Nuclear submarines of Russia: number. Multipurpose nuclear submarines of Russia. "Nautilus" and others The first nuclear submarine was called

“It was simply pointless to talk about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines. The Americans gave them the humiliating nickname “roaring cows.” The pursuit of Soviet engineers for other characteristics of boats (speed, diving depth, weapon power) did not save the situation. An airplane, helicopter or torpedo still turned out to be faster. And the boat, being discovered, turned into “game” without having time to become a “hunter”.
“The problem of noise reduction of Soviet submarines began to be solved in the eighties. True, they were still 3-4 times noisier than the American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines.

Such statements are constantly found in Russian magazines and books devoted to domestic nuclear submarines (NPS). This information was taken not from any official sources, but from American and English articles. That is why the terrible noise of Soviet/Russian nuclear submarines is one of the myths of the United States.

It should be noted that not only Soviet shipbuilders faced noise problems, and while we were able to immediately create a combat nuclear submarine capable of serving, the Americans had more serious problems with their firstborn. "Nautilus" had many "childhood diseases" that are so characteristic of all experimental machines. Its engine produced such a noise level that the sonars - the main means of navigation under water - practically died out. As a result, during a hike in the Northern Seas in the area of \u200b\u200b. Spitsbergen, echolocators “overlooked” a drifting ice floe, which damaged the only periscope. Subsequently, the Americans launched a struggle to reduce noise. To achieve this, they abandoned double-hull boats, switching to one-and-a-half-hull and single-hull boats, sacrificing important characteristics of submarines: survivability, immersion depth, and speed. In our country they built double-hulled ones. But were the Soviet designers wrong, and were double-hulled nuclear submarines so noisy that their combat use would have become pointless?

It would, of course, be good to take noise data from domestic and foreign nuclear submarines and compare them. But this is impossible to do, because official information on this issue is still considered secret (just remember the Iowa battleships, for which the real characteristics were revealed only after 50 years). There is no information at all on American boats (and if it appears, it should be treated with the same caution as information about booking the Iowa ship). There are sometimes scattered data on domestic nuclear submarines. But what is this information? Here are four examples from different articles:

1) When designing the first Soviet nuclear submarine, a set of measures was created to ensure acoustic stealth...... However, shock absorbers for the main turbines were never created. As a result, the underwater noise of the nuclear submarine Project 627 at increased speeds increased to 110 decibels.
2) The Project 670 SSGN had a very low level of acoustic visibility for that time (among the second-generation Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, this submarine was considered the quietest). Its noise level at full speed in the ultrasonic frequency range was less than 80, in the infrasound - 100, in the sound - 110 decibels.

3) When creating the third generation nuclear submarines, it was possible to achieve a reduction in noise compared to the previous generation boats by 12 decibels, or 3.4 times.

4) Since the 70s of the last century, nuclear submarines have reduced their noise by an average of 1 dB every two years. Over the past 19 years alone - from 1990 to the present - the average noise level of US nuclear submarines has decreased tenfold, from 0.1 Pa to 0.01 Pa.

It is in principle impossible to draw any reasonable and logical conclusion from these data on noise levels. Therefore, we have only one way left - to analyze the real facts of the service. Here are the most famous cases from the service of domestic nuclear submarines.

1) During an autonomous cruise in the South China Sea in 1968, the K-10 submarine, one of the first generation of nuclear-powered missile carriers of the USSR (Project 675), received an order to intercept an aircraft carrier formation of the US Navy. The aircraft carrier Enterprise covered the guided-missile cruiser Long Beach, frigates and support ships. At the calculated point, Captain 1st Rank R.V. Mazin took the submarine through the defensive lines of the American order directly under the bottom of the Enterprise. Hiding behind the noise of the gigantic ship's propellers, the submarine accompanied the attack force for thirteen hours. During this time, training torpedo attacks were practiced on all pennants of the order and acoustic profiles (characteristic noises of various ships) were taken. After which the K-10 successfully left the order and carried out a training missile attack at a distance. In the event of a real war, the entire formation would have been destroyed by choice: conventional torpedoes or a nuclear strike. It is interesting to note that American experts rated Project 675 extremely low. It was these submarines that they dubbed “Roaring Cows.” And it was them that the ships of the US aircraft carrier force could not detect. Project 675 boats were used not only to track surface ships, but sometimes “ruined the lives” of American nuclear-powered ships on duty. Thus, in 1967, K-135 continuously monitored the Patrick Henry SSBN for 5.5 hours, remaining undetected itself.

2) In 1979, during another aggravation of Soviet-American relations, the nuclear submarines K-38 and K-481 (Project 671) carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where at that time there were up to 50 US Navy ships. The campaign lasted 6 months. Campaign participant A.N. Shporko reported that Soviet nuclear submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very secretly: even if the US Navy detected them for a short time, they could not correctly classify them, much less organize a pursuit and practice conditional destruction. These conclusions were subsequently confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking of US Navy ships was carried out at weapons range and, if an order was received, they would be sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%

3) In March 1984, the United States and South Korea held their regular annual naval exercises, Team Spirit. Moscow and Pyongyang closely followed the exercises. To monitor the American carrier strike group, consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven US warships, the K-314 nuclear torpedo submarine (Project 671, this is the second generation of nuclear submarines, also reproached for noise) and six warships were sent. Four days later, K-314 managed to detect a US Navy carrier strike group. Monitoring of the aircraft carrier was carried out over the next 7 days, then after the discovery of the Soviet nuclear submarine, the aircraft carrier entered the territorial waters of South Korea. "K-314" remained outside territorial waters.

Having lost hydroacoustic contact with the aircraft carrier, the boat under the command of Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Evseenko continued the search. The Soviet submarine headed to the supposed location of the aircraft carrier, but it was not there. The American side maintained radio silence.
On March 21, a Soviet submarine detected strange noises. To clarify the situation, the boat surfaced to periscope depth. It was already eleven o'clock. According to Vladimir Evseenko, several American ships were spotted coming towards them. The decision was made to dive, but it was too late. Unnoticed by the crew of the submarine, the aircraft carrier with its running lights turned off was moving at a speed of about 30 km/h. K-314 was ahead of Kitty Hawk. There was a blow, followed by another. At first, the team decided that the wheelhouse was damaged, but when checking, they did not find any water in the compartments. As it turned out, the stabilizer was bent in the first collision, and the propeller was damaged in the second. A huge tugboat "Mashuk" was sent to help her. The boat was towed to Chazhma Bay, 50 km east of Vladivostok, where it was to undergo repairs.

For the Americans, the collision was also unexpected. According to them, after the strike they saw the retreating silhouette of a submarine without navigation lights. Two American SH-3H anti-submarine helicopters were scrambled. Having escorted the Soviet submarine, they did not find any visible serious damage to it. However, upon impact, the submarine's propeller was disabled and it began to lose speed. The propeller also damaged the hull of the aircraft carrier. It turned out that its bottom was pierced by 40 m. Fortunately, no one was injured in this incident. Kitty Hawk was forced to go to Naval Station Subic Bay in the Philippines for repairs before returning to San Diego. During an inspection of the aircraft carrier, a fragment of a K-314 propeller was found stuck in the hull, as well as pieces of the submarine’s sound-absorbing coating. The exercises were curtailed. The incident caused a lot of noise: the American press actively discussed how a submarine was able to sail undetected at such a close distance to a US Navy aircraft carrier group conducting exercises, including anti-submarine exercises.

4) In the winter of 1996, 150 miles from the Hebrides. On February 29, the Russian Embassy in London appealed to the command of the British Navy with a request to provide assistance to a crew member of the submarine 671RTM (code "Pike", second generation+), who underwent surgery on board the ship to remove appendicitis, followed by peritonitis (its treatment is possible only in conditions hospital). Soon the patient was redirected to the shore by a Lynx helicopter from the destroyer Glasgow. However, the British media were not so much moved by the manifestation of naval cooperation between Russia and Great Britain, as they expressed bewilderment at the fact that while negotiations were being held in London, NATO meetings were taking place in the North Atlantic, in the area where the Russian Navy submarine was located. anti-submarine maneuvers (by the way, the Glasgow EM also took part in them). But the nuclear-powered submarine was detected only after it floated to the surface to transfer the sailor to the helicopter. According to The Times, the Russian submarine demonstrated its stealth while tracking anti-submarine forces conducting an active search. It is noteworthy that the British, in an official statement made to the media, initially attributed the “Pike” to the more modern (lower noise) Project 971, and only later admitted that they could not notice, according to their own statements, the noisy Soviet boat Project 671RTM.

