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All-metal Tupolev heavy trucks.

1924 became a special year for the Tupolev team. The few years they were given to accumulate experience have expired. The Air Force Command raised the question of creating the first Soviet bomber. According to Tupolev, the new aircraft was supposed to be a novelty monoplane with a cantilever wing. It was in the wing design that Tupolev made revolutionary changes, which were then picked up by designers all over the world and are used to this day. For the first time in the history of aviation, on the ANT-4 bomber, in serial production called TB-1 (heavy bomber 1st model), Tupolev made a wing of variable section. Thick at the root, it gradually thinned out and became very thin towards the end. It was in the thick part of the wing that Tupolev decided to install engine nacelles and place gas tanks here. As a result, he immediately killed two birds with one stone. Firstly, thanks to the thick wing at the root, he was able to install engines on a monoplane. And he killed the second hare by placing additional gas tanks, again in the wings. As a result, the bomber's flight radius increased sharply. But Tupolev was able to implement his ideas only because the plane was made of corrugated duralumin. It would be impossible to make such a wing from wood. Now duralumin allowed Tupolev to create a machine that was unique at that time, which had a maximum weight of 7.8 tons and could lift up to 3.5 tons of bomb load.

On November 26, 1925, ANT-4 (TB-1) went on its first test flight. The tests very thoroughly and comprehensively confirmed that the Red Army received an excellent bomber from AGOS. It is interesting to note that the characteristics of the TB-1 were compared with the recently purchased French twin-engine bomber Farman-Goliath F-62. The French aircraft, built according to a biplane design, was inferior to the TB-1 in both speed and bomb load. After all, the TB-1 could reach a speed of about 200 km/h and with a load of 1 ton of bombs could cover a distance of 1350 km when installing imported Napier-Lyon engines. After the tests, it was decided to put the TB-1 into mass production. And subsequently 216 of the first Soviet bombers were produced.

The design of the new four-engine heavy bomber TB-3 (ANT-6) at the A.N. Tupolev Design Bureau began in 1925. The plane was supposed to be gigantic. The wingspan is 42 meters, the fuselage length is 25 meters. The cockpit rose above the ground when the plane was at the airfield, by as much as five meters. And this colossus made of corrugated duralumin was no longer supported by the usual two wheels, but by a cart with two pairs of wheels. In principle, the main decisions of the TB-3 were the same as the TB-1, with the only difference being that the second heavy bomber was much larger than the first. The take-off weight of the aircraft was 21 tons. There has never been such a giant in the history of aviation. Its crew consisted of 8 people, including the radio operator. Mechanics crawled inside the wings of the plane to monitor the operation of 4 engines. The TB-3 was protected from attack by enemy fighters by 8 machine guns. It carried a bomb load of 2 tons. The flight range was close to 2.5 thousand kilometers, and the speed was 300 km/h. However, the TB-3 was able to develop such a speed when it was equipped with 4 M-34 Mikulin engines equipped with aircraft gearboxes. The prototype was flown into the air by pilot M.M. Gromov on December 22, 1930. After successful flight tests, the aircraft was recommended for serial production. Serial production began in 1932. The first production vehicles were equipped with M-17 liquid-cooled engines.

In 1931, under the leadership of A.A. Mikulin, the first successful powerful engine of the domestic design, M-34, was created. The serial TB-3 began to be equipped with these engines. With the continuous improvement of the M-34 engine, the bomber also improved. Since 1934, the TB-3 was produced with geared M-34R and since 1935, M-34RN, equipped with superchargers, which significantly improved the flight characteristics of the aircraft. The latest modification, TB-3, with even more powerful M-34FRN engines, has been produced since 1936. In 1936, pilot Yumashev A.B. The TB-3 set several world records for lifting loads to heights. In 1937, on four specially converted aircraft, the crews of pilots M.V. Vodopyanov, V.S. Molokov, I.P. Mazuruk and A.D. Alekseev carried out a unique aerial operation to land on ice in the area of ​​the North Pole of a polar expedition led by I.D. Papanin. A large number of TB-3 (G-2) with weapons removed were used as cargo and passenger aircraft in the Far North and south of the country. A total of 818 aircraft of this type were built. In the early 1930s, AGOS was faced with several very difficult tasks. First of all, it was necessary to ensure, and in a very short time, the serial production of TB-1 and TB-3.

In 1929, the TsAGI team made a socialist commitment: to complete the ANT-9 passenger aircraft based on the TB-1 by May 1. And by the specified date the plane was ready. The aircraft is named "Wings of the Soviets" and M.M. Gromov with eight passengers on board performs a demonstration flight of the ANT-9 along the route Moscow - Berlin - Paris - Rome - Marseille - London - Berlin - Warsaw - Moscow.

Journalist Mikhail Koltsov told about how the flight took place in his report: “Except for the noise, the passengers of the Soviet air yacht are in complete comfort. The cabin is spacious and wide, almost like a Moscow tram. The seats are excellent. You can sit in them and watch through the wide carriage windows, you can recline and, having released the belt, lie in an almost horizontal position. In the cabin (Koltsov calls the cabin the cabin. Author's note.) there are two steamer-buffet-type lockers, curtains, curtains, luggage nets, even a tiny hallway with a hanger. the area is approximately the same as in new Moscow cooperative apartments. And, finally, the restroom, which leads to the simple-minded delight of everyone examining the plane, there is no great need for this institution, it is designed more to demonstrate the current human well-being in the air, they say, everything is like that of people. and even here you are. During the long journey, no one used the small compartment for its intended purpose; only one of the passengers retired six times and, as it turned out, complacently smoked there, which is strictly prohibited and quite dangerous.”

With the release of "Wings of the Soviets" our aviation industry began a new stage. The West did not believe in our successes: they did not believe that Soviet industry had gone a hundred miles ahead because it was difficult to believe where in a backward country such advanced precision technical production could be established. In 1931, production vehicles began to be produced with three Soviet M-26 engines, and then with American Wright engines (300 hp). However, the M-26 turned out to be unreliable, and supplies of American engines soon ceased. The engine problem was solved at the end of 1931, when the plane was equipped with two M-17 engines instead of three. The power plant was completely taken from the military R-6 (modification of TB-1 for aerial reconnaissance). In this modification, the aircraft was mass-produced under the name PS-9. A total of 66 production aircraft were produced, most of which were PS-9.

In 1931, Tupolev gave Arkhangelsky the task of developing a large five-engine passenger aircraft, the ANT-14, based on the TB-3 bomber. The plane turned out to be huge for those times. For 32 passengers, not including 5 crew. Newspapers enthusiastically described the spacious passenger compartment, the size of a tram car, a buffet and other amenities. Four engines were located on the wings, and the fifth in the nose of the fuselage. And although the total engine power was not very high for such a large aircraft, only 2,400 horsepower, the ANT-14 easily took off even from small airfields, since the aircraft’s takeoff run was 250-300 meters. The Pravda's cruising speed was 200 km/h, and by boosting the engines, it reached a speed of 236 km/h. The Pravda plane spent almost ten years in the air. During this time, it carried about 40 thousand passengers. And when the life of the machine ran out, the plane was brought to the Central Park of Culture and Leisure in Moscow and... they made a cinema in its cabin, where short films were shown.

With the advent of durable and rigid duralumin, it became possible to create a new generation of heavy aircraft with a smooth skin. One of the first such machines was a long-range bomber, designed on the basis of the TB-3 bomber by the design team of the N.E. Air Force Academy. Zhukovsky. This team was headed by V.F. Bolkhovitinov. The technical requirements for the new aircraft were very strict: the speed must be at least 310 km/h, the ceiling must be 6-7 thousand m, the payload capacity must be up to 5 tons. Work on the design and construction of the bomber, called DB-A (long-range bomber of the Academy), soon began, and already in 1934 the first copy of the aircraft was ready. It represented a significant step in the design of multi-engine vehicles. Smooth skin, semi-monocoque fuselage, metal propellers, retractable landing gear wheels, six-meter long bomb bays, a servomotor to control the front turret... The designers tried to find application for all the aircraft manufacturing innovations of that time. Its first flight took place on May 2, 1935. The designers' calculations were completely confirmed, and the speed achieved during the test was even higher than the expected 330 km/h, 40 km/h more than that of the TB-3. The reason for such a significant increase was the high aerodynamic quality; its value for this aircraft reached 15 units. The plane could freely perform turns with a bank of up to 60°. An installation series of ten DB-A vehicles was laid down, and by the end of 1938, five of them flew along the Kazan-Sverdlovsk-Omsk-Ulan-Ude-Khabarovsk route, and were later used to deliver mail and cargo to the Far East.

On a quiet August evening in 1937, a four-engine Soviet airship DB-A took off from the Shchelkovo airfield and headed north. The crew of the car was faced with the task of making a record non-stop flight Moscow - North Pole - Alaska. The plane was commanded by the famous polar pilot, participant in the Chelyuskin epic, Hero of the Soviet Union S.A. Levanevsky. Unlike the famous flights of the crews of V.P. Chkalov and M.M. Gromov on the ANT-25, the flight to DB-A was carried out with a solid commercial load, which, in principle, predetermined future regular flights... For almost a day (20 hours 17 minutes) the flight went smoothly. Radio communication between the command post and the airship remained stable and was carried out in accordance with a pre-agreed plan. The only alarming thing was that starting from the middle of the Barents Sea the plane was flying in completely cloudy conditions. Having passed the North Pole, Levanevsky directed the car along the 148th parallel, in the direction of the city of Fairbanks in Alaska. At 14:32 a radiogram was received saying that the rightmost engine had failed due to damage to the oil line. Then the connection deteriorated sharply. Over the next three hours, two more radiograms were received at the command post. All that could be understood from them was that the flight continued. Then the connection was completely interrupted... Despite a large-scale search undertaken, in which 24 Soviet and 7 foreign aircraft took part, traces of the missing expedition could not be found.

