialists expressed very different opinions on this matter. The two-machine system was regularly criticized. At the same time, some called for “pulling up” the light to the level of the heavy, while others called for abandoning the light, concentrating all efforts on the more effective “heavy”.
The two-aircraft system was also assessed on a financial basis. It turned out that it is impossible to make LFI at half the price of PFI. This is worth remembering because in modern debates the MiG is often argued to be a cheap but effective aircraft. This is wrong. By Soviet standards, where no money was spared on defense, the LFI, costing 0.75 of the PFI, was a completely inexpensive aircraft. Today, the concept of “inexpensive” looks completely different.
The final decision on the fate of the two aircraft remained with the USSR Ministry of Defense - both aircraft are needed, each will occupy its own niche and they will not interfere with each other. This is how it happened in the Soviet weapons system.
In service
By 1991, both aircraft were established and firmly in service. Of exceptional interest is how they were distributed among the Air Force and Air Defense staff.
The Air Force's fighter aircraft consisted of 735 MiG-29s, 190 Su-27s and 510 MiG-23s. There were also about 600 MiG-21s, but they were all concentrated in training regiments. In the most powerful and combat-ready Air Force formation, the 16th Air Army in the GDR, there were 249 MiG-29s and 36 MiG-23s, and not a single Su-27. It was the MiGs that formed the basis of front-line aviation, becoming the main striking force of the Air Force. The southern flank of the Soviet group was supported by the 36th VA in Hungary with its 66 MiG-29s and 20 MiG-23s.
Simply beautiful MiG-29
It would seem that the current state of affairs clearly demonstrates which aircraft the Soviet command considered to be the main and best. There were not a single Su-27 in the forward units. However, the situation is somewhat more complicated. The MiG-29 was supposed to become a consumable material for the outbreak of the world war, repelling the first strike. It was assumed that a significant number of these aircraft would quickly perish, but would ensure the deployment and launch of an offensive by the USSR ground forces and the Department of Internal Affairs.
Breathing at the back of the troops stationed in the GDR were troops in Poland and Ukraine, which were supposed to develop the initial success of the army. And now all the Su-27 FA Air Forces were there - two regiments in Poland (74 Su-27s) and one regiment in Mirgorod (40 Su-27s). In addition, it is obvious that the rearmament of the Air Force with the Su-27 was far from complete; the 831st IAP in Mirgorod received the Su-27 in 1985, the 159th IAP in 1987, and the 582nd IAP in 1989. Those. The saturation of the Air Force FA with Su-27 fighters proceeded quite steadily, which cannot be said about the air defense, where over the same time period two times more aircraft of this type were received.
There were practically no MiG-29s in the air defense forces (in combat units - not a single one, and in total there were about 15 MiG-29s in the air defense forces, but they were concentrated in the Combat Training Center of the Air Defense IA) and about 360 Su-27s (and besides that, 430 MiG-25, 410 MiG-31, 355 Su-15, 1300 MiG-23). Those. at the start of serial production, MiGs went exclusively to front-line aviation, and Sushki first began to enter the air defense forces - in 1984, they appeared in the 60th air defense aviation regiment (Dzemgi airfield). This is logical, since the primary need for 4th generation fighters of the Air Force was covered by the MiGs. And in the air defense forces at that time, the bulk of the MiG-23 and Su-15 could only be replaced by the Su-27. The MiG-31 stood apart and primarily replaced the aging MiG-25.
In addition to the Air Force and Air Defense, the Navy aviation also received 4th generation fighters - it consisted of about 70 MiG-29s. However, as a promising deck-based option, the sailors chose the Su-27K variant - as it has a long flight duration and powerful avionics, which is important in sea conditions. The MiG-29 ended up in the Navy because of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which provides concessions for naval aviation. This is how two regiments of the 29th in Moldova and the Odessa region ended up with the sailors. They were not of great value in the role of naval fighters.
Simply beautiful Su-27
An important point in understanding the role and place of the MiG-29 and Su-27 was export deliveries. Here an amazing picture emerges - the Su-27 was not delivered abroad during Soviet times. But the MiG-29 began to actively enter the Air Force of the Soviet allies. On the one hand, this was determined by the peculiarities of the geography of these countries - there was simply nowhere for the Su-27 to deploy there. On the other hand, the Su-27, as a more complex and expensive aircraft, was “secret”, and the MiG-29, being a simpler aircraft, was easily allowed to be produced outside the native Air Force.
Thus, in the USSR Armed Forces, two new generation aircraft did not compete with each other, each solving its own task. By the end of the existence of the USSR, the fighter weapons system consisted of three types of promising aircraft - the light MiG-29 for the Air Force FA, the universal heavy Su-27 for both the Air Force FA and the Air Defense Agency, and the MiG-aircraft, which does not lend itself to fighter “weight” classification. 31 - exclusively for air defense intelligence. But already in 1991, this orderly system began to collapse along with the country, giving rise to a new round of internal competition between two wonderful fighters.
On the issue of classification
The debate still rages on about what kind of fighter actually came out of the MiG-29 project? Light or not so easy? It gets to the point that ordinary people consider the MiG to be a kind of “medium” fighter, occupying an intermediate position between light and heavy.
In fact, the concepts of “light” and “heavy” were initially very arbitrary and relative. They existed together, within the framework of the PFI program, and their appearance was caused by the need to somehow separate the projects of two new fighters within the same program. The LPFI, the future MiG-29, became lightweight, and it was not lightweight on its own, but precisely in combination with the future Su-27. Without the Su-27, the concept of “light” becomes meaningless.
As for the USSR Air Force and Air Defense, there was no weight classification. The air defense had interceptor fighters, the air force had front-line fighters. It’s just that the needs of the Air Force were such that they always had mostly smaller, simpler and cheaper vehicles. And in the air defense there was also the MiG-31, which was very, very heavy even compared to the Su-27. So such a weight classification is very arbitrary.
Compared to its foreign counterparts, the MiG-29 looked quite traditional. The competitors F-16, Rafale, EF-2000 had almost the same weights and dimensions. For most countries operating these aircraft, they are neither light aircraft nor anything else. They are typically the only type of fighter in service with most countries. Nevertheless, in terms understandable to the average person, all these aircraft can be combined into a subclass of “light”, against the backdrop of the clearly larger Su-27, F-15, F-22, PAK-FA. The only exception in this series will be the American F/A-18, which is indeed located almost exactly in the middle between standard “light” and standard “heavy” fighters, but it is worth remembering that this is a very specific machine, created according to special, naval requirements based on aircraft carriers.
As for the MiG-31, with its dimensions and weight it is a unique exception that does not exist anywhere else. Formally, it is also “heavy”, like the Su-27, although the difference in maximum take-off weights reaches one and a half times.
To be continued…
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