5) In one of the Northern Fleet training grounds near the Kola Bay on May 23, 1981, a collision occurred between the Soviet nuclear submarine K-211 (SSBN 667-BDR) and the American Sturgeon-class submarine. An American submarine rammed its conning tower into the aft section of the K-211 while it was practicing elements of combat training. The American submarine did not surface in the area of the collision. However, a few days later, an American nuclear submarine appeared in the area of the English naval base of Holy Loch with pronounced damage to the wheelhouse. Our submarine surfaced and arrived at the base under its own power. Here the submarine was awaited by a commission consisting of specialists from industry, navy, designer and science. K-211 was docked, and during the inspection, holes were discovered in two aft tanks of the main ballast, damage to the horizontal stabilizer and the right propeller blades. In damaged tanks, they found bolts with countersunk heads and pieces of plexi and metal from the wheelhouse of a US Navy submarine. Moreover, the commission was able to establish from individual details that the Soviet submarine collided with an American submarine of the Sturgeon type. The huge SSBN pr 667, like all SSBNs, was not designed for sharp maneuvers that an American nuclear submarine could not dodge, so the only explanation for this incident is that Sturgeon did not see or even suspect that it was in the immediate vicinity of K- 211. It should be noted that the Sturgeon-class boats were intended specifically to combat submarines and carried appropriate modern search equipment.

It should be noted that submarine collisions are not that rare. The last collision for domestic and American nuclear submarines was near the island of Kildin, in Russian territorial waters, on February 11, 1992. The nuclear submarine K-276 (entered into service in 1982), under the command of captain of the second rank I. Lokt, collided with the American nuclear submarine Baton Rouge. (“Los Angeles”), which, while tracking Russian Navy ships in the exercise area, missed the Russian nuclear submarine. As a result of the collision, the Crab's wheelhouse was damaged. The situation of the American nuclear submarine turned out to be more difficult; it barely managed to reach the base, after which they decided not to repair the boat, but to remove it from the fleet.

6)Perhaps the most striking fragment in the biography of Project 671RTM ships was their participation in the major operations “Aport” and “Atrina”, carried out by the forces of the 33rd Division in the Atlantic and which significantly shook the confidence of the United States in the ability of its Navy to solve anti-submarine missions.
On May 29, 1985, three submarines of Project 671RTM (K-502, K-324, K-299), as well as the submarine K-488 (Project 671RT), simultaneously left Zapadnaya Litsa on May 29, 1985. Later they were joined by the Project 671 nuclear submarine K-147. Of course, the entry of a whole group of nuclear submarines into the ocean could not go unnoticed by US naval intelligence. An intensive search began, but it did not bring the expected results. At the same time, the Soviet nuclear-powered submarines, operating secretly, themselves monitored the missile submarines of the US Navy in the area of their combat patrol (for example, the K-324 nuclear submarine had three hydroacoustic contacts with the US nuclear submarine, for a total duration of 28 hours. And the K-147 was equipped with the latest tracking system The submarine, following the wake, using the specified system and acoustic means, carried out six-day (!!!) tracking of the American SSBN “Simon Bolivar”. In addition, the submarines also studied the tactics of American anti-submarine aircraft. The Americans managed to establish contact only with K, which was already returning to the base. -488. On July 1, Operation Aport was completed.

7) In March-June 1987, Operation Atrina, similar in scope, was carried out, in which five Project 671RTM submarines took part - K-244 (under the command of captain of the second rank V. Alikov), K-255 (under the command of captain of the second rank B.Yu. Muratov), K-298 (under the command of captain of the second rank Popkov), K-299 (under the command of captain of the second rank N.I. Klyuev) and K-524 (under the command of captain of the second rank A.F. Smelkov) . Although the Americans learned about the departure of nuclear submarines from Western Litsa, they lost the ships in the North Atlantic. The “underwater hunt” began again, which involved almost all the anti-submarine forces of the American Atlantic Fleet - shore- and deck-based aircraft, six anti-submarine nuclear submarines (in addition to the submarines already deployed by the United States Navy in the Atlantic), 3 powerful ship-based search engines group and 3 of the latest Stallworth-class vessels (hydroacoustic observation ships), which used powerful underwater explosions to generate a hydroacoustic pulse. Ships of the English fleet were involved in the search operation. According to the stories of commanders of domestic submarines, the concentration of anti-submarine forces was so large that it seemed impossible to surface for air pumping and a radio communication session. For the Americans who failed in 1985, it was necessary to regain their face. Despite the fact that all possible anti-submarine forces of the US Navy and its allies were pulled into the area, nuclear submarines managed to reach the Sargasso Sea area undetected, where the Soviet “veil” was finally discovered. The Americans managed to establish their first short contacts with submarines only eight days after Operation Atrina began. Project 671RTM nuclear submarines were mistakenly mistaken for strategic missile submarines, which only increased the concern of the US naval command and the country's political leadership (it must be recalled that these events occurred at the peak of the Cold War, which at any time could turn into "hot") During the return to base to separate from the anti-submarine weapons of the American Navy, the submarine commanders were allowed to use secret hydroacoustic countermeasures; until that moment, Soviet nuclear submarines had successfully hidden from anti-submarine forces solely due to the characteristics of the submarines themselves.

The success of Operations Atrina and Aport confirmed the assumption that the United States Navy, given the massive use of modern nuclear submarines by the Soviet Union, would not be able to organize any effective countermeasures against them.

As we see from the available facts, American anti-submarine forces were not able to detect Soviet nuclear submarines, including the first generations, and protect their Navy from sudden attacks from the depths. And all the statements that “It was simply pointless to talk about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines” have no basis.

Now let’s examine the myth that high speeds, maneuverability and diving depth do not provide any advantages. Let's look again at the known facts:

1) In September-December 1971, the Soviet nuclear submarine of Project 661 (number K-162) made its first voyage to full autonomy with a combat route from the Greenland Sea to the Brazilian Trench. In October, the submarine stood up to intercept an aircraft carrier strike force of the US Navy, during headed by the aircraft carrier Saratoga. They were able to spot the submarine on the cover ships and tried to drive it away. Under normal conditions, spotting a submarine would mean the failure of a combat mission, but not in this case. K-162 developed a speed of over 44 knots in a submerged position. Attempts to drive away the K-162, or to break away at speed, were unsuccessful. The Saratoga had no chance at a maximum speed of 35 knots. During the hours-long chase, the Soviet submarine practiced torpedo attacks and several times reached an advantageous angle to launch Amethyst missiles. But the most interesting thing is that the submarine maneuvered so quickly that the Americans were sure that they were being pursued by a “wolf pack” - a group of submarines. What does it mean? This suggests that the appearance of the boat in the new square was so unexpected for the Americans, or rather unexpected, that they considered it contact with a new submarine. Consequently, in the event of hostilities, the Americans would search and strike to kill in a completely different square. Thus, it is almost impossible not to escape an attack or to destroy a submarine in the presence of a high speed nuclear submarine.

2) Early 1980s. One of the USSR nuclear submarines, which operated in the North Atlantic, set a kind of record; it monitored the nuclear-powered ship of a “potential enemy” for 22 hours, being in the aft sector of the tracking object. Despite all the attempts of the commander of the NATO submarine to change the situation, it was not possible to throw the enemy “off the tail”: tracking was stopped only after the commander of the Soviet submarine received the appropriate orders from the shore. This incident happened with the Project 705 nuclear submarine, perhaps the most controversial and striking vessel in the history of Soviet submarine shipbuilding. This project deserves a separate article. Project 705 nuclear submarines had a maximum speed that was comparable to the speed of universal and anti-submarine torpedoes of “potential enemies”, but most importantly, due to the peculiarities of the power plant (there was no need for a special transition to increased parameters of the main power plant when increasing speed, as was the case on submarines with water-water reactors), were able to develop full speed in minutes, having almost “airplane” acceleration characteristics. Its significant speed made it possible to enter the “shadow” sector of a submarine or surface ship in a short time, even if the Alpha had previously been detected by enemy hydroacoustics. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral Bogatyrev, a former commander of the K-123 (Project 705K), the submarine could turn around “on the spot,” which is especially important during active tracking of the “enemy” and friendly submarines one after another. “Alpha” did not allow other submarines to enter their heading stern corners (that is, into the hydroacoustic shadow zone), which are especially favorable for tracking and launching sudden torpedo strikes.