1932 First victories of TB-3.

The first victories of the new all-metal heavy bombers of the Tupolev Design Bureau TB-3 turned out to be, oddly enough, purely peaceful, but of enormous political and strategic importance for the USSR and potential aggressors who were hatching plans to attack the young state of workers and peasants.

The enormous attention that the Central Committee of the Party paid to the work of AGOS was the result of an understanding of the role that TB-3 could play in a future war, especially since the situation in the world was alarming. In the Far East, Japanese militarists went on the offensive. In 1905, they managed to defeat the Russian army and capture the cities of Port Arthur and Dalniy, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. Five years later, the Japanese captured Korea. During the civil war, they tried to turn Soviet Primorye into their colony. But the Red Army and the Far Eastern partisans quickly made it felt that the times of Tsarist Russia were gone forever. However, the samurai did not calm down. In 1931, they occupied Manchuria, placing the puppet emperor Pu-yi on the throne there. Now Japanese troops stood along the entire Manchurian border face to face with the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army.

What was the basis of the strategy of the Japanese generals who dreamed of Soviet Primorye again? No matter how paradoxical it is, impunity. The Far East is Far East because it is far from Moscow. Russian communications are stretched, the supply of reserves and the supply of troops is difficult. (Then a fast train from Moscow to Vladivostok took 10 days.) The Japanese fleet dominates the sea. Consequently, the Land of the Rising Sun will not even feel that there is a war going on in Primorye. This, at first glance, logical scheme, already successfully tested in the war against Tsarist Russia, was broken in one fell swoop by the formidable step of the Red Army command. An armada of 150 TB-3, the first vehicles that had just left the factories and entered service with the Air Force, was transferred to the Far East in a matter of days. And the range of action of Soviet bomb carriers was such that almost all of Japan could be covered with a bomb carpet. And... the samurai became quiet. Of course, border violations continued, but the army was not deployed. True, then we still had to cross arms, but this was only a few years later, on Khalkhin Gol. And during this time the troops were further strengthened. The Far East has become even more inaccessible. Komsomolsk-on-Amur grew, the Pacific Fleet became stronger. Typically, combat aircraft are evaluated in battle. But TB-3 did not have to fight in the Far East; at that moment they did a lot to cool the warlike ardor of the samurai. And this is their historical merit. And their creators too.

In 1934, the well-known “ceremonial dozen” TB-3 was assembled at plant No. 22, which was intended for a series of flights to Warsaw, Rome and Paris. They were assembled to special order and the cars were distinguished by improved aerodynamics (stabilizer and fin fairings, improved engine hoods) and finishing. These vehicles had no weapons. But in the bomb bays there were sofas upholstered in velvet. The wheels in the carts were equipped with brakes, and the spokes of the front wheels were covered with caps. The planes were painted white and had fake civilian registration numbers that matched the factory ones. Soviet bombers made a proper impression in European capitals. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force Khripin, who participated in two flights, wrote in his report: “The entire officer and engineering staff treated our aircraft with exceptional interest, seeing in them a successful solution to the problem of a heavy bomber aircraft. This applies equally to Poland, Austria and Italy. Everyone emphasizes the surprise that such a large aircraft has high flight performance. This emphasizes that our success in the construction of TB aviation is real and this will be taken into account by the command of the European air fleets."

Opinions about these “goodwill missions” expressed in European newspapers were sometimes close to panic. Thus, one of the leading reporters of the British weekly "Independent" wrote, "while in Europe they are arguing about the value of Douai's theory, the Reds have already actually implemented it, demonstrating powerful four-engine bombers that are significantly superior to British machines of a similar purpose," and the correspondent of the French "Petit Parisien" was generally hysterical stated that “five hundred Russian bomb carriers can crush Europe like a rotten egg...”

1937 In the skies of China.

TB-3 first took part in combat operations in the summer and autumn of 1937. They acted against the “internal enemy” - the Basmachi in the Pamirs. To support the operations of border guards and units of the Red Army, 30 R-5s and three TB-3s were then brought in. The latter transported people and goods to hard-to-reach areas.

And the first war in which these machines were involved was the Japanese-Chinese one. Shortly after the Japanese attack, on August 21, China and the USSR entered into a mutual assistance treaty. Already in September, the Soviet leadership began to carry out Operation Zet - the supply of combat aircraft to China. In mid-September, they began to select crews for TB-3. As a matter of fact, these machines have been in Chinese skies before. Bombers of the Trans-Baikal District Air Force from time to time got lost and ended up in the airspace of their neighbors. Since the Chinese not only did not have air defense, but also did not have an intelligent surveillance service, everything ended well. Unless, according to the reports of our border guards, it was possible to end up in trouble. So, in February 1934, pilot Kostromin crossed the border on a night flight, but after 50 minutes, having gained his bearings, he returned to our side.

Now we were talking about servicing the Alma-Ata-Lanzhou route, along which they were going to ferry planes to China. Transport TB-3, along with ANT-9 and DB-3, transported specialists and cargo along it. Soon fighters and high-speed bombers flew along the route to China. Then the question arose about transferring the TB-ZRN batch to the Chinese side. On October 22, six heavy bombers flew to Alma-Ata. The planes were not new; they had already been in service with the Red Army Air Force for about a year. Four cars were taken from the 23rd TAB and two were transported from Rostov. The detachment was commanded by Captain Dontsov. Unlike the I-16 and I-15bis fighters and SB bombers, a significant portion of which were to be flown by Soviet pilots, the TB-3s were intended for use by the Chinese. Our crews acted only as drivers and instructors.

The planes took off from Almaty with additional cargo: ten FAB-100 bombs in the fuselage and two FAB-500 or four FAB-250 bombs under the wings. In addition, they carried two rounds of ammunition. On October 27, TB-3 landed in Urumqi and then continued along the highway without incident until Lanzhou, where they arrived on the 31st. Here the planes were officially handed over to the Chinese authorities. Soviet identification marks were painted over already in Almaty. Now, white twelve-pointed stars on a blue background were applied to the planes and the fuselage, and a blue and white zebra stripe (four blue and three white horizontal stripes) was applied to the rudder.

Chinese crews began training in Lanzhou. At the end of November, a Chinese pilot “attacked” one plane so much that it had to be written off. On November 30, the remaining five with mixed Soviet-Chinese crews flew to Nanchang. There they were covered by Japanese bombers. On December 13, the emergency vehicles were supposed to take off and relocate, but they did not have time. The Japanese destroyed two planes and seriously damaged two. On December 25, three TB-3s, including two repaired ones, returned to Lanzhou. The Chinese did not use heavy bombers for their intended purpose. Together with the S.72s purchased in Italy before the war, they transported people and cargo. On March 16, 1938, one of the engines failed on the TB-3, piloted by Guo Chia-yan and Zhang Jun-yi. The pilots decided to return, but crashed in the Tsipan mountain gorge. Of the 25 Soviet volunteers on board, only two survived. The entire crew died. Fighter pilot D.A. Kudymov recalled that he had previously flown on this plane from Hankou to Lanzhou. The commander, taking off, did not even check whether there was enough fuel. The air has run out of fuel. Having barely crossed the mountain ridge, the bomber landed at the foot of the mountains among boulders, about half a kilometer short of the runway. “We got out of the plane outraged and angry to the limit. The TB pilot laughed..."

TB-3s of the Red Army Air Force also appeared in China, but in small numbers and not for long - only as transport ones. Thus, in November 1937, three TB-3s delivered bombs and cartridges to Lanzhou from the warehouses of the Trans-Baikal Military District. The planes were en route through Ulaanbaatar. On the way, they were accompanied by a pair of P-5s - not so much for security, but in case of an emergency landing.

1938 Khasan, Khalkin-Gol.

The first real combat targets of the TB-3 had to be hit on their native soil. In the summer of 1938 they took part in the battles near Lake Khasan in the Far East. At the end of July, the Japanese took up positions on the Zaozernaya and Bezymyannaya hills on the Soviet side of the border. To knock them out, TB-3s with M-34 engines were ready to take off from there, they concentrated units of the Red Army, which supported 250 aircraft. These included 60 TB-3 under the command of A.V. Konovalova. On the evening of August 6, this entire armada fell on the trenches, artillery batteries and the rear of the Japanese group. TB-3s were in the first wave. This was the first and only time when four-engine giants were used as originally intended - during the day, in large groups, with salvo bombing from a dense formation from medium altitudes, with complete air supremacy.

Then, support for the advancing tanks and infantry was provided mainly by SBs and fighters, and TB-3s switched to cargo transportation. The flood cut off the Soviet troops from the rear, and the planes carried crackers, butter, cereals and shag to the combat area. Naval aviation was not involved in bombing, although its TB-3s were on duty at airfields with suspended bombs. They were also used to escort steamships heading to Posiet Bay. And the 16th transport detachment participated in transporting food and ammunition to the front line.

TB-3s were also used at Khalkhin Gol. True, there were few of them there. After the outbreak of hostilities, two squadrons (formerly the 113th and 114th) were separated from the 4th TBAP, based at Domno station in Transbaikalia, and transferred to Mongolia, to the Obo-Somon area. By May 1, seven TB-3s with M-17 engines arrived at the Air Force in the 57th Rifle Corps (they were also called “Comrade Feklenko’s Air Force”, after the surname of the corps commander, and in official documents too), and four more were preparing for departure to Mongolia. They formed the 19th transport and sanitary squadron, sometimes also called “Major Egorov’s group”; a little later it was increased to 23 aircraft. Two other squadrons of the 4th Tank Battalion remained in Domno and were used as transport ones.