The high maneuverability and speed characteristics of the Project 705 nuclear submarine made it possible to practice effective maneuvers to evade enemy torpedoes with a further counterattack. In particular, the submarine could circulate 180 degrees at maximum speed and begin moving in the opposite direction after 42 seconds. Commanders of nuclear submarines of Project 705 A.F. Zagryadsky and A.U. Abbasov said that such a maneuver made it possible, by gradually increasing speed to maximum and simultaneously performing a turn with a change in depth, to force the enemy watching them in the noise direction finding mode to lose the target, and for the Soviet nuclear submarine to go “at the tail” of the enemy “in fighter style.”

3) On August 4, 1984, the nuclear submarine K-278 Komsomolets made an unprecedented dive in the history of world military navigation - the needles of its depth gauges first froze at the 1000-meter mark, and then crossed it. K-278 sailed and maneuvered at a depth of 1027 m, and fired torpedoes at a depth of 1000 meters. To journalists, this seems like a common whim of the Soviet military and designers. They don’t understand why it is necessary to reach such depths, if the Americans at that time limited themselves to 450 meters. To do this you need to know ocean hydroacoustics. Increasing depth does not reduce detection capability linearly. Between the upper, highly heated layer of ocean water and the lower, colder layer lies the so-called temperature jump layer. If, say, the sound source is in a cold, dense layer, above which there is a warm, less dense layer, the sound is reflected from the boundary of the upper layer and propagates only in the lower cold layer. The top layer in this case represents a “silent zone”, a “shadow zone” into which noise from the submarine’s propellers does not penetrate. Simple direction finders of a surface anti-submarine ship will not be able to find it, and the submarine can feel safe. There can be several such layers in the ocean, and each layer additionally hides the submarine. The axis of the earth's sound channel below which was the working depth of K-278 has an even greater hiding effect. Even the Americans admitted that it was impossible to detect nuclear submarines at a depth of 800 m or more by any means. And anti-submarine torpedoes are not designed for such a depth. Thus, the K-278 traveling at working depth was invisible and invulnerable.

Does this raise questions about the importance of maximum speeds, diving depths and maneuverability for submarines?

Now let’s look at the statements of officials and institutions, which for some reason domestic journalists prefer to ignore.

According to data from scientists from MIPT cited in the work “The Future of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: Discussion and Arguments” (ed. Dolgoprudny, 1995). even under the most favorable hydrological conditions (the probability of their occurrence in the northern seas is no more than 0.03) nuclear submarine pr. 971 (for reference: serial construction began back in 1980) can be detected by the American Los Angeles nuclear submarines with GAKAN/BQQ-5 at ranges of no more than 10 km. Under less favorable conditions (i.e., under 97% of weather conditions in the northern seas), it is impossible to detect Russian nuclear submarines.

There is also a statement by a prominent American naval analyst, N. Polmoran, made at a hearing in the National Security Committee of the US House of Representatives: “The appearance of Russian 3rd generation boats demonstrated that Soviet shipbuilders closed the noise gap much earlier than we could have imagined.” . According to the US Navy, at operational speeds of about 5-7 knots, the noise of Russian 3rd generation boats, recorded by US hydroacoustic reconnaissance, was lower than the noise of the most advanced nuclear submarines of the US Navy, the Improved Los Angeles type.

According to the Chief of Operations of the US Navy, Admiral Jeremi Boorda, made in 1995, American ships are not able to accompany third-generation Russian nuclear submarines at speeds of 6-9 knots.

This is probably enough to assert that the Russian “roaring cows” are able to carry out the tasks facing them despite any enemy opposition.

Since the first nuclear submarine, the American Nautilus, 98.75 m long, launched in 1954, a lot of water has passed under the bridge. And to date, the creators of underwater ships, like aircraft manufacturers, have already counted 4 generations of submarines.

Their improvement went from generation to generation. The first generation (late 40s - early 60s of the XX century) - the childhood of nuclear-powered ships; At this time, ideas about the appearance were being formed and their capabilities were being clarified. The second generation (60s - mid-70s) was marked by the massive construction of Soviet and American nuclear submarines (NPS) and the deployment of the Cold War underwater front throughout the oceans. The third generation (until the beginning of the 90s) was a silent war for supremacy in the ocean. Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, nuclear submarines of the fourth generation are competing in absentia with each other.

To write about all types of nuclear submarines would result in a separate solid volume. Therefore, here we will list only individual record achievements of some submarines.

Already in the spring of 1946, employees of the US Navy Research Laboratory Gunn and Abelson proposed equipping a captured German submarine of the XXVI series with an APP with a reactor cooled by a potassium-sodium alloy.

In 1949, construction of a ground-based prototype of a ship reactor began in the United States. And in September 1954, as already mentioned, the world's first nuclear submarine SSN-571 (Nautilus, Project EB-251A), equipped with an experimental installation of the S-2W type, came into operation.

The first nuclear submarine "Nautilus"

In January 1959, the first domestic nuclear submarine of Project 627 was commissioned by the USSR Navy.

The submariners of the opposing fleets tried their best to outdo each other. At first, the advantage was on the side of potential opponents of the USSR.

So, on August 3, 1958, the same Nautilus, under the command of William Anderson, reached the North Pole under the ice, thereby fulfilling the dream of Jules Verne. True, in his novel he forced Captain Nemo to surface at the South Pole, but we now know that this is impossible - submarines do not swim under continents.

In 1955-1959, the first series of Skate-type nuclear torpedo submarines (project EB-253A) was built in the United States. At first, they were supposed to be equipped with compact fast neutron reactors with helium cooling. However, the “father” of the American nuclear fleet, X. Rickover, put reliability above all else, and the Skates received pressurized water reactors.

A prominent role in solving the problems of controllability and propulsion of nuclear-powered ships was played by the high-speed experimental submarine Albacore, built in the USA in 1953, which had a “whale-shaped” hull shape, close to optimal for underwater travel. True, it had a diesel-electric power plant, but it also provided the opportunity to test new propellers, high-speed controls and other experimental developments. By the way, it was this boat, which accelerated underwater to 33 knots, that for a long time held the speed record.

The solutions developed at Albacore were then used to create a series of high-speed torpedo submarines of the US Navy Skipjack type (project EB-269A), and then nuclear submarines carrying George Washington ballistic missiles (project EB-278A).

"George Washington" could, in case of urgent need, launch all missiles with solid fuel engines within 15 minutes. Moreover, unlike liquid rockets, this did not require pre-filling the annular gap of the mines with sea water.

A special place among the first American nuclear submarines is occupied by the anti-submarine Tullibi (project EB-270A), commissioned in 1960. The submarine was equipped with a full electric propulsion scheme; for the first time, a hydroacoustic system with a spherical bow antenna of increased size and a new arrangement of torpedo tubes were used for a nuclear submarine: closer to the middle of the length of the submarine’s hull and at an angle to the direction of its movement. The new equipment made it possible to effectively use such a new product as the SUBROK rocket torpedo, launched from under water and delivering a nuclear depth charge or anti-submarine torpedo to a range of up to 55-60 km.

American submarine Albacore

"Tullibi" remained the only one of its kind, but many of the technical means and solutions used and tested on it were used on serial nuclear submarines of the "Thresher" type (Project 188).

Special-purpose nuclear submarines also appeared in the 60s. To solve reconnaissance tasks, the Helibat was re-equipped, and at the same time the Triton radar patrol nuclear submarine (project EB-260A) was built in the United States. By the way, the latter is also notable for the fact that of all the American nuclear submarines it was the only one that had two reactors.

The first generation of Soviet multi-purpose nuclear submarines of projects 627, 627A, having good speed qualities, were significantly inferior in stealth to American nuclear submarines of that period, since their propellers “made noise throughout the entire ocean.” And our designers had to work a lot to eliminate this shortcoming.

The second generation of Soviet strategic forces is usually counted with the commissioning of strategic missile submarines (Project 667A).

In the 70s, the United States implemented a program to re-equip the Lafayette-class nuclear submarine with the new Poseidon S-3 missile system, the main feature of which was the appearance of multiple warheads on ballistic missiles of the submarine fleet.

Soviet specialists responded to this by creating the D-9 naval intercontinental ballistic missile system, which was installed on Project 667B (Murena) and 667BD (Murena-M) submarines. Since 1976, the first submarine missile carriers of Project 667BDR, also armed with naval missiles with multiple warheads, appeared in the USSR Navy.

Missile carrier Murena-M

In addition, we created “fighter boats” of projects 705, 705K. In the early 80s, one of these boats set a kind of record: for 22 hours it pursued a potential enemy submarine, and all attempts by the commander of that boat to throw the pursuer off the tail were unsuccessful. The pursuit was stopped only by order from the shore.

But the main thing in the confrontation between the shipbuilders of the two superpowers was the “battle for decibels.” By deploying stationary underwater surveillance systems, as well as using effective hydroacoustic stations with flexible, long towed antennas on submarines, the Americans detected our submarines long before they reached their starting position.

This continued until we created third-generation submarines with low-noise propellers. At the same time, both countries began creating strategic systems of a new generation - Trident (USA) and Typhoon (USSR), which culminated in the commissioning of the lead missile carriers of the Ohio and Akula type in 1981, which are worth talking about in more detail, since they claim to be the largest submarines.

Schematic diagram of the engine compartment with a nuclear reactor

In a typical nuclear reactor engine (left), cooled water is pressurized into the reactor vessel containing nuclear fuel. The heated water leaves the reactor and is used to turn other water into steam, and then, when cooled, is returned to the reactor. Steam rotates the blades of a turbine engine. The gearbox converts the rapid rotation of the turbine shaft into a slower rotation of the electric motor shaft. The electric motor shaft is connected to the propeller shaft using a clutch mechanism. In addition to transmitting rotation to the propeller shaft, the electric motor generates electricity, which is stored in on-board batteries.

Nuclear reaction

In the reactor cavity, the atomic nucleus, consisting of protons and neutrons, is struck by a free neutron (figure below). The impact splits the nucleus, and in this case, in particular, neutrons are released, which bombard other atoms. This is how a chain reaction of nuclear fission occurs. This releases a huge amount of thermal energy, that is, heat.

A nuclear submarine cruises along the coast in a surface position. Such ships need to replenish fuel only once every two to three years.

The control group in the conning tower monitors the adjacent water area through a periscope. Radar, sonar, radio communications and cameras with scanning systems also assist in the navigation of this vessel.

12:07 am - The first Soviet nuclear submarine. History of creation 1

Zhiltsov: - You have been appointed senior assistant to the commander of the first experimental nuclear submarine. I also learned that the commander of the boat has not yet been selected and all the work of selecting, calling, arranging and organizing crew training will have to be led by me. I admit, I was taken aback. I, a twenty-six-year-old lieutenant commander, had to resolve all issues in departments where any officer was senior to me both in rank and age. The documents necessary for the formation of the crew will have to be signed by high-ranking managers. But I didn’t know how to click my heels on the parquet floor, and my favorite uniform was an oiled work jacket.

Seeing my confusion, the new boss hastened to “encourage” me: upon completion of testing of the new submarine, the best officers will be presented with high state awards. There was, however, an alarming nuance: testing a boat of a fundamentally new design that had not yet been built with a crew that had not yet been selected and trained was supposed to take place in six to eight months!

Since there was no question of In order to tell someone about my new appointment, I had to urgently come up with an intelligible legend even for those closest to me. The hardest thing was to fool my wife and brother, also a sailor. I told them that I had been assigned to the non-existent “submarine crewing department.” The wife did not fail to insert the pin: “Where is your determination to sail the seas and oceans? Or did you mean the Moscow Sea?” My brother gave me a briefcase without a word - in his eyes I was a complete loser.

Commentary by nuclear submarine commander L.G. Osipenko: A natural question is: why was Lev Zhiltsov chosen from among many young, capable, disciplined officers for the key position of chief mate of a nuclear submarine, in the creation of which every step was a pioneering step? Meanwhile, there were enough reasons for such an appointment.

After the command is given from the center to allocate for the formation of a crew trained, competent, disciplined, without penalties, etc., the search for the right people begins primarily in the Black Sea Fleet. Everyone was eager to serve there: it was warm, and in the summer it was just a resort. It cannot be compared, for example, with the Northern Fleet, where there is winter for nine months of the year and polar night for six. There were no “thieves” at that time, and the most capable people ended up in this blessed place. The best graduates of naval schools had the right to choose the fleet in which they would like to serve. Zhiltsov graduated from the Caspian School 39th out of more than 500 cadets, then with honors from mine and torpedo classes. Of the 90 people, only three, besides him, became assistant commanders. A year later, Zhiltsov was appointed senior assistant on the S-61.

The boat was considered exemplary in many respects. This was the first, lead boat of the largest post-war series, which owes much of its technical excellence to the engineers of the Third Reich. At that time, all new types of weapons, new radio engineering and navigation equipment were tested on it. And the people on the boat were chosen accordingly. It is no coincidence that it was the training base for dozens of other crews.

Zhiltsov served without criticism, as did his subordinates and the equipment entrusted to him. Although he did not have access to independent control, the commander trusted him with the boat even during such complex maneuvers as remooring. Both the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet and the brigade commander went to sea when Zhiltsov was in charge. Last but not least, the young officer was awarded an inspection from Moscow for his exemplary conduct of political training. Then it was believed that the better politically savvy you are, the more capable you are of leading people. This is how Lev Zhiltsov was chosen from among many young officers.

The next day began with a joyful event: Boris Akulov, assigned to the same crew, appeared on Bolshoi Kozlovsky. We have known each other since 1951, when a division of new submarines arrived in Balaklava. Akulov then served as commander of the BC-5 (power plant on submarines). He was a little older than me - in 1954 he turned thirty. Boris Akulov graduated from the Naval Engineering School. Dzerzhinsky in Leningrad. On the first day, he went through the same procedure of being introduced to secrecy, only now with my participation. We were allocated a workplace (one for two), and we began to form a crew.

Ironically The department to which we were subordinated was testing nuclear weapons for the Navy. Naturally, there were not only submariners, but also naval engineers in general. Therefore, despite all the desire of the management officers to help us, they were of little use.

We could only rely on our own experience submarine service of the post-war generation. Strictly classified bulletins from the foreign press also helped us. There was practically no one to consult with: in the entire Navy, only a few admirals and officers of the so-called expert group were allowed to see our documentation, who looked down on us, the green lieutenant commanders.

In parallel with work on the staffing table Akulov and I studied personal affairs and called people whose need was already obvious. Weekly, or even more often, we received detailed “field files” from the fleets, which included service and political characteristics, punishment and reward cards. Naturally, nowhere was there a word or hint about a nuclear submarine. Only by looking at the set of military specialties could naval personnel officers guess about forming a crew for an extraordinary ship.

For each vacancy, three candidates were presented who met the strictest requirements for professional training, political and moral qualities and discipline. We studied their cases in the most meticulous way, because we knew that we would be controlled by “another authority” and if she rejected the candidacy, we would have to start all over again. They were screened out based on the most absurd criteria, as I understood even then: some ended up in occupied territory as a child, some had a wife’s father who was captured, and some, even though “Russian” was listed in the “nationality” column, The mother's patronymic is clearly Jewish.

If most of our future colleagues languished in idleness, Akulov and I did not notice how we flew by day after day. In addition to the routine work associated with the arrival of people, interviews, and accommodation, we had to resolve issues on which the operation of the future boat depended. Let me give you one example. The staffing table provided for only three managers for two main power plants with a minimum salary in the fleet of 1,100 rubles per month.

It took several months to prove: only six engineers can provide a full three-shift shift at the power plant. And how right was the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR V. A. Malyshev, who later proposed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov to create an all-officer crew - a forge of qualified personnel for the development of the nuclear fleet. Unfortunately, this turned out to be impossible, including for objective reasons: someone needed to do heavy physical and auxiliary work.