As a matter of fact, at first all TB-3s at Khalkhin Gol served as transport ones. The nearest railway was hundreds of kilometers away. Everything was transported either by car or by air. TB-3 was shuttled along the Tamtsag - Bulak - Chita route. Weapons, people, ammunition, uniforms, and medicine were transported to the front. One time, three vehicles delivered equipment to a printing house, which began printing leaflets in Japanese, Chinese and Mongolian. In total, TB-3 transported 1885 tons of cargo. The wounded were being transported back - 15-20 people per plane.

TB-3, which was not specially adapted for transporting the wounded, usually took six to eight seriously and 14 lightly wounded, and the equipped one - 12 seriously and six lightly wounded. The stretchers were placed on three floors in the center section, next to the gas tanks. Seated wounded were placed in the fuselage and on planes. Already during the operations at Khalkhin Gol, in July 1939, the Sanitary Institute of the Red Army prepared a special project for the sanitary TB-3 and asked to allocate a machine for conversion. On August 5, the Air Force proposed to take five bombers from Rzhev and modify them at plant No. 84 in Khimki. Overloaded with orders, the plant refused. Apparently, the sanitary TB-3s never appeared. The vehicles of the 4th Tbap were retrofitted on site independently in the simplest way.

TB-3 made more than 500 transport flights. In all cases, cargo and people were safely delivered to their destination. On one plane, during a flight to Chita, the right engine closest to the fuselage caught fire. The fire was extinguished in the air and we arrived at our destination. On another car, the radiator leaked during the flight. The flight engineer, tied with a halyard to the fuselage rail, walked along the plane with a can of water in his hand and topped up the system with a hand pump.

When the Soviet-Mongolian forces began preparing for the offensive, TB-3s from Obo-Somon switched to the role of night bombers. The first flight took place on the night of August 19-20. We approached the targets one by one. The front line was marked by lanterns located 3-7 km from the front edge and positioned so that they were visible only when approaching from our rear. About 8 km from the front line there was a landmark 50-meter arrow of lanterns. Bombing was aimed at psychologically exhausting the enemy, and sometimes at noise masking the movements of troops on our side. Therefore, we then switched to the tactics of flying single aircraft at different times. Every night 6-20 ships took off. Each TB-3 took up to 1300 kg of small-caliber bombs; in total they dropped 25 tons per night.

Usually, the target was first illuminated by SABs, then, slowly, they made several passes, dropping bombs from a height of 1000-1500 m. Japanese anti-aircraft artillery fired at the bombers, but without much success. The only case recorded was when a TB-3 received significant damage - the engine of L. Varochkin’s plane was damaged over the front line. Nevertheless, he reached the target on three engines, bombed and returned to the airfield.

In general, until September 15, when the Japanese group capitulated, only one TB-3 was written off, and only after the accident. During this period, they made 160 combat sorties. During the Khalkhin Gol operation, these aircraft operated as night bombers for the first time. Assessment of their effectiveness may vary. On the one hand, they completed their task - they constantly harassed the enemy, exhausting his troops and not allowing them to sleep. The Air Force report of the 1st Army Group (to which the 57th Corps was deployed) states: “The experience of using night heavy aviation in the second stage was successful in the absence of night fighter aircraft and searchlights from the enemy. Her actions caused both moral and material damage to the enemy.” Regarding the second, the question is controversial. The search for dispersed targets near the front and in the near rear and their defeat at night turned out to be quite difficult, “... the results of night bombing were insignificant,” said a captured document from the headquarters of the Japanese 23rd Infantry Division. But in general, the experience of using TB-3 at night turned out to be quite successful.

1939 "Liberation campaign" to Poland.

The fighting in Mongolia had just ended when the TB-3s found themselves on the front line again. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the border of Poland. A large air force was assembled for this operation. In the border Belarusian and Kiev military districts, there were 157 TB-3s, but the equipment was quite worn out, and about half of this number of aircraft were combat-ready. On the Belorussian Front in the 3rd TBAP, out of 75 aircraft, only 38 were serviceable. It is interesting that the aircraft of later production with the M-34 and M-34R were even inferior to the old bombers with the M-17 in terms of the percentage of combat readiness. Two thirds of the first in the Kiev district were chained to the ground.

TB-3 was assigned exclusively transport functions. At first they were used to transport ground personnel from air regiments redeployed to the front. When the troops crossed the border, it turned out that there was no enemy in front of them. On the Polish side there were scattered military units, most of them already battered by the Germans and withdrawn to the rear for replenishment. They were completely deprived of air cover. Many of them surrendered with existing equipment. Only the most persistent tried to break through to the Romanian or Hungarian borders, and even then, trying to avoid fighting with Soviet troops. The pace of the Red Army's advance far exceeded what was planned. The forward detachments were far removed from the supply bases. The air regiments that flew to the captured airfields were left without fuel and ammunition. This is where TB-3 came in handy.

So, for the horse-mechanized group named after. Dzerzhinsky, moving towards Grodno, the planes of the 3rd Tank Battalion for four days, from September 20 to 24, dropped by parachute or delivered 100 tons of fuel by landing method. The headquarters of the Air Force of the Belorussian Front itself, after relocating to Volkovysk, was fed for 18 days with food dropped by parachute. On the Ukrainian Front, similar transportation was carried out by the 14th Tank Battalion. He delivered people, ammunition, food. Operations in Poland ended by mid-October.

1939 "Winter War" with Finland.

Already at the end of October, Air Force units that had completed the Polish campaign began to be transferred to the Leningrad Military District. A month later, the war with Finland began. It also could not do without TB-3. A significant number of these vehicles were permanently based near Leningrad before the war. They were part of the 7th Tbap. After the outbreak of hostilities, equipment also arrived from the rear districts. The 2nd squadron of the 3rd tank regiment entered the 9th Army Air Force. The first five of its TB-3s flew from Borovsky near Kalinin to the Chiksha ice airfield in Karelia on January 9, 1940. Three more arrived after them. The “Spirin group” operating in the same sector of the front (commanded by brigade commander Spirin) included six TB-3s from the 1st Tank Battalion. They were transported from Rostov-on-Don on March 1. These aircraft were based at the Straits airfield.

At first, the four-engine giants flew out to bomb during the day, under the cover of old I-15bis fighters. Settlements, railway stations, and factories were bombed. But they tried not to let them into areas where Finnish fighters were actively operating - they were used mainly in secondary sectors of the front. Thus, in the zone of the 9th Army until January 1940, no enemy aircraft were seen at all. They took different bombs - from small “lighters” and fragmentation AO-32 to FAB-500. The raids were carried out from altitudes of 2500-3000 m by single aircraft and small groups. In a similar way, TB-3, for example, bombed Kyurynsalmi and Suomussalmi.

But as the skill of Finnish anti-aircraft gunners and fighter pilots increased, and enemy aviation was replenished with more modern types of aircraft, Tupolev aircraft increasingly switched to a “night lifestyle”. The 9th Army Air Force report states: “The use of TB-3 aircraft as combat aircraft is impractical due to their large dimensions and low speed, and use during the day is completely unacceptable.”

The final point on daytime bombing missions was set by the incident with an aircraft from Spirin’s group, which occurred on March 10, 1940. The recently arrived TB-3s were released during the day to familiarize themselves with the area before night missions. They walked in a group without cover. The goal was Rovaniemi. At Vika station they were attacked by a lone Finnish fighter. Ours identified it as a “Gamecock” (in fact, it was a Swedish-made “Gladiator”, and the pilot G. Karlsson was also a Swede). He made several passes from below and from behind (the group included old vehicles without stern and “dagger” rifle installations). One of the TB-3s fell to the right and, descending, disappeared into the clouds. The bomber gunners opened fire indiscriminately. The fighter escaped without damage, but on two TB-3s that were not subject to its attacks, several bullet holes were later found in the stabilizers. TB-3, whose commander was senior lieutenant ST. Karepov, made an emergency landing on enemy territory. The crew fought with Finnish soldiers who surrounded the car. All were killed except two who were taken prisoner. The then head of the Air Force Smushkevich reacted to this incident very sharply: “In the future, I categorically prohibit the use of TB-3 during the day without my special permission.”

The four-engine giants were used as night bombers until the end of hostilities. In particular, they were used during the period of the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line. They dropped bombs of 250, 500 and 1000 kg on fortified areas. But overall they flew more transport missions than bombing missions. In winter and off-road conditions, aviation often remained the only means of supplying troops on the front line. Shells, charges, PPD machine guns and disks for them, radio stations, batteries, telephones were dropped in PDMM parachute bags. If there were not enough special cargo vehicles, they attached combat landing gear PN-2 or PN-4. Gasoline was dumped in PDBB tanks or simply in barrels.

Airplanes played a particularly important role in providing support to the 54th Infantry Division, which was cut off from its own by the Finns. For 45 days it was supplied only by air. All cargo was transferred to SB and TB-3. The latter turned out to be much more profitable for such operations. You can’t carry much on the SB - the bomb bay is small, and bulky PDMM bags were torn off from the external suspension already at a speed of more than 250 km/h. But TB-3 was filled to the brim. Food, shag, cigarettes, matches, vitamins were placed in bags, and the bags were packed in FAB-50 and FAB-100 bomb containers. Grenades were also transported. They were wrapped in rags, and hay or tow was placed in the bags. The cartridges were placed in bags in zinc, boxes and buckets. Overcoats, felt boots, blankets, padded jackets were simply tied into bales. All this was placed in bomb bays on makeshift wooden bridges or hung on external bomb racks. The drop was carried out without parachutes from a height of 50-400 m (depending on the situation). The passage of the TB-3 at low altitude in full view of the enemy was the most dangerous part of the task. Three vehicles were shot down by conventional infantry machine guns and small arms fire.