By early October 1954 All the officers were in Moscow, and there was a need to plan specifically who and where to train. It was decided to send officers from navigational, radio engineering and mine-torpedo specialties to the relevant institutes and design bureaus that created equipment for the boat, and then to the Northern Fleet, to Polyarny, for training on diesel submarines.

Another, larger group, which included commanding officers, officers of the electromechanical combat unit and chiefs of the medical service, had to undergo a course of study and practical training in operating a nuclear power plant. By that time, such training could only be carried out at the world's first nuclear power plant (NPP), launched in the summer of 1954 in the village of Obninsky, 105 km from Moscow. At that time, the location of the nuclear power plant was considered a state secret, and the village - later the city of Obninsk - was partially closed to entry, and only those working with special passes were allowed into certain zones.

Directorate of the Navy agreed on our trip to Obninsk to agree on specific plans and deadlines for October 2, 1954. The dress code is civilian. The head of the facility, which was called “Laboratory “B” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” and later became the Institute of Nuclear Research, was Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR Dmitry Ivanovich Blokhintsev. He introduced us to affairs and life in Obninsky, listened attentively to our story about the tasks and desired timing of officer training. We agreed on the time of classes and internship, and then went to see the nuclear power plant.

Its director Nikolai Andreevich Nikolaev was skeptical about our plans to master the control of a nuclear reactor in two to three months. In his opinion, this should take at least a year. And while he explained to us the operating principle of a nuclear reactor using demonstration diagrams, walked us through all the rooms of the station and showed us the work of the operators on the control panel, his words acquired more and more weight. But we continued to do our best and discussed with him the principle of distributing officers into shifts during the internship period, the timing of passing exams for admission to independent management, etc. Nikolai Andreevich no longer objected, but finally remarked, as if jokingly: “Well, well.” , our people haven’t been on vacation for several years. So all hope lies with your engineers.

Looking ahead, I’ll say: he was ironic in vain. Our internship began at the end of January 1955, and already in March the first officers passed the exam for access to reactor control. In April, they took control of the station themselves, and the station operators went on vacation. To be fair, I note that the nuclear power plant workers and Nikolaev himself did everything in their power to help us.

But for now our task was to dress all the officers in civilian clothes, since the appearance of a group of military sailors in Obninsk would immediately betray the intention of the Soviet Union to create a ship with a nuclear power plant. Since the choice of clothing in the Navy warehouses was not very rich, and the officers tried, no matter what, to follow the requirements of the then modest fashion, we found ourselves dressed in the same hats, coats, suits, ties, not to mention sparkling naval boots. When leaving for Obninskoye in November 1954, on the station platform, our group resembled Chinese students studying in Moscow. This was immediately noticed by the employees of the regime of Laboratory “B”, and even at the pass office we were asked to immediately “protect ourselves” and, above all, not to go in a crowd.

First acquaintance with a nuclear-powered ship. In parallel with the formation of the crew, the creation of the boat itself was in full swing. The time was approaching to convene the mock-up commission and defend the technical design. And then the chief designer, Vladimir Nikolaevich Peregudov, received news about the internship of future officers in Obninsk and those already appointed as the first mate and chief mechanic. The chief designer asked to urgently send both officers to him in Leningrad for ten days.

Even if we had not been assigned to the first nuclear-powered ship, the interest in us was explained by the fact that we served on boats of the latest generation. Our 613th project, unlike wartime ships, was equipped with location, hydraulics, and many other technical innovations. It is no coincidence that so many boats were built according to this project and were actively sold abroad - to Poland and Indonesia. And we, in addition to sailing on this boat, also had experience in testing and training crews.

Top secret design bureau was located on one of the most famous squares of Leningrad on the Petrograd side. We were escorted to him by an employee with pre-prepared passes who met us at the appointed place. Opposite the cozy little park between two shops there was an inconspicuous door without identification marks. Having opened it, we found ourselves in front of a turnstile, manned by two guards who looked more like orderlies, with the only difference being that their white coats bulged on their right sides. And having passed the turnstile, we suddenly found ourselves in the realm of the most advanced technologies at that time, where the first-born of the country’s nuclear fleet was born.

The main difficulty was, to create a boat that would be superior to American nuclear-powered ships in all respects. Already in those years there was an attitude that became widely known during the time of Khrushchev: “Catch up and overtake America!” Our boat had to give a hundred points ahead of the American one, which by that time was already sailing - and sailing well. They have one reactor, we will make two with the highest parameters in mind. In the steam generator, the nominal water pressure will be 200 atm, the temperature will be more than 300 °C.

Responsible managers did not particularly think about the fact that in such conditions, with the slightest cavity in the metal, the slightest fistula or corrosion, a microleak should immediately form. (Subsequently, in the instructions, all these parameters were reduced as unjustified.) This means that tons of lead will have to be driven under water for reliable protection against radiation. At the same time, the advantages of such harsh operating conditions seemed very doubtful.

Yes, high reactor operating parameters made it possible to develop a speed under water not about 20 knots, like the Americans, but at least 25, that is, approximately 48 km/h. However, at this speed, the acoustics stopped working, and the boat rushed forward blindly. When on the surface, it is generally not worth accelerating more than 16 knots, since the nuclear-powered ship can dive and bury itself under the water with the hatch open. Since surface ships try not to sail at speeds exceeding 20 knots, there was no point in increasing the reactor power.

In our first conversation Vladimir Nikolaevich, of course, did not express all the doubts. Only later did I have to think about it myself and understand the unnecessaryness of this race for superiority. By the way, when testing our boat, we reached a design speed of 25 knots somewhere while using 70–75% of the reactor power; at full power we would reach speeds of about 30 knots.

Naturally, there was little help from us for the design bureau on all technical issues.. However, Peregudov wanted to create optimal conditions for submariners to maintain equipment and live on board during long voyages. It was assumed that the boat should be able to not float to the surface for months, so living conditions came to the fore. The purpose of our trip was stated as follows:

- Climb all the compartments on the layouts, all residential and domestic premises and think about how to improve them. Look at how compartments in railway cars, cabins on passenger ships, airplane cabins are equipped, down to the smallest detail - where are the flashlights and ashtrays. (Although there was no smoking on our boat.) Take everything that is most convenient, we will transfer it to the nuclear-powered ship.

In a conversation with the chief designer, we first heard concerns and fears, due to the fact that the boat was created in an emergency manner. The Ministry of Medium Engineering was responsible for the order, many of whose employees had not seen the sea at all. The design bureau was formed from employees of various bureaus, among whom there were many inexperienced young people, and the novelty of the tasks being solved was beyond the capabilities of even many veterans of the design bureau. Finally - and this seems incredible! - in the Peregudov Design Bureau there was not a single observation officer who sailed on submarines of post-war projects or participated in their construction.

The layouts were located in five different locations in the city. They were built life-size mainly from plywood and wooden logs. Pipelines and power cable routes were marked with hemp ropes with appropriate markings. At one of the factories, three end compartments were mocked up at once, and both bow compartments were hidden in a basement in the very center of Leningrad, not far from the Astoria Hotel.

Not for every submariner I had to see my boat in its infancy. As a rule, formation commanders, their deputies, and occasionally flagship specialists, that is, people who will have to sail on these boats from time to time, participate in the work of the mock-up commission. And to be able to manage and arrange the premises as conveniently as possible is the dream of every submariner.

In a week Boris and I We climbed all the accessible and hard-to-reach corners of the future nuclear-powered ship, fortunately our slender figures allowed this. Sometimes we sawed off one “device” in the form of a wooden block right on the model with a hacksaw and moved it to a more convenient place. It was clear that the equipment was placed without really delving into its purpose and the requirements associated with its operation. Everything bore the imprint of the hellish haste in which the nuclear-powered ship was created. Nowadays, any ship takes a good ten years to be created - it manages to become outdated before they begin to build it. But Stalin gave two years for everything. And although he was no longer alive then, like Beria, their spirit still hovered over the country, especially at the top. Malyshev was a Stalinist type: they asked him without discounts, and he asked accordingly.

With all the cruelty of this system and the errors it generated, which we encountered so many times in the process of creating a nuclear-powered submarine, it had two undoubted advantages: the manager was indeed endowed with great rights, and there was always a specific person from whom one could ask.