It was supply operations for the encircled units that made the greatest contribution to the losses of TB-3. One damaged TB-3 was forced to land at the command post of the 54th division, the crew remained alive. Another did not reach his airfield and landed in the forest: one crew member was killed, two were wounded. Two more cars were heavily damaged. On February 13, an aircraft of the 7th Tank Battalion was damaged by anti-aircraft artillery after dropping cargo. The bomber landed on the ice of a frozen lake. Finnish soldiers rushed to the car. Her crew took up the fight. Only two wounded survived and were taken prisoner. The bomber itself was finished off with mortar fire.

1940 Annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia.

The pre-war years, when exercises with the participation of airborne troops were regularly held, bore fruit. During the annexation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia to the USSR, large troops were landed in a combat situation. And they were dropped off with TB-3. The 214th Airborne Brigade (Airborne) operated in Lithuania and Latvia. On June 16, 1940, 63 TB-3s transferred the first wave of landing forces - 720 people - to the airfield near Siauliai. The bombers were escorted by fighters from two squadrons of the 1st 7th Fighter Regiment (IAP). Each plane took 16-24 people plus two or three bags of PDMM. They also transported 160 machine guns and 36 mortars. From Siauliai, the paratroopers moved on the armor of tanks to Latvia.

A second wave landing, including 18 45 mm guns, was planned, but was cancelled. The landing at Gaijuni station with the aim of capturing Kaunas did not take place either. TB-3s also provided supplies for mechanized columns rushing from the borders into the depths of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. At the same time, 1983 people and 768 tons of cargo were transported, 402 tons had to be dropped with parachutes.

In preparation for a similar operation in Bessarabia in June 1940, the 1st (from Minsk to Gogolev), 3rd (from Reblitsy to Boryspil), 7th (from Reblitsy to Boryspil and Odessa) and 14th (from Palestine to Boryspil) Tbap. In total there were 136 TB-3. Initially, the command of the Southern Front (which had the 201st, 204th and 214th airborne battalions) planned to organize one large landing in the Tirgu-Frumos area, 20 km from Iasi, blocking a large road junction to prevent the evacuation of material assets. The landing force was to be landed by 120 TB-3s, which were supposed to be covered by five fighter regiments.

In reality, according to the situation, two troops were landed. On June 29, a landing took place in the Bolgrad area. At dawn, two R-5s were sent to the selected site for additional reconnaissance. 99 TB-3s flew after them, taking 1,436 people on board. 97 aircraft flew to the site, two made emergency landings due to problems. The area was too small for the TB-3 to land, so the troops were dropped by parachute. Strong winds upon landing caused several accidents. One fighter died (his canopy caught on the stabilizer of the bomber), another received a concussion and then died in the hospital, five had broken legs. By the next day, Bolgrad was completely captured by the fighters of the 204th airborne battalion. One battalion moved to Cahul and, after a short skirmish with the Romanians at Reni, occupied the city.

The second landing took place on June 30. 44 TB-3s were transferred by a combined method to Izmail by the 201st airborne battalion. The brigade was tasked with taking the city, blocking the roads and preventing steamships from leaving the port. The landing was supposed to be landing. 43 aircraft reached the target, one fell behind and got lost. The site was too small for the TB-3, but the pilots decided to take a chance. 12 cars landed, but three of them were damaged and blocked the landing strip. Then they started parachuting. 240 people disembarked from the previously landed bombers and unloaded a pickup truck and cargo. 509 paratroopers landed by parachute. There were no casualties, one fighter broke his leg and ten others received minor injuries. Two TB-3s returned to base loaded: one was carrying radio equipment that could not be dropped, and the other was carrying a music team, which, as it turned out, did not know how to jump with parachutes.

Everything seemed to go well. But the command understood perfectly well that both in the Baltic states and in Bessarabia, the landings were landing in extremely favorable conditions, in the absence of opposition from aviation and anti-aircraft artillery. The commander of the Air Force of the Kyiv Military District, Major General Nikolaenko, wrote in a report on operations in Bessarabia: “It is necessary to equip the airborne units with a Douglas-type landing aircraft, because TB-3 is unsuitable for this purpose due to its flight performance.” Clear and concise.

1940 On the eve of the great war.

Until the spring of 1940, the position of the Air Force command regarding the TB-3 was unequivocal: the aircraft was completely outdated, it was no longer suitable for the role of a bomber or an airborne landing aircraft. It was supposed to select more efficient vehicles for military transport aviation and the Civil Air Fleet, and write off the rest. Over the course of a year, they wanted to remove a total of 330 TB-3 from the Air Force. This is despite the fact that on February 1, 1940, their total fleet in the Air Force was 509 aircraft, of which 100 were faulty. More than half were old cars with M-17 engines (80% of them were in good working order). TB-ZRs were in second place in number; there were more than a hundred of them, and up to 90% could fly into the air. There were slightly fewer aircraft with M-34 and M-34RN; of them, too, 75-80% were listed as combat ready. The average life of the gliders was about 30%. Of this total number, 459 TB-3s were located directly in combat units (of which 92 were faulty). A decision was already being prepared to completely remove this type from service.

But already in the summer of 1940 the course began to change sharply. It became clear that entry into a major war could not be avoided. And at the same time, plans for the rapid expansion of the Air Force were thwarted; the industry did not have time to saturate them with modern technology. Many long-range bomber regiments, formed in 1940 and according to plan armed with DB-ZF and DB-240, did not receive a single aircraft at all. Under these conditions, it was impossible to neglect a large fleet of even more or less serviceable TB-3s. If they could no longer bomb during the day, they were still quite capable of doing it at night. This was facilitated by the long life of the airframe of the Tupolev machine, which was extended several times, and each time it turned out that this was quite justified. Another thing is that the production of these aircraft was discontinued long ago, there were not enough spare parts, and, in fact, no one set the task of completely bringing the aircraft to combat-ready condition, since they were going to be written off. It was impossible to deny the general obsolescence of the TB-3, and they were going to use it only for lack of a better one.

And at this very time, a sharp turn came in the fate of TB-3. It was ordered to remove TB-3 from the landing and transport units. Using these vehicles, they wanted to transfer the 3rd and 7th TBAP to a five-squadron staff, create heavy detachments in the 5th (Murmansk) and 80th (Arkhangelsk) mixed regiments (SAP) and form eight separate squadrons - in Vaziani, Tashkent and in the Far East. They refused to write off a significant portion of TB-3. By January 1, 1941, it was planned to have aircraft with M-17 - 278, with M-34 - 76, with M-34R - 123 and with M-34RN - 69. Based on these figures, it can be assumed that only about a dozen of the most dilapidated bombers, and some of the TB-ZRNs should be converted to M-34RB engines, lower altitude but more reliable (they were made from rebuilt M-34RNs, removing the superchargers).

The next step followed in February 1941, when the decree “On the reorganization of the aviation forces of the Red Army” was issued, which provided for the formation of five more regiments on these clumsy giants. The TB-3 was intended to be used both as a bomber and as a military transport aircraft. But the obstacle turned out to be an insufficient number of working equipment. On June 6, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars issued a joint resolution on urgently bringing 500 TB-3 to combat-ready condition. Factories were given orders to restore production of spare parts. Plant No. 26 in Rybinsk continued to produce M-17 engines in small quantities. In addition to this, they tried to establish their production at the Gorky Automobile Plant. Brigades of aircraft factory workers were sent to military units. Some of the work was carried out by workshops and civil aviation factories. According to the report of Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin, the Red Army Air Force on June 15, 1941 had six combat-ready regiments of heavy bombers. So they started a war with them.

1941 The beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Before the German invasion, according to data as of 06/01/41, the Red Army Air Force had 4 TB-3 regiments on the western border of the USSR: 7 TBAP (40 BAD 1 DBAC).

northwestern direction, had 44 aircraft, of which 18 were operational.

the western direction of the 1st and 3rd TBAP (3 DBAC), had 94 TB-3. In addition, in the area where the 3rd TBAP was based there were 14 faulty TB-3s.

the southwestern direction of 14 TBAP (18 BAD Air Force KOVO), had 32 serviceable aircraft. There were 6 TB-3s under repair, 1 aircraft was assigned to the 16th BBP.

The main focus in the combat training of heavy bomber regiments was on practicing landings. In the 3rd and 7th TBAP, some crews had experience in transporting heavy loads on an external sling (between the main racks). The relocation of air regiments to field airfields was also not possible without the participation of the TB-3, the most load-lifting aircraft at that time. Training bombing missions were also carried out in the heavy bomber regiments. The crews of the 3rd and 7th TBAP had experience of night combat operations in the Finnish war. The crews' training was at a high level. Attitudes towards the equipment that we had to fly on were different. Somewhere - friendly, somewhere - hostile. So, the 14th Heavy Bomber Regiment received the TB-7, and they looked at the TB-3 as junk, from which nothing could be squeezed out. This attitude towards the veteran vehicle grew stronger in the regiment as the crews of the 2nd AE mastered the TB-7. And one can imagine the disappointment of the pilots of the 14th regiment when they had to enter the war on the much unloved TB-3.

As of June 22, 1941, the Air Force had 516 TB-3s in service. Naval aviation had another 25 aircraft. Being located at airfields relatively remote from the border, these vehicles avoided catastrophic losses from the first German attacks. As a result, at the initial stage of the war they made up a fairly significant part of the bomber aircraft participating in the hostilities.

3 TBAP was located closest to the western border. The concrete strip of its main base, Borovichi, was under reconstruction. And the regiment, since the summer training period had arrived, flew to a nearby reserve unpaved airfield. The 1st and 3rd TBAP entered battle on the evening of June 22, 1941, bombing enemy troops, and by the beginning of July, all TB-3 regiments located on the Soviet-German front were making night bombing missions. Although the TB-3 was not perceived in 1941 as a long-range bomber (wear and tear of materiel, coupled with operational limitations, led to a decrease in flight characteristics), one of the first it was assigned to a long-range bomber operation: on the night of June 24, 1941 1 and 3 TBAP bombed railway junctions in Poland: Biala Podlaska, Siedlce, Ciechonowiec, Ostrow, MalkinaTura.

With the beginning of the war, the bomb stockpile, created in the warehouses of units in peacetime, was used in anticipation of the tasks that, as planned, would have to be carried out during the war. 7 TBAP had an arsenal suitable for solving a variety of tasks - from the destruction of bridges to the destruction of objects scattered over a large area. Before the war, the warehouses of 7 TBAP received not only high-explosive bombs of various calibers, but also SABs, ZABs, RRABs (the latter received AO-2.5-8 bombs and KS balls). This made it possible to carry out successful bombing against a variety of targets.

1 and 14 TBAP were armed with old vehicles with M-17b and M-17f engines, which were expected to be used in war only as transport and landing aircraft. 14 TBAP before the war even bore the name “airborne bomber”, with emphasis on the first word. Some aircraft in 14 TBAP met the war disarmed, without bomb racks, so they had to be used mainly for landing people and cargo, as well as for scattering leaflets in the rear of German troops. Accordingly, the type of bombs in warehouses 1 and 14 TBAP in 1941 was limited. There were no flare bombs, which is why the bombing was carried out “blindly” at first. Due to the lack of aerial cameras in the regiments, the effectiveness of bomb attacks there was estimated approximately.

Much has been written about the chaos that reigned in the first days of the war on the Western Front due to the vile betrayal of its commander Pavlov. Communications worked unstably, headquarters did not have intelligence information, and if they did receive it, it was usually already outdated due to the pace at which it was passed through the chain of command. Because of this, the direction of the enemy's actions, his numbers, and the pace of advance were determined incorrectly. As a result, the Germans captured airfield after airfield, and it was not always possible to evacuate faulty equipment to the rear. On November 26, 1941, an aerial reconnaissance aircraft from the 750th DBAP discovered 8 TB-3 aircraft at the Vitebsk airfield, captured by the Germans, some of which probably belonged to the 3rd TBAP. 3 TBAP turned out to be the most unlucky of all. The regiment was tormented by absurd orders from the very beginning of the war. So, on the afternoon of June 23, TB-3 was lost, one of four sent to... reconnaissance of the movement of tank columns! As a result, by June 30, 1941, the regiment lost 11 vehicles, 7 of them from enemy fighters.

Many are familiar with the novel by K. Simonov Living and dead. And, of course, they remember the episode of the destruction of the TB-3 group by German fighters. What is described in detail repeats what happened on the afternoon of July 10, 1941 in the Zhitomir region: 12 TB-3 aircraft of the 14th TBAP took off for bombing without fighter cover and in the target area were attacked by two Bf-109s. One of the fighters was shot down by friendly fire from the bombers, but the second continued to attack and destroyed 7 aircraft. The crews of the downed planes escaped by parachute. The episode of the novel also has similarities with what happened on June 29, 1941 on the Western Front in the Bobruisk region: 3 TBAP received a combat order late, and the planes did not have time to take off before dawn. Of course, it was unreasonable to release them before dark, but the command was unable to resist the pressure from the “tops,” who demanded an immediate departure for bombing, and the takeoff was made in the morning. The bombers appeared over the target in the light of the bright sun - the weather was perfect as never before! After the bombing, two detachments of ships took a route, laid, probably out of habit, over populated areas, which by that time had already been occupied by the Germans, were identified and shot down one after another. Of the ship commanders, only Senior Lieutenant Pozhidaev survived.

Fortunately, these were exceptional cases. However, it is unfortunate that the writer’s story, which was generally true, was subsequently dogmatized, imposed on public opinion as the only true fact of the combat work of the TB-3 and began to be perceived as evidence of the work of our entire bomber aviation in 1941.

1941 In the night sky of war.

During the day, any enemy aircraft became an enemy of the TB-3 in the air. Not only fighters were eager to hunt for the giant slowly crawling across the sky: another Heinkel, returning from bombing, tried to chalk up the downed TB-3 to its account... Even a strong fighter cover was not able to save the TB-3 regiments from large losses during daytime flights, including over their territory. But the TB-3 initially flew during the day. The fact is that the main targets soon became the advancing German troops, and it is not easy to detect and hit these targets at night. Night flights required more highly trained crews and better navigation equipment. When it was cloudy it became very difficult to find a target, and on clear moonlit nights the slow-moving TB-3s became vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery. Radio half-compasses were still a rarity, as were special night bomb sights. However, a significant number of crews in the heavy bomber regiments were trained for night combat flights, and there was no need for daytime bombing. Fortunately, “those at the top” also understood this; the TB-3 crews began to fly combat missions exclusively at night, and in 1941, for a long time by military standards, they found themselves in relative safety. Although the exhaust manifolds of the TB-3 engines did not have flame arresters, and the exhaust lights were clearly visible in the darkness of the night from aircraft flying above, encounters with German fighters began to occur much less frequently. The 14th Air Regiment had no encounters with fighters during night sorties. Others were less fortunate.

However, TB-3 was not as harmless as it seems today. The air gunners, discovering that the bomber was being pursued by an enemy aircraft, opened intense fire on it from all points. The fiery trails in the night sky had a very strong psychological effect on enemy pilots, and there were few who wanted to test the caliber of the weapon protecting the air giant first hand. During night air battles with German fighters, the TB-3 was not doomed to destruction, even if the air gunners were disabled. The following episodes are typical in this regard:

On the night of February 23, 1942, the crew of Major Mosolov (3 TBAP) took off to deliver the command of the airborne corps led by Major General Levashov beyond the front line. When approaching the landing site, the ship was attacked by a Bf-110 fighter. Levashov was killed by a shell fragment. The pilot landed on the first available landing pad (the main one was unsuitable - black bomb craters were clearly visible in the snow), landed the paratroopers' headquarters and, despite the engine damage received during the attack, took off. Once in the air, he was fired a second time by a Bf-110 patrolling nearby. After two attacks, the TB-3 fuselage was riddled with bullets, and one of the crew members was killed. But the plane did not burn and stayed in the air. Maneuvering, the pilot left the fighter and returned to his airfield.

During a flight to the Vyazma area, Captain Plyashechnik's TB-3 (1 TBAP) was attacked by two Bf-110s. Both air gunners were killed, the gas system was broken, and a fire broke out on board. But the enemy rejoiced prematurely. The radio operator led the battle, repelling the Messerschmitt attacks with the tower UBT. Navigator Mikhailov prevented the fire from spreading throughout the plane by clamping the damaged fuel system tube. Having simulated the fall of the ship and evaded pursuit, the crew, 40 minutes after the attack, flew over the front line and landed in a field. The fire was extinguished, after which the plane took off and returned to its airfield.

1941 Losses in the first year of the war.

TB-3 turned out to be a very “tenacious” machine. Its strong and reliable glider had the ability to hold on even with very significant combat damage. Sometimes a bomber with a meter-long hole in the skin would calmly return to its home airfield. Four engines, two pilots, a huge wing with good gliding qualities kept the car in the air. Even with very “harsh” forced landings on forests, stumps, ditches, the crew usually remained alive. The main danger was fires - the gas tanks on the TB-3 were not protected and did not have a neutral gas pressurization system.

By the spring of 1942, measures were taken to improve the combat qualities of the TB-3. The defensive armament of the bombers was replaced: aircraft that had a central (sometimes also tail) turret with ShKAS began to be equipped with UTK-1 turrets with 12.7 mm UBT machine guns. This increased the aircraft's protection from air attack. Installation of a large-caliber machine gun (BS, UBT) in the hatch installation allowed the shooters to extinguish enemy searchlights when flying at low altitudes. Instructions were given to equip all TB-3s in heavy bomber regiments with NKPB-3 night collimator sights. Their installation on aircraft helped to improve the accuracy of bombing.

In the first year of the war, the losses of the TB-3 regiments from German bombing (16 vehicles) were also not so significant. Although it seemed that everything was leading to the opposite. Due to the continued retreat of troops, it was difficult to create a reliably functioning warning system about enemy raids in the front-line zone. The dimensions of the aircraft made it difficult to camouflage it at the airfield. But German bombing was not equally effective on all sectors of the front. 1 TBAP lost the most aircraft from enemy bombing in the summer of 1941 - 7 TB-3.

The situation was different in the southwestern direction. On the afternoon of June 25, 1941, the Germans bombed the airfields of the 14th regiment - Boryspil and Gogolevo. At the Gogol airfield at that moment there were 30 TB-3s, dispersed throughout the field. The Germans dropped 36 bombs and made 2 attack runs, but even weak anti-aircraft fire reduced the effect of the strike: the result of enemy attacks was only one burned TB-3. In the 14th Regiment, it was the only loss from bombing in the entire 1941.

3 TBAP lost only one aircraft from bombing in 1941 - thanks to the large amount of work carried out by ground personnel to camouflage ships. In the first year of the war, when 3 TBAP was based in a wooded area, a parking space was cut down in the forest for each of the aircraft, where they rolled in after takeoff, and then covered with a camouflage net.

Immediately after the start of the war, an order was issued to camouflage vehicles, however, this process was interpreted very generally, which led to the appearance of a wide variety of colors. This applied to almost all types of aircraft. Regarding the TB-3, there was one peculiarity: the size of the bomber, and even with the intensity of hostilities characteristic of the beginning of the war, made it difficult to carry out the order. In addition, the command of the heavy bomber regiments was skeptical about the effectiveness of camouflage. The winged ship was too huge, it was almost impossible to hide the TB-3 from the eye of aerial reconnaissance in this way, and wasting paint for the most part did not make sense. Only by the beginning of 1942 did most TB-3s acquire a “protective coloring” and by the summer, almost all bombers that fought on the Soviet-German front had black (or dark green) stripes applied over the pre-war green-khaki paint. The undersides of the planes were not repainted, remaining light blue. In the winter of 1942/43. Attempts were made to repaint bombers white. In the 14th regiment, due to a lack of paint for such large vehicles, they ended in nothing. In 7 TBAP, after half the wing of one of the TB-3s was painted, such experiments were abandoned. The 325th Regiment was ordered to repaint three bombers white, but how the order was carried out remains unknown. Work on winter camouflage was also carried out in the 1st regiment - this is evidenced by a surviving photograph.