Our proposed changes concerned not only household amenities. For example, in a number of compartments, purely for layout reasons, many specialists found themselves sitting with their backs facing the direction of the boat. Even in the central control room, the control panel faced the stern, therefore, the ship’s commander and navigator also looked there. For them, the left side automatically turned out to be on the right hand, and vice versa. That is, they will have to constantly transform left into right as soon as they sit down at their workplace, and do the opposite operation as soon as they stand up. It is clear that such an arrangement could become a source of constant confusion, and in an emergency, lead to disaster. Of course, first of all, Akulov and I tried to correct such absurdities.

The cabins also underwent significant modifications., as well as an officer's wardroom. It was already clear to us that, in addition to the main crew, the experimental and lead boat would always have nuclear specialists, engineers testing new devices, and, on missions of particular importance, representatives of the command. And there were only eight seats in the wardroom. We refitted one cabin, thus adding four more berths and replacing the otherwise inevitable three-shift meal plan with a two-shift meal plan. But this was not enough. During the tests, we had so many engineers, specialists and command representatives with us that we ate in five shifts.

It also happened that the modifications we required encountered resistance from the compartment designers. For example, it was not easy for us to convince them that three powerful refrigerators in the galley would not replace the refrigerator in the wardroom. It’s quite hot on board, and the appetizer is prepared for everyone at once, which means that by the second shift they’ll have to scoop up the butter with a spoon.

Besides, in order to smooth out the monotony in food, and most importantly in drinks, officers chip in and form a “black cash register”. When sailing, you are allowed one hundred grams of dry wine per person per day. For a strong man - not much, especially since alcohol is considered a good remedy against radiation. Therefore, the wardroom allocates a person in charge who buys “Aligote” in addition to this norm, and on Sunday at least a bottle of vodka for four. Where should I put all this? Of course, in the refrigerator.

Of course, we kept silent about the “black cash register”(although this was not a secret for the people who sailed), and our question was formulated in front of the designers like this: “What if there is a holiday or guests on the boat? Where to put champagne or Stolichnaya? In my opinion, it was the last argument that worked, although the designers did not want to change anything - the compartment was already closed. “Okay,” they told us, “try to find a refrigerator that will fit through the removable sheet to load the battery.”

After work, Akulov and I went to an electrical store, fortunately there was no shortage of refrigerators back then, we tried everything on and found that the Saratov would fit in if the door was removed from it. Those in charge of the compartment had no choice but to agree, and Saratov was solemnly installed in the mock-up wardroom without dismantling the bulkhead.

Looking ahead, I’ll say, that at the mock-up commission we had to endure another battle for the refrigerator. The old submariners who were part of it, who sailed during the war on “little ones”, deprived of the most basic amenities, did not want to come to terms with the idea that for some, a voyage of many months could be combined with a minimum of comfort. For them, our requests to provide an electric meat grinder or a press for flattening cans were unnecessary “lordship” that only dampened the sailors. Victory remained ours, but when the chairman of the commission, who read out the act, reached the part where it was said about the refrigerator, he looked up from the text and added on his own, to the grins and laughter of those present: “So that Stolichnaya is always cold.”

Why, you ask, talk about such a little thing? The fact is that several years later, in the most difficult campaigns, we many times had to note with joy how necessary our perseverance was, and regret the things that we were not able to defend. Moreover, we fought not only for our boat, but for dozens of others that should be built in this series. But the main result of our work turned out to be different. During this trip, the entire concept of the first nuclear-powered submarine was called into question, which, in our opinion, was a pure gamble.

Kamikaze boat. The plan for the combat use of the boat, laid down by the designers, boiled down to the following. The submarine is secretly removed from its home base by tugboats (hence, it does not need an anchor). She is exported to the dive point, from where she continues to swim underwater on her own.

At that time, rockets as carriers of atomic weapons did not yet exist, and only traditional means of delivery were thought of: aerial bombs and torpedoes. So, it was planned to arm our boat with a huge torpedo 28 m long and one and a half meters in diameter. On the model, which we first saw in the basement of one of the residential buildings near Nevsky Prospekt, this torpedo occupied the entire first and second compartments and rested against the bulkhead of the third. Another compartment was allocated for the equipment that controls its launch and movement. There were no electronic devices then, and it all consisted of motors, rods, wires - the design was cumbersome and, by our modern standards, extremely antediluvian.

So, a boat equipped with a giant torpedo with a hydrogen head, had to secretly go out to the initial area and receive an order to fire, entering into the torpedo control devices a program for moving along the approach fairways and the moment of detonation. Large enemy naval bases were seen as the target - this was the height of the Cold War.

Just in case, two more torpedoes with smaller nuclear charges remained on board the boat in two torpedo tubes. But no spare torpedoes on the racks, no torpedoes for self-defense, no countermeasures! Our boat was clearly not intended to be an object of persecution and destruction, as if it were floating alone in the vast oceans of the World.

Having completed the task, the boat had to go to the area where a meeting with the escort was scheduled, from where it was supposed to be towed with honor to its home pier. There were no plans for the nuclear-powered vessel to surface during its entire autonomous voyage (there was even a zinc coffin on board), nor for anchorage. But the most important thing was not even the lack of an anchor and means of protecting the boat itself. Akulov and I, as submariners, immediately became aware of what would happen to the boat when a torpedo of this size was fired. Only the mass of water filling the annular gap in the apparatus (the diameter of which is 1.7 m) will amount to several tons.

At the moment of launch, this entire mass of water had to be shot out along with the torpedo, after which an even larger mass, taking into account the vacated space of the torpedo, had to flow back into the boat’s hull. In other words, when fired, an emergency trim will inevitably be created. First the boat will stand on its butt. To level it, submariners will have to blow out the bow tanks of the main ballast. An air bubble will be released to the surface, allowing you to immediately detect the boat. And with the slightest mistake or hesitation by the crew, it could surface off the enemy’s coast, which meant its inevitable destruction.

But, as already said, the submarine project was financed and created by the Ministry of Medium Engineering, and neither the Main Headquarters of the Navy nor research institutes made calculations for the use of its weapons. Although meetings of the mock-up commission had to take place before the technical design was approved, the torpedo compartments were already built in metal. And the giant torpedo itself was tested on one of the most beautiful lakes of our vast country

after with the boat concept The first operating specialists got acquainted and were given tasks to study how realistic the proposed project was. The calculations of the shipbuilding section fully confirmed our and Akulov’s fears regarding the behavior of the boat after the shot. Moreover, operators of the General Staff of the Navy established how many bases and ports there were not only in the United States, but throughout the world, which, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, could be destroyed with sufficient accuracy by a giant torpedo.

It turned out that there are two such bases! Moreover, they had no strategic significance in the future conflict. Thus, it was necessary to immediately develop another version of the boat’s armament. The project for using a giant torpedo was buried, the life-size equipment made was thrown away, and the reconstruction of the bow of the boat, already made in metal, took a whole year. In the final version, the boat was equipped with normal-sized torpedoes with both nuclear and conventional warheads.

Regarding the anchor, then its necessity was recognized, and it was installed on all subsequent boats. However, it technically turned out to be so difficult to equip an already developed nuclear-powered submarine with it that our boat received it only after the first repair. So we sailed for the first time without an anchor. When we had to surface, the boat turned toward the wave with its lag, and the entire time we were on the surface, we were rocking sideways. When anchored, the boat would turn its bow against the wind, and we would not rock.

It was worse when near the shore the boat began to be carried by the wind onto the rocks - the anchor in this case is simply irreplaceable. Finally, at the base, when we couldn’t get to the pier, we had to moor behind a barrel - a huge floating cylinder with a butt, to which the mooring rope is hooked. One of the sailors had to jump on it, and in winter it freezes over. The poor fellow had to cling to it almost with his teeth until the cable was secured.

Leaving Leningrad, Akulov and I assigned work to everyone, including ourselves. It became clear to us that the combat organization of the service and the staff of the submarine should be based on the basic mode of operation of the crew: underwater position and long-term maintenance of a three-shift watch. Consequently, we had to immediately redo the table of command posts and combat posts, as well as the staffing table.