1941 Replenishment of the TB-3 fleet at the front.

The number of TB-3 regiments operating on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War in 1941 not only did not decrease, but, on the contrary, increased. On June 28, 1941, the Kharkov Military District began forming the 325th Airborne Bomber Regiment (later the 325th Heavy Bomber Regiment). To equip it, 22 TB-3 were received from flight schools. By September 1, 1941, the unit had trained 7 night crews, who immediately began combat missions. In addition, on June 25, 1941, the entire 250 heavy bomber regiment (49 vehicles) flew from the Far East to the west and arrived in the Voroshilovgrad area by July 9.

In the fall of 1941, after the completion of the operation in Iran, the 39th separate squadron, which had 12 TB-3-4M-17 aircraft, was relocated from the Central Asian Military District to the Western Front. The appearance on the Soviet-German front of new air units equipped with the “grandfathers of Russian aviation” can hardly be called “patching holes.” The course of the war in its first days was still unpredictable, and therefore the arrival of TB-3s at the front speaks rather of the importance that was attached to their combat and especially transport capabilities.

From the very first days of the war, the TB-3 regiments began to come under direct command of the front air forces. The use of these aircraft as heavy-duty night front-line bombers was very effective. The concentration of all heavy bomber regiments in the ADD, carried out in March 1942, contributed to the even greater effectiveness of the use of TB-3. Two Long-Range divisions were formed: the 53rd - based on the 23rd SAD, and the 62nd based on the 22nd BAD. Each of them had 3 TB-3 regiments, 3 squadrons each. The number of materiel in the regiments was determined not by the number of staff, but by the serviceability of the aircraft fleet. By mid-1942, the regiment's readiness for combat missions with 15 TB-3s could be considered a good result. The number of combat-ready vehicles, thanks to the fantastic work of repairmen and technical staff, could rise to 20, but this happened extremely rarely. The main difficulties were associated with the lack of spare parts for the M-17 and M-34 engines, which had long been discontinued.

On June 22, 1941, there were 45 four-engine G-2s (the same TB-3s, only disarmed) in civil aviation. The four-engine giants were used very intensively by the Civil Air Fleet. In 1940, the G-2 was one of the few types of aircraft whose ton-kilometer output turned out to be higher than planned. To help the front, by July 1, five air groups and three air detachments were formed. They included 25 G-2. Most of them were in the Moscow Special Purpose Air Group (MAGON). In August, civil aircraft began to be armed. They installed what was at hand - both YES and ShKAS. By the end of the month, four G-2s received machine guns. In October 1941, civilian aircraft were used to transport units of the 5th Airborne Corps near Orel and Mtsensk. At the same time, the vehicles were overloaded almost twice as much as normal. The planes landed on sites close to the front edge, often under artillery fire.

1941. Combat tactics.

The tactics of the TB-3 during the Patriotic War were built taking into account the full use of its positive qualities, as well as the activity of enemy air defense systems on one or another sector of the front. Access to the target was carried out at different heights, from different directions and with a time delay. The TB-3 (with the possible exception of the 325th regiment, whose personnel were recruited from reserve officers) was flown, as a rule, by “old” crews who had sufficient experience, which allowed them to confidently approach the target, maintain a combat course and understand the navigator’s signals about amendments to the course “without words,” since most TB-3s did not have intercom systems. The high accuracy of bombing was facilitated by the low flight speed of the TB-3 and good visibility from the navigator's cabin, and the large mass of the bomb load lifted by the aircraft allowed the suspension of bombs of almost all types and calibers then available on the TB-3, and in various combinations. After a year of war, front commanders noted that the TB-3 had fully justified itself as a night bomber.

The main targets for this bomber were area, large-sized targets: railway junctions, airfields, concentrations of enemy troops. When striking them, bombs of predominantly large caliber (250 and 500 kg) were used, which destroyed objects not only with a direct hit, but also with a blast wave. To increase the lethality, fragmentation and incendiary bombs, RRABs equipped with KS glass balls were dropped simultaneously with high-explosive bombs. The affected area covered by balls ejected by centrifugal force from a rotating RRAB could be a hectare or more, depending on the height of the release. The disadvantage was that some of the glass balls, colliding with each other in the air, ignited before falling to the ground. Special precautions had to be taken when equipping RRABs with them. Bombs of 1000 kg caliber were dropped from TB-3 only twice during the war: on March 17, 1942, by the crew of Senior Lieutenant Borodkin from the 7th Air Regiment, and on March 23, 1942, by the crew of Captain Yakushkin from the 3rd Air Regiment (both from 53 BP DD). They were used in combination with fragmentation and incendiary bombs against enemy troops in the area of ​​Gzhatsk.

When destroying enemy columns, bombing of the target was carried out from heights of 700-1000 m. When operating against railway junctions and airfields well covered by anti-aircraft guns, the combat flight altitude rose to 2000 m (for TB-3-4M-34 and TB-3-4M-17 aircraft ), 2600-2800 m (TB-3-4M-34R) and 3300-3500 m (TB-3-4M-34RN). Of course, even at these altitudes the bombers were within reach of German artillery systems. And the noise created by the “direct” (gearless) motors M-17 and M-34 indicated their position in the night sky. The roar of an invisible armada slowly creeping towards the enemy (which often turned out to be a single TB-3) gave the enemy anti-aircraft gunners time to prepare for the meeting. The AM-34R, RB, RN and RNB engines operated much softer, but were also not silent.

But strange as it may seem, targeted shooting at the TB-3 from anti-aircraft guns showed its complete ineffectiveness during the war. There was something mystical about this: the ship, captured by searchlights and subjected to intense fire, hung in the air, threw bombs and did not want to fall. In the German units over which TB-3s regularly appeared, there was a rumor that the plane was covered with armor and therefore invulnerable... Of course, it was not the additional kilograms of iron, but the low speed of the airship that became its salvation: the German large-caliber anti-aircraft gun was not designed for it artillery. The situation with the U-2 biplane was repeated. It should be taken into account that when approaching the target, TB-3 pilots often reduced their flight speed by turning off the engines, and it did not exceed 145 km/h.

The barrage fire was more worrying. Since the shells exploded chaotically, at different heights without any system, it was incredibly difficult to protect ourselves from their explosions. But the TB-3 had a minimal number of pneumatic and electrical units, so multiple fragmentation damage from an exploding shell in the vast majority of cases did not lead to fires or loss of control. In addition, the aircraft and its crew were helped by the greater structural strength of the TB-3 airframe. The following example of the survivability of a bomber is indicative: On the night of March 20, 1943, while bombing enemy trains at Bakhmach station, the plane of Senior Lieutenant Alekseev (7 AP DD) was caught by the beams of eight searchlights and fired upon by large-caliber artillery fire and MZA. Engine No. 4 (far right) caught fire from a direct hit from a shell. It was not possible to extinguish the fire. However, it was a rare accident: another large-caliber shell, hitting the wing, knocked off the engine, and it fell to the ground burning. The anti-aircraft guns stopped firing at the plane, but the situation still remained difficult. Shell fragments pierced the gas tanks and interrupted the thrust to the left aileron. The plane glided slightly, but stayed in the air. The ship's commander, having leveled the bomber at an altitude of 1400 m, led it to his territory. After an hour and a half of flight, having flown over the front line, Alekseev landed at a suitable site.

The Oerlikon fire posed a much greater danger to the aircraft. A “ladder” of luminous shells, built by a rapid-fire cannon, forced the crews to raise the bombing altitude by more than 2000 m. Of course, when bombing from lower altitudes, about 500-700 m, the hit accuracy was higher, but the TB-3 was superior to other bombers and so there was already a trump card - low flight speed, which worked to reduce the spread of bombs. Therefore, moving to heights inaccessible to MZA shells had little effect on the accuracy of bombing from the TB-3. In order to reduce the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire, various techniques were used. When approaching the target, TB-3 crews were advised to stay at non-circular heights. The calculation was that the remote tubes, set to a circular height, would prevent a large-caliber projectile from exploding even if it directly hit the plane. And often this calculation was justified. In addition, there were many cases when pilots, wanting to mislead enemy anti-aircraft gunners, ignited Holt landing rockets suspended under the wing. The bright flame of the rockets gave the impression that the plane was on fire, and the anti-aircraft gunners left it alone.

Measures to combat FOR the enemy were not limited to passive methods. Back in 1941, some crews saved a few bombs for enemy searchlights, which they dropped on them after finishing the bombing on the main target. Sometimes such attacks had some success, and anti-aircraft resistance decreased. From the beginning of 1942, this initiative was legalized: crews began to be assigned to heavy bomber regiments to combat anti-aircraft guns and searchlight installations. As a rule, RRABs equipped with fragmentation bombs, FAB-50 and FAB-100 landmines were dropped onto air defense systems. The enemy anti-aircraft gunners changed tactics - they did not fire before the bombing began, hoping that the TB-3 would go for the intensely illuminated decoy target. The bomber crews did not drop all the bombs at once, expecting that the anti-aircraft gunners would not stand it and show themselves, thereby opening up their own position for both the leading bomber and the aircraft approaching behind them. Machine gun fire was fired at anti-aircraft points and searchlights during flights at low altitudes. However, it was noted that in 325 AP some shooters got carried away and opened fire even from flight altitudes of 2000-2500 m. In addition to the fact that the effectiveness of shooting from such altitudes was zero, there was a threat of hitting aircraft approaching the target at lower altitudes. Once, in the combat report of the 62nd AD DD, lines appeared that the shooters of the departing bombers, firing at the searchlights, interfered with the bombing. Therefore, in 1942, by special order, machine-gun fire at anti-aircraft points was limited in height.