Layout commission, which simultaneously considered the technical project, began work after the October holidays, on November 17, 1954. Representatives of all interested organizations of the Navy and industry gathered in Leningrad. The commission was headed by Rear Admiral A. Orel, Deputy Head of the Submarine Directorate. The heads of the sections were experienced employees of the departments and institutes of the Navy - V. Teplov, I. Dorofeev, A. Zharov.

Our command section was headed by Captain 1st Rank N. Belorukov, who himself commanded a submarine during the war. And yet there were some things he resolutely refused to understand. - Here's another thing, give them potato peelers, refrigerators, smoking rooms! How did we sail during the war without all this and not die? At the section he was often supported by front-line soldiers like him. Heated skirmishes arose, from which we did not always emerge victorious. Sometimes, seeing how several elders were piling on me at once, Akulov disappeared, and I knew: he went to Orel for support.

The commission worked for two weeks. In addition to our comments, which she basically confirmed, more than a thousand proposals were made to improve the design of the boat. For example, despite the fairly good technical parameters of the turbines, they did not meet the requirements for stealth navigation. The misconception about the purpose of the boat has finally been dispelled: to shoot a giant torpedo, swim only under water and enter the base only in tow.

Layout commission gave a conclusion on the need to make changes to the preliminary design. In its existing form, the technical project could not be accepted - the Navy, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and other organizations expressed a special opinion on it. Their objections were reported at the very top, in any case not below the level of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. A. Malyshev.

Not only the boat was created by organizations that were not previously connected by industrial relations or had never been involved in the implementation of this type of project. For a long time they did not know who to subordinate her future crew to.

As already stated, at first we belonged to the Navy Personnel Directorate. When we returned from the mock-up commission to Moscow, we learned that our military units had been transferred to the subordination of the Shipbuilding Department. Now we were commanded by engineer-rear admiral M.A. Rudnitsky. Time will pass until we are reassigned to our intended purpose - the Submarine Division in Leningrad. But the Submarine Directorate, then commanded by Rear Admiral Boltunov, had already become interested in us. After working in the layout commission, A. Orel reported to him about us.

Attempt at contract recruitment. V. Zertsalov (senior mate of the second crew) and I were called to the Main Headquarters of the Navy. We arrived from Obninsk in civilian clothes, and at the checkpoint the commandant detained us as suspicious. I had to make a note on my identity card: “Wearing civilian clothes while on duty is permitted.” (For many years, this note helped our officers in the most incredible circumstances. In those years, it was enough, for example, with a mysterious look to show this mark to the administrator of a hotel in which there were no free rooms, so that you were immediately accommodated.)

Boltunov listened carefully to all our considerations regarding personnel training. Our biggest doubts were the possibility of operating nuclear submarines by conscript personnel. A sailor, an eighteen-year-old boy who has barely graduated from school, needs at least two to three years to master a truly new specialty. At that time, they served in the navy for four years, which means that in a year this sailor will leave and give way to a newcomer.

We thought, that it was necessary to recruit over-conscripts to fill the jobs or sign contracts with the most promising sailors in their first or second year of military service. These people would spend, if not their entire lives, then at least many years with their new profession. Then professional competence, the desire to improve skills, and actions in emergency situations would become automatic.

Boltunov instructed me and Zertsalov As soon as possible, develop a special regulation on the contractual hiring of conscript personnel for nuclear submarines. We dealt with it quickly, but the regulation was introduced... several years later and lasted about ten years. The highest military, including naval, apparatus resisted with all its might the introduction of the contract system at the most critical military installations. The result of this persistence was, in particular, a high accident rate on nuclear submarines. Only in May 1991 was it allowed, as an experiment, to recruit sailors into the Navy under a contract for a period of 2.5 years who had served for at least six months.

Our preparation schedule moved towards advance: instead of two months, a little more than a month was enough for the theory. Already during the January holidays of 1955, we were transferred to an internship directly at the reactor, assigning three to four people to each of the four shifts of nuclear power plant personnel.

The silent “predators” of the deep sea have always terrified the enemy, both in war and in peacetime. There are countless myths associated with submarines, which, however, is not surprising considering that they are created in conditions of special secrecy. But today we know enough about the general...

Operating principle of the submarine

The submarine's submersion and ascent system includes ballast and auxiliary tanks, as well as connecting pipelines and fittings. The main element here is the main ballast tanks, by filling them with water the main buoyancy reserve of the submarine is extinguished. All tanks are included in the bow, stern and middle groups. They can be filled and purged one at a time or simultaneously.

The submarine has trim tanks necessary to compensate for the longitudinal displacement of cargo. The ballast between trim tanks is blown using compressed air or pumped using special pumps. Trimming is the name of the technique, the purpose of which is to “balance” the submerged submarine.

Nuclear submarines are divided into generations. The first (50th) is characterized by relatively high noise and imperfect hydroacoustic systems. The second generation was built in the 60s and 70s: the hull shape was optimized to increase speed. The boats of the third are larger, and they also have electronic warfare equipment. The fourth generation nuclear submarines are characterized by an unprecedented low noise level and advanced electronics. The appearance of the fifth generation boats is being worked out these days.

An important component of any submarine is the air system. Diving, surfacing, removing waste - all this is done using compressed air. The latter is stored under high pressure on board the submarine: this way it takes up less space and allows you to accumulate more energy. High-pressure air is in special cylinders: as a rule, its quantity is monitored by a senior mechanic. Compressed air reserves are replenished upon ascent. This is a long and labor-intensive procedure that requires special attention. To ensure that the crew of the boat has something to breathe, air regeneration units are installed on board the submarine, allowing them to obtain oxygen from sea water.

Premier League: what are they?

A nuclear boat has a nuclear power plant (which is where the name actually comes from). Nowadays, many countries also operate diesel-electric submarines (submarines). The level of autonomy of nuclear submarines is much higher, and they can perform a wider range of tasks. The Americans and British have stopped using non-nuclear submarines altogether, while the Russian submarine fleet has a mixed composition. In general, only five countries have nuclear submarines. In addition to the USA and the Russian Federation, the “club of the elite” includes France, England and China. Other maritime powers use diesel-electric submarines.

The future of the Russian submarine fleet is connected with two new nuclear submarines. We are talking about multi-purpose boats of Project 885 “Yasen” and strategic missile submarines 955 “Borey”. Eight units of Project 885 boats will be built, and the number of Boreys will reach seven. The Russian submarine fleet will not be comparable to the American one (the United States will have dozens of new submarines), but it will occupy second place in the world rankings.

Russian and American boats differ in their architecture. The United States makes its nuclear submarines single-hull (the hull both resists pressure and has a streamlined shape), while Russia makes its nuclear submarines double-hulled: in this case, there is an internal, rough, durable hull and an external, streamlined, lightweight one. On Project 949A Antey nuclear submarines, which included the infamous Kursk, the distance between the hulls is 3.5 m. It is believed that double-hull boats are more durable, while single-hull boats, all other things being equal, have less weight. In single-hull boats, the main ballast tanks, which ensure ascent and submersion, are located inside a durable hull, while in double-hull boats, they are inside a lightweight outer hull. Every domestic submarine must survive if any compartment is completely flooded with water - this is one of the main requirements for submarines.

In general, there is a tendency to switch to single-hull nuclear submarines, since the latest steel from which the hulls of American boats are made allows them to withstand enormous loads at depth and provides the submarine with a high level of survivability. We are talking, in particular, about high-strength steel grade HY-80/100 with a yield strength of 56-84 kgf/mm. Obviously, even more advanced materials will be used in the future.

There are also boats with a mixed hull (when a light hull only partially covers the main one) and multi-hulls (several strong hulls inside a light one). The latter includes the domestic missile submarine cruiser Project 941, the largest nuclear submarine in the world. Inside its lightweight body are five durable housings, two of which are the main ones. Titanium alloys were used to make durable cases, and steel alloys were used for lightweight ones. It is covered with a non-resonant anti-location soundproofing rubber coating, weighing 800 tons. This coating alone weighs more than the American nuclear submarine NR-1. Project 941 is truly a gigantic submarine. Its length is 172 and its width is 23 m. There are 160 people on board.

You can see how different nuclear submarines are and how different their “contents” are. Now let’s take a closer look at several domestic submarines: boats of project 971, 949A and 955. All of these are powerful and modern submarines serving in the Russian Navy. The boats belong to three different types of nuclear submarines, which we discussed above:

Nuclear submarines are divided according to their purpose:

· SSBN (Strategic Missile Submarine Cruiser). As part of the nuclear triad, these submarines carry ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. The main targets of such ships are military bases and enemy cities. The SSBN includes the new Russian nuclear submarine 955 Borei. In America, this type of submarine is called SSBN (Ship Submarine Ballistic Nuclear): this includes the most powerful of these submarines - the Ohio-class boat. To accommodate the entire lethal arsenal on board, SSBNs are designed taking into account the requirements of a large internal volume. Their length often exceeds 170 m - this is noticeably longer than the length of multi-purpose submarines.

PLAT (nuclear torpedo submarine). Such boats are also called multi-purpose. Their purpose: the destruction of ships, other submarines, tactical targets on the ground and the collection of intelligence data. They are smaller than SSBNs and have better speed and mobility. PLATs can use torpedoes or high-precision cruise missiles. Such nuclear submarines include the American Los Angeles or the Soviet/Russian MPLATRK Project 971 Shchuka-B.

The American Seawolf is considered the most advanced multi-purpose nuclear submarine. Its main feature is the highest level of stealth and deadly weapons on board. One such submarine carries up to 50 Harpoon or Tomahawk missiles. There are also torpedoes. Due to the high cost, the US Navy received only three of these submarines.

SSGN (nuclear submarine with cruise missiles). This is the smallest group of modern nuclear submarines. This includes the Russian 949A Antey and some American Ohio missiles converted into cruise missile carriers. The SSGN concept has something in common with multi-purpose nuclear submarines. Submarines of the SSGN type, however, are larger - they are large floating underwater platforms with high-precision weapons. In the Soviet/Russian navy, these boats are also called “aircraft carrier killers.”

Inside a submarine

It is difficult to examine in detail the design of all main types of nuclear submarines, but it is quite possible to analyze the design of one of these boats. It will be the Project 949A submarine “Antey”, a landmark (in every sense) for the Russian fleet. To increase survivability, the creators duplicated many important components of this nuclear submarine. These boats received a pair of reactors, turbines and propellers. The failure of one of them, according to the plan, should not be fatal for the boat. The submarine's compartments are separated by intercompartment bulkheads: they are designed for a pressure of 10 atmospheres and are connected by hatches that can be sealed if necessary. Not all domestic nuclear submarines have so many compartments. The Project 971 multi-purpose nuclear submarine, for example, is divided into six compartments, and the new Project 955 SSBN is divided into eight.

The infamous Kursk belongs to the Project 949A boats. This submarine sank in the Barents Sea on August 12, 2000. All 118 crew members on board became victims of the disaster. Many versions of what happened have been put forward: the most likely of all is the explosion of a 650 mm torpedo stored in the first compartment. According to the official version, the tragedy occurred due to a leak of a torpedo fuel component, namely hydrogen peroxide.

The Project 949A nuclear submarine has a very advanced (by the standards of the 80s) apparatus, including the MGK-540 Skat-3 hydroacoustic system and many other systems. The boat is also equipped with an automated Symphony-U navigation system that has increased accuracy, increased range and a large volume of processed information. Most of the information about all these complexes is kept secret.

Compartments of the Project 949A Antey nuclear submarine:

First compartment:
It is also called bow or torpedo. This is where the torpedo tubes are located. The boat has two 650 mm and four 533 mm torpedo tubes, and in total there are 28 torpedoes on board the submarine. The first compartment consists of three decks. The combat stock is stored on racks designed for this purpose, and torpedoes are fed into the apparatus using a special mechanism. There are also batteries located here, which are separated from the torpedoes by special flooring for safety reasons. The first compartment usually houses five crew members.

Second compartment:
This compartment on submarines of projects 949A and 955 (and not only on them) plays the role of the “brain of the boat”. This is where the central control panel is located, and this is where the submarine is controlled. There are consoles for hydroacoustic systems, microclimate regulators and navigation satellite equipment. There are 30 crew members serving in the compartment. From it you can get into the control room of the nuclear submarine, designed for monitoring the surface of the sea. There are also retractable devices: periscopes, antennas and radars.

Third compartment:
The third is the radio-electronic compartment. Here, in particular, there are multi-profile communication antennas and many other systems. The equipment of this compartment allows receiving target indications, including from space. After processing, the received information is entered into the ship's combat information and control system. Let us add that the submarine rarely makes contact, so as not to be unmasked.

Fourth compartment:
This compartment is residential. Here the crew not only sleeps, but also spends their free time. There is a sauna, gym, showers and a common area for communal relaxation. In the compartment there is a room that allows you to relieve emotional stress - for this, for example, there is an aquarium with fish. In addition, in the fourth compartment there is a galley, or, in simple terms, a nuclear submarine kitchen.

Fifth compartment:
There is a diesel generator that generates energy here. Here you can also see an electrolysis installation for air regeneration, high-pressure compressors, a shore power supply panel, diesel fuel and oil reserves.

5 bis:
This room is needed for decontamination of crew members who worked in the reactor compartment. We are talking about removing radioactive substances from surfaces and reducing radioactive contamination. Due to the fact that there are two fifths of the compartment, confusion often occurs: some sources claim that the nuclear submarine has ten compartments, others say nine. Even though the last compartment is the ninth, there are ten of them in total on the nuclear submarine (including 5-bis).

Sixth compartment:
This compartment, one might say, is located in the very center of the nuclear submarine. It is of particular importance, because it is here that two OK-650V nuclear reactors with a capacity of 190 MW are located. The reactor belongs to the OK-650 series - a series of water-water nuclear reactors using thermal neutrons. The role of nuclear fuel is played by uranium dioxide, highly enriched in the 235th isotope. The compartment has a volume of 641 m³. Above the reactor there are two corridors that allow access to other parts of the nuclear submarine.

Seventh compartment:
It is also called turbine. The volume of this compartment is 1116 m³. This room is intended for the main distribution board; power plants; emergency control panel for the main power plant; as well as a number of other devices that ensure the movement of the submarine.

Eighth compartment:
This compartment is very similar to the seventh, and is also called the turbine compartment. The volume is 1072 m³. The power plant can be seen here; turbines that drive nuclear submarine propellers; a turbogenerator that provides the boat with electricity, and water desalination plants.

Ninth compartment:
This is an extremely small shelter compartment, with a volume of 542 m³, with an escape hatch. This compartment, in theory, will allow crew members to survive in the event of a disaster. There are six inflatable rafts (each designed for 20 people), 120 gas masks and rescue kits for individual ascent. In addition, the compartment contains: steering system hydraulics; high pressure air compressor; electric motor control station; lathe; combat post for reserve rudder control; shower and food supply for six days.

Armament

Let us separately consider the armament of the Project 949A nuclear submarine. In addition to torpedoes (which we have already discussed), the boat carries 24 P-700 Granit anti-ship cruise missiles. These are long-range missiles that can fly along a combined trajectory of up to 625 km. To aim at a target, the P-700 has an active radar guidance head.

The missiles are located in special containers between the light and durable hulls of nuclear submarines. Their arrangement roughly corresponds to the central compartments of the boat: containers with missiles go on both sides of the submarine, 12 on each side. All of them are turned forward from the vertical at an angle of 40-45°. Each of these containers has a special lid that slides out during a rocket launch.

P-700 Granit cruise missiles are the basis of the arsenal of the Project 949A boat. Meanwhile, there is no real experience in using these missiles in combat, so it is difficult to judge the combat effectiveness of the complex. Tests have shown that due to the speed of the rocket (1.5-2.5 M), it is very difficult to intercept it. However, not everything is so simple. Over land, the missile is not capable of flying at low altitude, and therefore represents an easy target for enemy air defense systems. At sea, the efficiency indicators are higher, but it is worth saying that the American aircraft carrier force (namely, the missile was created to combat them) has excellent air defense cover.

This type of weapon arrangement is not typical for nuclear submarines. On the American boat Ohio, for example, ballistic or cruise missiles are located in silos running in two longitudinal rows behind a fence of retractable devices. But the multi-purpose Seawolf launches cruise missiles from torpedo tubes. In the same way, cruise missiles are launched from the domestic Project 971 Shchuka-B MPLATRK. Of course, all these submarines also carry various torpedoes. The latter are used to destroy submarines and surface ships.