The heavy bomber regiments did not begin photomonitoring the results of the bombing at the same time. 53 AD DD took up this task only in January 1943, having received NAFA-19 night cameras. The division's 7th Regiment was assigned two photo control aircraft; Experienced crews of N. Bobin and V. Kalygin were assigned to perform control flights. 1 TBAP did not record the results of the raids. In the 62nd Air Division, photographing the results of the bombing was carried out by the crews of the 250th TBAP: the photographs they took were of exceptionally high quality, since photographic reconnaissance was part of the regiment’s UBP plan even during its stay in the Far East. When taking photographs, FotAB-35 bombs were dropped. The photocontrol technique was as follows. Before the raid, a controller aircraft came to the target and photographed it, then stepped aside, and its crew observed the actions of the bombers; The navigator recorded on the map the impact points of all the bombs, noting the time of the explosions and fires that occurred. After completing the bombing, the controller aircraft passed over the target and took repeated photographs. The NAFA-19 night camera was installed in the rear fuselage (on 7 AP DD aircraft) or in the navigation cabin (on 250 AP DD aircraft).

1941 Combat actions of Vakhmistrov’s “SPB unit”.

In the thirties, work was carried out in the Soviet Union under the leadership of engineer Vladimir Sergeevich Vakhmistrov to create flying aircraft carriers. The tasks assigned to them changed from time to time, but the main purpose of the developed and streamlined “SPB link” system was to carry out dive strikes against important small targets behind enemy lines, which conventional front-line bombers with a limited flight range could not “reach” . “SPB link” was a heavy TB-3 bomber with four AM-34RN engines and two I-16 type 24 fighters suspended under its wing. In the target area, uncoupling was carried out, after which the “donkeys” struck and returned to the airfield “under their own power” " Each fighter was armed with a pair of 250 kg bombs; an independent takeoff of the I-16 with such a load was hardly possible. The main technical problems in the design of the “SPB link” were solved back in the late 30s, but by the beginning of the war all work on the “links” had been curtailed, and they were not in service with the Soviet Air Force. Several TB-3 aircraft with dismantled installations for fighter suspension were transferred to the Black Sea Fleet aviation.

In the early 30s, the Soviet engineer-designer of the mine experiments commission of the Naval Scientific and Technical Committee (NTKM) Solomon Fedorovich Valk based his project on a glide torpedo (PT), the idea of ​​launching glide bombs or torpedoes from aircraft equipped with small wings and proposed to aim gliding a torpedo onto a target using infrared rays. After separation from the vehicle, such a projectile independently planned to the target. For this purpose, the TB-3, which carries two (PT), was equipped with a special rotating frame, on which three IR spotlights were installed to illuminate the target, and on the (PT) an IR receiver was installed for aiming “along the beam”. This system was designated "Quantum".

For full-scale flight tests of the PT, two aircraft were allocated as mother aircraft - TB-3 with M-17, with special holders mounted under each wing. The first experimental takeoff and flight of the TB-3 mother aircraft with a torpedo with training bombs suspended under the right wing was carried out on August 30, 1935. The beginning of 1936 was spent preparing the PTs under construction for testing, which began in the summer. On July 24, 1936, the FZ glider with a modified angle of the stabilizer without a redan was suspended from the rigid descending system of the TB-3 mother aircraft, took off and flew at an altitude of 2000 m. On August 1, 1936, the glider flew with a load of 550 kg. Gliding after uncoupling from the carrier at a speed of 185-190 km/h is stable. By the beginning of 1938, the plant had launched 138 torpedoes. At the same time, the suspension system and equipment for launching from the carrier aircraft functioned flawlessly, with the exception of several cases that occurred due to errors by technical personnel. However, these developments were not destined to be translated into real designs. On July 19, 1940, by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov, all work at the N379 plant and at a special test batch in Krechevitsy was stopped. The suspension systems on the TB-3 carrier aircraft were dismantled, the sighting consoles were removed, and the aircraft themselves were transferred to the troops and the Civil Air Fleet.

Soon after the German invasion, V.S. Vakhmistrov, who worked for N.N. Polikarpov at plant No. 51, turned to the Deputy Chief of the Navy Air Force, Major General Korobkov, with a proposal to use “links” in combat operations over the sea. The motivations were as follows: - the accuracy of dive bombing is much higher than from horizontal flight, which is especially important for hitting ships; - fleet aviation did not have a sufficient number of modern twin-engine dive bombers; - over the sea, where counteraction of anti-aircraft guns to aircraft carriers is excluded, and the likelihood of a collision with enemy fighters is low, the obsolescence of the TB-3 becomes not so important; - after uncoupling and dropping bombs, the “donkeys” can easily fend for themselves in an air battle. The arguments had an effect. General Korobkov applied for permission to use the “links” to the People’s Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.F. Kuznetsov, and on July 22 received the go-ahead. By July 1941, the only unit that had pre-war experience flying I-16 aircraft as part of “flights” was the 2nd Special Purpose Squadron of the 32nd Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. Its commander was captain Arseny Vasilyevich Shubikov. An experienced pilot, a participant in the battles over Zaragoza and Guadalajara, he wore two military orders on his chest, which in those years was considered very rare.

The enemy should have been deprived first of all of oil, this “blood of war,” and on June 30, 1941, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, Major General V.A. Rusakov, received direct instructions from N.F. bridge over the Danube. The important military-strategic significance of the Chernavodsky (modern transcription, during the war years they wrote Chernovodsky. - Note, author) bridge was explained by the following reasons. The two-story railway and road bridge, built in 1927, was located 60 km west of Constanta and was one of the largest capital structures in Europe at that time. Suffice it to say that the total length of its spans reached 750 m, and the height of the bridge at its highest point was 75 m above river level. From the west, an overpass almost a kilometer long adjoined the bridge. The railway line connecting the main centers of Romania with the coast passed through it, and under the lower deck of the bridge the Ploiesti-Constanza pipeline was laid (three lines, one of which carried first-class gasoline, which powered Wehrmacht tanks and Luftwaffe aircraft).

The combat effectiveness of the “links” was tested during the bombing of Constanta on July 26. Then one pair of I-16s successfully attacked the oil town, and the other - the floating dock. After dropping the bombs, the donkeys were intercepted by a pair of Bf-109Es, but the air battle was inconclusive. The Germans managed to shoot down only the MBR-2 flying boat, assigned to search and rescue the crews of Soviet aircraft that participated in the attack on the Romanian port.

The raid on the Chernovodsky Bridge was planned for August 13, not paying attention to the “dubious” number. The launch from the airfield in Yevpatoria was given at 03:30. The TB-3 aircraft were piloted by senior lieutenants S. Gavrilov, Ognev and lieutenant Trushin; captain A. Shubikov, senior lieutenant B. Filimonov and lieutenants P. Danilin, I. Kasparov, S. Kuzmenko and D. went on missions in the I-16 cockpits. Skrynnik. At 05:40, 15 km from the coast, a release was made, and after just ten minutes the “donkeys” were already diving in pairs at the target from an altitude of 1800 m. This time the success was complete: the crews noted five (!!) direct hits with FAB bombs 250 into the bridge and one explosion 30-40 m from it. Based on updated data and photographs taken later, it was possible to establish that as a result of the bombing, one 140-meter bridge truss was completely destroyed and the oil pipeline was again interrupted. Almost along the entire route of the independent flight of fighters to the target, anti-aircraft guns fired, but the Soviet aircraft did not receive damage. Having fired at the anti-aircraft gun crews as they exited the dive, the “donkeys” left the bridge with a climb of 1,500 m and landed at the Odessa airfield at 07:05.

“SPB units” took to the air several more times (at least five) to strike columns of German troops and important targets in the immediate rear of the enemy. On the land front, obsolete TB-3 aircraft, together with suspended SPBs, risked becoming victims of enemy fighters every minute.

1941 Transport and landing operations.

When in the pre-war period some aviation commanders considered the TB-3 only as a transport aircraft, considering it in this role as a temporary machine (they say, how could it compete with the promising Li-2), they could not imagine how events would develop in the first year of the war ...

On the afternoon of June 22, having dispersed, the crews of the 7th TBAP began delivering fuel to field airfields for units of the 1st DBAC (North-Western Front). On June 29, 1941, the 14th TBAP, consisting of 24 aircraft, carried out a landing in the Slutsk area. This was the first landing operation of the war. In July, TB-3 regiments transferred a large sabotage group to the Kyiv area. 3 TBAP in the summer and autumn of 1941 carried out the delivery of fuel to tankers of the Western Front. From August 30 to September 10, in the sector of the North-Western Front, 7 TBAP dropped cargo to the Luga group emerging from encirclement. On October 3, 1941, 40 heavy bombers delivered T-38 tanks, anti-tank artillery, trucks, weapons, and ammunition to Mtsensk for the 5th Airborne Brigade that landed in the area. She was given the task of closing the gap in the defense of the Soviet troops. TB-3 made a great contribution to the organization of the air bridge to Leningrad. In November-December 1941 and early January 1942, 7 TBAP with eighteen aircraft, 14 TBAP with five aircraft of the 1st and 3rd AE delivered food to the besieged city. To increase the payload, bomb racks, stepladders, and some equipment were removed from the bombers.

At the end of 1941, the Special Purpose Heavy Bomber Group was formed from fourteen crews of the 250th Regiment and five crews of the 14th Regiment. The group was entrusted with the delivery of fuel, aviation oil and antifreeze to the 8, 12 and 347 IAP based at the airfields of the Kerch Peninsula. Drop tanks, new engines, and searchlight installations were also transported to Kerch, Bagerovo, and the Seven Kolodezei airfield. Reinforcements were delivered and the wounded were transported. The group's planes dropped paratroopers behind enemy lines; mines, ammunition, and food were dropped on them; The bombing of the enemy-occupied Dzhankoy and Simferopol stations was carried out. The autumn of 1941 and winter of 1942 in Crimea were not characterized by good weather; enemy fighter aircraft were confined to the ground by frequent snowfalls, and on rare flying days they acted rather passively. One day, a delayed TB-3 carried out a landing mission behind enemy lines in the morning. Noticing a Bf-109 loitering in the drop zone, he completed the landing and disappeared from pursuit in the clouds. But the air giants also suffered from the vagaries of the weather. Heavy snowfalls filled airfields with snow. Then all available ground personnel and local residents were thrown into clearing them. Without their continuous work on the airfield, it would be difficult to carry out the orders of the command. To a large extent, the intensity of TB-3 flights in Crimea is due to the dedication of the people working on the ground. However, this was also the case in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The Crimean disaster in the spring of 1942 forced the command to reduce transport and landing operations on the peninsula. By July 1942, the group of heavy bombers was relocated to the Nikiforovka airfield, near Michurinsk (Central Front). The crews joined the 62nd AD DD and began bombing the enemy advancing on Voronezh. Until the fall of 1942, flights to Crimea continued to be carried out by the crews of the 325 AP DD, but due to the large distance of the home airfields from the Crimean Peninsula, this was done with less intensity.

In the twenties of January 1942, the preparation of air regiments for the Vyazma airborne operation began. Aircraft of the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 14th TBAP and the 4th separate airborne squadron (25 TB-3 in total) flew to the Grabtsevo airfield near Kaluga. Concentration proceeded slowly, the size of the ships did not contribute to the secrecy of the preparation of the operation, and it is not surprising that their appearance close to the front line interested German intelligence. On the afternoon of January 27, a Bf-110 appeared over Grabtsevo. Coming from the direction of the sun, he shot down a LaGG-3 that was performing aerobatics and left. Not wanting to waste energy without proper efficiency, the Germans carried out additional reconnaissance of the target on the same day. At 17.00 two Bf-110s appeared over the airfield. One of them, descending to low level, fired at the ships in the parking lots, drawing fire from air defense systems, while the other, meanwhile, at an altitude of about 1000 m, passed over the airfield, apparently photographing it. At 19.30 enemy bombers appeared over Grabtsevo. The bomb strike caused significant damage to the group of aircraft providing the landing. 1 TBAP lost 4 aircraft, 3 TBAP - 3, 14 TBAP and the 4th separate airborne squadron - 2 each, one bomber from the 7 TBAP was destroyed. During the second raid by German aviation on February 3, two more TB-3s were burned - from the 3rd and 7th TBAP, which were undergoing repairs in Grabtsevo after the raid on January 27. We had to shift the timing of the landing operation and abandon the idea of ​​​​using front-line airfields. The paratroopers were dropped near Vyazma in the second half of February 1942, this time the planes took off from the Vnukovo and Lyubertsy airfields. The TB-3 drop site was approached at the highest possible height. Not reaching 25-30 km from the drop point, the engines were muffled, and the plane descended to an altitude of 300-600 m. The paratroopers left it through the bomb bay and the upper gunner turrets. Heavy weapons were also delivered to Vyazma. Airplanes of 3 TBAP delivered snowmobiles to the paratroopers.

Spring 1942 was the time of intensive use of TB-3. Due to a number of circumstances, the advancing armies of generals Belov and Efremov (Western Front) were surrounded. The task of providing food and ammunition to the encircled troops, as well as the paratroopers sent to support them, was carried out by the TB-3 regiments until the beginning of April 1942. At the same time, the TB-3 crews bombed enemy units in Vyazma and Gzhatsk. In April 1942, it was necessary to provide emergency assistance to the troops of the North-Western Front, which were holding a German group in the Demyansk area. Ground troops fighting in swampy areas, cut off from their troops by the spring thaw, found themselves in a difficult situation. The TB-3 regiments were tasked with uninterrupted supply of those surrounded by everything necessary for combat. Cargo delivery was carried out from April 19, 1942 by shuttle flights. Loaded TB-3s took off from the Monino airfield. On the section of the route from Pola station to the drop site, they flew at an altitude of 1000-1200 m along a narrow corridor 10-15 km wide; were repeatedly shelled by German troops located on both sides of the corridor. Having arrived at the target, the planes descended to a height of 150-200 m and threw out the cargo in bags with a parachute suspension according to posted signals from the fires. Without parachutes, the cargo was dropped from heights of 20-50 m (sometimes it came in packaging made of high-strength paper - designers even in wartime were looking for ways to reduce the cost of landing operations). The planes landed at the Yam-Khotilovo jump airfield. We refueled, loaded up and flew out again that same night to the line of contact between the troops. Having dropped off at established sites near the villages of Lyakhovichi and Shchelgunovo, we returned to the Monino airfield at dawn the next day. And so night after night. The intensity of the flights was very high: individual crews (for example, N. Bobina from the 7th AP DD) made three flights per night, with two landings at the jump airfield.

Due to the mud, the German group was also supplied by air, with transport aircraft landing on a dirt airfield near the village. Glebovschina. Knowing about the regular flights of TB-3 in this area, German aviation, apparently, as soon as the take-off pads dried up, began the struggle for local air supremacy. At night, German fighters began to appear in the landing area. At first they acted hesitantly; after the bomber gunners opened intense fire on them, they rolled to the side and walked away. But soon the actions of enemy aircraft intensified. In the area where the cargo was dropped, TB-3s began to be met by patrolling Bf-110s: they lay in wait for them at altitudes of 1000-1500 m, so that when the ship descended to a drop height of 100-300 m, they would strike from above. Along the way, the landing sites, marked by fires, were bombed. The TB-3 crews also did not remain in debt, carrying out a bomb attack on the German airfield near the village of Glebovshchina. Up to 10 Ju 52 aircraft were destroyed. In May 1942, TB-3 regiments supplied cavalry units of the Red Army that were raiding the rear of German troops. The cargo was delivered to the area west of Vyazma, to sites near the villages of B. Vergovo, Glukhovo, Preobrazhenskoye. In just one night on May 4, they delivered 1.8 tons of ammunition, 6.7 tons of food and 1 ton of fuel.

The effectiveness of these flights was appreciated primarily by the enemy: the relationship between the intensity of TB-3 flights and their own losses in battles with cavalry turned out to be direct. And for the first time since the beginning of the war, large forces were sent to destroy this air bridge. Cases of failure to complete combat missions due to strong anti-aircraft resistance have become more frequent. The landing sites were bombarded by the enemy. To detect TB-3s in the air, loitering fighters, as soon as signal fires were lit at the sites, dropped SABs at an altitude of about 4000 m. Flying TB-3s were illuminated and became visible to night fighters. In the regiments of the 53rd AD DD there were losses, although not as numerous as they could have been - this was due to the good training of the air gunners.

The slow giants were unique in their capabilities when delivering large equipment. If the PS-84 could take on board a field or anti-tank gun, then the TB-3 on an external sling could carry various wheeled or tracked vehicles, including light tanks. Both a truck and an anti-aircraft gun could fit between the chassis struts when assembled. TB-3 TB-3s of the 53rd and 62nd AD began their participation in the defense of Stalingrad with the bombing of crossings across the Don. In August 1942, TB-3 regiments delivered fuel for tankers to the Rzhev area. The Battle of Stalingrad required a lot of effort from all forces, and in the fall of 1942 the TB-3 regiments largely stopped participating in landing operations, concentrating on bombing German troops.

1946 End of long service.

In mid-1942, a conference was held at the 53rd AD DD, at which the crews of TB-3 bombers shared their combat experience. The units that had this type of aircraft in service (and by that time there were 6 of them on the Soviet-German front) were given recommendations on its effective use. Despite the skepticism towards the slow-moving giant that prevailed at the beginning of the war, the TB-3 proved to be very worthy and made a significant contribution to the cause of Victory. From mid-1942, both as night bombers and as military transport aircraft, the TB-3 began to replace the more modern PS-84 (Li-2). Later, even more advanced American C-47s appeared in transport regiments and divisions. From the beginning of 1943, obsolete bombers began to be returned from the front to flight schools. So, in August of the 1st Guards. The ADD regiment transferred 12 of the oldest and most worn-out vehicles to Chelyabinsk. There they were used for bombing and aerial gunnery training until the very end of the war. From the beginning of 1944, TB-3s finally switched to the role of military transport and training vehicles, and they were operated mainly in the rear. But the archaic-looking Tupolev four-engine aircraft lingered in the Soviet Air Force for a long time. Moreover, the aircraft was not decommissioned from combat service even after the end of the war - on the TB-3, the crews of the 52nd Guards Regiment continued to carry out combat training plans until the fall of 1946!

Some G-2s (the same TB-3s, only disarmed) also remained at the front until the victory over Germany. By the beginning of 1944, there were 17 of them left in the rear. They worked mainly in Siberia and Central Asia. So, they used them to export gold from the Magadan region. Due to the lack of equipment in the rear, aircraft were used very intensively. The pilot V.T. Bulgin alone in Siberia transported 700 tons of various cargo and more than 700 passengers on his plane during three years of war. On January 1, 1945, the Civil Air Fleet had ten G-2s, on June 1 there were two left, and on December 1 - one, the last. He, still in good working order, transported sulfur in Turkmenistan. This aircraft was written off in August 1946.